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Summary 
Many scholars perceive state sovereignty as absolute, inviolable, indivisible, final, 
binding and stagnant. That perception emanates from inter alia political, social, 
cultural and environmental contexts of the modern era. Most literature converge that 
the doctrine of sovereignty first received official codification at the Peace Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648. Contemporary international norms, particularly the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, are arguably an environment and culture of 
current global politics. With human rights and democracy having taken centre-stage 
in contemporary political discourses, sovereignty is affected and influenced by such 
developments in international politics. Hence the argument that globalisation, among 
others, has eroded, weakened and rendered the doctrine of sovereignty obsolete. 
This study, using Zimbabwe‟s Operation Murambatsvina as a case study, 
demonstrates that sovereignty is neither unitary in practice, nor sacrosanct; it is 
dynamic and evolves, thus, in need of constant reconfiguration. To this end, the 
study uses the qualitative research methodology. 
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Preamble 
„It would be impossible to have a society of sovereign states … unless each state, 
while claiming sovereignty for itself, recognised that every other state has the right to 
claim and enjoy its own sovereignty as well‟ (Wight 1977:135). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Introduction 
 
Globalisation has among other impacts, widened, deepened and sped-up worldwide 
interconnectedness (Baylis 2011:16), thereby condensing the world into what the 
popular cliché refers to as the „global village‟. Despite the processes and merits of 
globalisation, states continue to jealously guard against any threats to their 
sovereignty, whether perceived or real. Generally defined state sovereignty implies 
power to control what happens in a state‟s jurisdiction. Seemingly „absolute‟ power 
(as once implied by sovereignty at the inception of the 1648 Peace Treaty of 
Westphalia) has been restricted and curtailed in the present and increasingly 
globalising world. It can be argued that communication technology has rendered 
governments powerless as they cannot effectively control information relayed and 
communicated to and from their jurisdictions, yet control over some jurisdiction is a 
necessary component of state sovereignty. Recent developments in the international 
political discourse, for example, the concept of Responsibility to Protect 
[henceforward R2P] (United Nations Summit 2005), have been interpreted as 
another indicator that state sovereignty is withering. The international community of 
states has a platform and can now legally intervene in the domestic affairs of 
another, under certain conditions, if approved by the United Nations Security Council 
(henceforward UNSC). The concept of R2P has had some impact on the traditional 
understanding of nation-states‟ sovereignty. The intersection between R2P and the 
doctrine of state sovereignty is under-investigated1. In the face of globalisation, and 
the processes and norms associated with it, the evaluation of the doctrine of state 
sovereignty becomes compelling. 
 
The modern understanding of sovereignty was permeated by the ideology of 
absolutism. Born out of modernism, sovereignty was portrayed as an absolute 
principle, indivisible, sacrosanct, stagnant, final and infinitely binding, hence 
perceived as a doctrine (Krasner and Froats 1996:4; Krasner 2001:99; Osiander 
2001:272). Sovereignty practised today has to adapt to contemporary ideologies 
                                                          
1
 See for example similar arguments advanced by Bajoria and McMahon (2013), King (2013), Murray (2014) 
and Williams (2010). 
2 
 
such as pluralism and democracy if it is to remain relevant. Contemporary society is 
permeated by pluralism. Thus sovereignty which is absolute and final is affected by 
the ideologies and values espoused by pluralism in contemporary society. Pluralism 
recognises and accepts various ideologies, preferences, perceptions and options to 
simultaneously, if not equally, be at play (Bahramiang and Ingram 2000; Connolly 
2005:131; Eisenberg 1995:2). Therefore in the frameworks of pluralism, sovereignty 
is just one among many concepts, principles, ideologies and, or even, opinions and 
preferences. This bears directly on the indivisibility, sacrosanctity and finality of the 
modern understanding of sovereignty. States and heads of governments, astute as 
they are, are aware of the precarious position advanced by pluralism which the 
doctrine of sovereignty is subjected to and finds itself embedded in.  
 
Some governments, such as Zimbabwe, Afghanistan and Iraq among others 
(Ditshwanelo 2006), stand accused of „abusing‟ the privilege and protection that 
comes with sovereignty and committed crimes against humanity and gross human 
rights abuses (Amnesty International 2005; Human Rights Watch 2005, 2013; United 
Nations 2005). Seemingly Zimbabwe (2005) and Iraq (2001) adopted a different 
interpretation of sovereignty to that which their critics embrace. Arguably shrewd and 
cunning statecraft is needed to interpret sovereignty which is loaded with modern 
absolutist undertones, and played out in contemporary pluralistic society. In the 
exploration and assessment of the doctrine of sovereignty, this study will investigate 
Zimbabwe‟s May 2005 Operation Murambatsvina2 which was justified3 on the 
premises that it was within the sovereign rights of the state of Zimbabwe4 to 
                                                          
2
 Murambatsvina translates to ‘drive out the filth’ in the Shona language of Zimbabwe; it is officially translated 
as ‘Operation Clean-Up’ (Vambe 2008:7). Operation Murambatsvina is also translated as ‘Operation Restore 
Order’ (Tibaijuka 2005:62). These phrases all referring to Operation Murambatsvina will be used 
interchangeably in this research. 
3
 It is imperative to note, from the onset, that this research assumes that the justification of Operation 
Murambatsvina provided by the GoZ is logical and therefore correct. As such, it seeks to interrogate the 
interpretation of state sovereignty according to the GoZ. 
4
This is evidenced by the remarks made by President Robert Mugabe in response to critiques of his 
Government-led Operation Murambatsvina at the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the 
18
th
 of September 2005 barely three months after the infamous Operation Murambatsvina. The basic 
justification was that it was within the sovereign rights of the state of Zimbabwe to carry out an operation such 
as the ‘Murambatsvina programme’ to use the words of President Mugabe in that address. For the full text of 
Mugabe’s UNGA 2005 speech refer to: 
(http://www.zanupf.org.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=74).   
3 
 
determine its trajectory on urban dwelling5 (Chimedza 2008:100; Mlambo 2008:19; 
Mhiripiri 2008:152,156), enforcing the rule of law (Mhiripiri 2008:153) and regulation 
of processes of commerce (Vambe 2008:76). Yet the execution of Operation 
Murambatsvina was condemned and described as gross human rights abuses, even 
by the United Nations (Tibaijuka 2005).  
 
On the one hand, Zimbabwe‟s self-justification was based on the exclusivity of 
sovereignty and on the other hand, the international community of states have the 
right to intervene in a state‟s domestic jurisdiction if that state is unable or unwilling 
to protect its citizenry (International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty 2001:xi) as was seemingly the case with Zimbabwe‟s Operation 
Murambatsvina. The tool for such an intervention is R2P and the multilateralism of 
the UN is the platform. The R2P doctrine evolved from the doctrine of sovereignty 
and is designed precisely to mitigate and curb governments‟ abuse of, or 
unwillingness to protect their citizens.  
 
This study seeks to investigate and determine if the doctrine of sovereignty indeed 
permitted, protected and justified the Government of Zimbabwe‟s (henceforward 
GoZ) Operation Murambatsvina. Zimbabwe is a signatory country to the United 
Nations Charter. As a member-state of the United Nations (henceforward UN), 
Zimbabwe subjects herself to the rules, norms, and regulations that guide and 
govern interstate relations as promulgated and embodied by the UN. This study will 
investigate Zimbabwe‟s argument that Operation Murambatsvina was justified by the 
doctrine of state sovereignty, against the UN definition of state sovereignty as 
enshrined in the UN Charter, specifically Articles 2(1)6, 2(7)7 and 788. This will 
                                                          
5
 This position was further mirrored in President Mugabe’s 26
th
 Independence Celebrations Address on the 18
th
 
of April 2006 arguing that Operation Murambatsvina was a success as it was meant to be succeeded by 
Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle meant to resettle displaced people as a result of the former operation. 
Mugabe argued that the operations that his government carried out were a consolidation and actualisation of 
the sovereign people of Zimbabwe’s independence. For the full text of that speech please refer to: 
(http://www.zanupf.org.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=71).   
6
 Article 2(1) of the UN Charter reads: ‘The Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of 
all its Members’ (http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml).  
7
 Article 2(7) of the UN Charter reads: ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall 
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall 
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll’ (ibid).  
4 
 
enable the study to make a critical investigation of Zimbabwe‟s Operation 
Murambatsvina. Despite the biased composition of the UNSC (Chandler 2008:27; 
Chomsky 2008:12,16; Mhiripiri 2008:153), the UN is generally accepted as an arbiter 
to international grievances of its member-states. This study will also investigate 
whether or not Operation Murambatsvina warranted the application of R2P. 
Sovereignty is premised on exclusivity while the R2P doctrine is premised on 
inclusivity. Are these two doctrines compatible, complimentary, reconcilable or 
otherwise? If Operation Murambatsvina warranted international intervention, was it 
rendered? If so how, and if not, why not? 
 
1.2 Background to the Research 
 
On the 19th of May 2005 with little, if not without warning at all, the GoZ embarked on 
an Operation it called „Operation Murambatsvina‟ (Chari 2008:105; Mhiripiri 
2008:149; Nyamanhindi 2008:118). The GoZ demolished and destroyed what it 
termed „illegal structures‟ which included houses in residential areas and market 
stalls that were used for informal trade and commerce. Admittedly some of those 
structures were in undesignated areas and some were of poor structural quality and 
inhabitable standards. Operation Murambatsvina was also presented as a clean-up 
operation to clamp down on crime and to get rid of „dirt‟ (Chari 2008:112; Musiyiwa 
2008:65). The irony of the definition of „dirt‟ in the view of the GoZ is that it refers to 
human beings (Vambe 2008:135). Vambe further argues that the post-colonial state 
of Zimbabwe has a tendency to assign an identity of „human dirt‟ to those it 
considers dissident (ibid). As such, Operation Murambatsvina exposed the idea that 
the „dirt‟ it sought to clean-up was human beings that were considered to be „illegally‟ 
settled in urban areas. In Chapter Four this work will demonstrate that part of the 
„human dirt‟ that „illegally‟ inhabited urban areas was a result of state-led violence 
that was termed Gukurahundi9. This operation affected specifically the Matabeleland 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
8
 Article 78 of the UN Charter reads: ‘The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become 
Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of 
sovereign equality’ (http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml). 
9
 Gukurahundi is translated to mean ‘the wind that blows away the chaff before the rains’ (Hill 2003:77).  In 
essence it was a violent series of terror attacks perpetrated by ‘dissidents’ on civilians and later by the state on 
both the dissidents and civilians as claimed by the GoZ, but mainly on civilians as attested by the Catholic 
Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP 2007) report. 
5 
 
and Midlands areas of Zimbabwe in the period 1982-1984 (Benyera 2013:106).  
Therefore, it can be argued that Gukurahundi produced some of this „human dirt‟ that 
needed cleaning up in Operation Murambatsvina.   
 
Operation Murambatsvina was officially ended on the 25th of June 2005 (Chari 
2008:110) exactly 37 days after its official commencement, yet its negative effects 
were arguably still felt and experienced in December 2013. Operation 
Murambatsvina was a legitimate government‟s operation to rid urban areas of clutter 
and „dirt‟. Sekesai Makwavarara, a spokesperson for the government-appointed 
Commission that managed the Harare City Council at the time of Operation 
Murambatsvina, stated this position (Nyamanhindi 2008:119 citing The Herald, 19 
May 2005:1). The GoZ further claimed that it was within its sovereign rights to 
determine its trajectory concerning urban dwelling structures and commerce. Power 
to control what happens in a state‟s jurisdiction is a corollary of state sovereignty.  
 
The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), the Labour and 
Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe (LEDRIZ), and the Country 
of Origin Information Service [COIS] in its report (2006:68), the Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre [IDMC] in its report (2008:22), inter alia, are some 
of the organisations that publicly and vehemently spoke out against Operation 
Murambatsvina, citing the massive human rights abuses. In other words, contrary to 
the GoZ‟s denial of committing human rights abuses in its Operation Murambatsvina 
the impact and consequences of that operation indicate gross human rights abuses. 
This fact was claimed and proved by various other international, regional and local 
civil-society organisations.  
 
The GoZ sturdily claimed that Operation Murambatsvina was justifiable according to 
the doctrine of state sovereignty and hence the international community had no 
legitimate right to intervene in such domestic affairs of Zimbabwe as Operation 
Murambatsvina. This necessitates and compels an investigation of the very doctrine 
of sovereignty that the Zimbabwean government claimed to justify its actions given 
the contestations that arose from civil society organisations and the international 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
6 
 
community at large. The GoZ, in its defence, highlighted the exclusive notion of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states as espoused by Article 2(7) of 
the UN Charter. Civil society organisations who made their cases based on human 
rights abuses and the international community of states as represented by the UN 
argued from a humanitarian (Mhiripiri 2008:149) and people-centred approach as 
espoused by the R2P doctrine. What doctrine should take precedence, and whose 
understanding should matter in a case such as Operation Murambatsvina? Hence 
the main research question reads: Was Operation Murambatsvina justifiable under 
the doctrine of state sovereignty as was insinuated and claimed by the GoZ?  
 
1.3 Statement of the Problem 
 
The problem relates to the openness of the concept of state sovereignty to abuse by 
governments. This instrumentalisation of international principles such as state 
sovereignty has resulted in its abuses and this leaves even the development of other 
concepts such as the R2P, equally open to instrumentalisation. The abuse of state 
sovereignty can be traced to the Berlin West Africa Conference 1884-1885 (IIife 
1979; Pakenham 1992; Chamberlain 2010). The conference partitioned Africa and 
divided it among sovereign European states. The conference marked the beginning 
of conquering and colonising sovereign African and Asian countries. This event also 
signalled the start of varying interpretations of state sovereignty. This gave credence 
to the perception that state sovereignty is an instrument that can be used for 
subjugation and repression of one government by another or a group of people on 
another. It can be suggested that it also created the impression that sovereign states 
can do as they please and not be held accountable for their actions by anyone.  
 
The Peace Treaty of Westphalia (1648) achieved through the adoption of the 
doctrine of sovereignty (Makinda 2001:406; Krasner 2006:86), initiated the end of 
European wars of conquest. Thus the Peace Treaty of Westphalia initiated the end 
of territorial conquests and interstate wars of that time. However, a number of 
governments, particularly the GoZ in its May 2005 Operation Murambatsvina 
(Ditshwanelo 2006; Tibaijuka 2005), allegedly abused the privilege and protection 
that comes with state sovereignty and committed human rights abuses and crimes 
7 
 
against humanity (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2005; National Council of 
Resistance of Iran Foreign Affairs Committee 2001; United States Institute for Peace 
2008). The GoZ believed that it was within its sovereign rights to carry out Operation 
Murambatsvina. Yet the execution of the operation was marred by violence 
perpetrated by the state on its citizenry, including deaths10 of innocent civilians. This 
calls for an evaluation of the doctrine of state sovereignty and its credibility, or lack 
thereof, in contemporary international politics. The doctrine of sovereignty remains 
central and crucial to attaining and maintaining world order, peace and development 
(Kegley 2009:27).  
 
The GoZ used the doctrine of state sovereignty as the justification on which it carried 
out Operation Murambatsvina in May 2005 after domestic and international 
condemnation of the exercise. In the event that a government commits human rights 
abuses in the processes of implementing its policies, as was seemingly the case with 
Operation Murambatsvina, it can be argued that seemingly there is no recourse for 
the abused citizens. This suggests that the doctrine of state sovereignty is open to 
various interpretations rendering the concept open to abuse by states. This study 
seeks to interrogate the basis of the justification that the GoZ advanced.  
 
The law of nations as espoused by the UN seem to offer a standard definition of 
state sovereignty as enshrined in its Charter Article 2(7), however the standard 
definition seemingly is not standardly interpreted and applied. Political realism as the 
dominant international relations theory endorses the doctrine of state sovereignty as 
it is premised on it. Political realism seemingly justifies the varied interpretation of 
state sovereignty and hence maintains the status quo that no state should interfere 
in the domestic affairs of another. It perpetuates and maintains the status quo in the 
domain of international politics.  
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 Of the deaths reported as a result of OM, three involved children, one child was hit by a truck, and the other 
was hit by falling debris. A woman also died as a result of being hit by falling debris (Tibaijuka 2005:62). 
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1.4 Objectives of the Study 
 
The study aims to: 
 Discuss the evolution, contestations and fluidity of the doctrine of state 
sovereignty 
 Discuss the [in]compatibility of state sovereignty and R2P doctrines  
 Discuss the GoZ‟s interpretation of sovereignty 
 Discuss the political implications of Zimbabwe‟s May 2005 Operation 
Murambatsvina on state sovereignty and the R2P doctrine 
  
1.5 Research Question 
 
This study will discuss the contestations inherent in the doctrines of sovereignty and 
R2P using Operation Murambatsvina as an example. Of particular interest it seeks to 
answer the following question:  
 
Was Operation Murambatsvina justifiable under the doctrine of sovereignty as was 
insinuated and claimed by the GoZ?  
 
The question necessitates an inquiry into the environment of international political 
relations, as Operation Murambatsvina proved to be of interest to academia, 
international organisations, governments, political practitioners, human rights 
activists and interest groups to name a few. The following sub-questions will enable 
the study to critically discuss and analyse the extent to which Operation 
Murambatsvina was justified by the doctrine of state sovereignty as was argued by 
the GoZ. 
 
1.5.1 Sub-Questions 
 
1. Does political realism, liberalism and constructivism sufficiently answer the 
questions and problems related to sovereignty in international politics? Is realism 
perpetuating and hence maintaining the status quo of anarchy in the international 
political realm? Does liberalism provide a more plausible way of conceiving 
interstate phenomena? Does constructivism provide for better solutions to issues 
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of social nature such as the doctrines of sovereignty, R2P and Operation 
Murambatsvina?  
 
2. Since the GoZ used the doctrine of sovereignty as the justification on which it 
mandated itself to carry out Operation Murambatsvina in May 2005, what exactly 
is this doctrine of sovereignty? How does sovereignty justify a government‟s 
domestic policy in the event that, in the processes of implementing its policies, 
abuses are committed, intentionally or unintentionally? 
 
3. What are the GoZ‟s understanding, interpretation and stance on the doctrine of 
sovereignty? Is the GoZ‟s stance and position valid and justifiable according to 
the laws of nations as espoused by the UN? 
 
4. What was Operation Murambatsvina about? What were the objectives of 
Operation Murambatsvina and what means were used to achieve those 
objectives? Were these objectives met? Was the operation justifiable from legal, 
political and ethical perspectives? 
 
1.6 Definitions of Key Concepts 
 
In order to better understand the doctrine of sovereignty, it is important to 
understand the implied notions of sovereignty as well. In clearly laying out the 
ground for this research, this study will recognise and adopt the following definitions 
of sovereignty and the implied notions thereof.  
 
Autonomy 
 
Sovereignty implies some sort of autonomy of the political unit involved. Hoffman 
(2007:12) describes autonomy as a concept that denotes „self-government‟ and 
„independence‟. In as much as sovereign states are autonomous, they however are 
inter-dependent. States, for example, need each other to form alliances, bilateral 
trade agreements, and multilateral trade agreements amongst others. Autonomy in 
international politics denotes the possible functioning of a state independent of 
another more than the inability to function in the total absence of other states to 
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trade and partner with.  
 
Globalisation 
 
Globalisation has to do with a border-less world of political, social, economic, cultural 
and technological interaction, to mention a few aspects; thus globalisation is „the 
shrinkage of the globe as a result of trading, technology (in particular the computer 
revolution) and cultural exchange‟ (Hoffman 2007:63). With globalisation, states are 
permeable and borders become insignificant as the power of globalisation transcends 
state borders. King and Kendal (2004:140) describe globalisation as „the increasing 
worldwide integration of economies‟. 
 
International Norms 
 
Norms in general are rules or patterns of behaviours that are accepted and expected 
in a particular society (Honderich 1995:626; Lacey 1986:161). Thus, international 
norms are rules and patterns of behaviours accepted and expected in interstate 
relations. These rules and patterns of accepted and expected behaviours are 
designed to regulate and maintain order in relations between states in the 
international system. In determining what passes as international norms, this study 
first and foremost recognises the UN as the best platform for multilateral 
representation and agreements with a global reach. This study therefore accepts 
international norms to be those promulgated by the UN. The particular international 
norms that are of interest to this study – as they have a bearing on the doctrine of 
sovereignty - are: Human Security, Responsibility to Protect and Human Rights 
amongst others. 
 
Power 
 
Hans Morgenthau (1955:26) defines power as „man‟s control over the minds and 
actions of other men (sic)‟. Power is the ability to influence others even to the extent 
of making others do something or act in a way that they otherwise would not have 
done. This indicates that power is a relational concept. One has power in so far as it 
is exercised over another (Kegley 2009:27). Power can be conceived and 
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measured by military force and economic activity. „Throughout history the decisive 
factor in the fates of nations has usually been the number, efficiency, and 
disposition of fighting forces; national influence bears a direct relationship to gross 
national strength; without that, the most exquisite statesmanship is likely to be of 
limited use‟ (Sullivan 1990:76). Power can also be palpable in religious circles 
(Gallagher and Ashcraft 2006:3). Very often religious leaders are in positions of 
immense influence of the people they lead, and that influence can be translated into 
political power (Piscatori 1992; Saliba 2003:56; Woodhead and Heelas 2000:44). 
 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
 
For the purpose of this study the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P): 
Insists that states have primary responsibility for protecting their own citizens. 
However, if they are unwilling or unable to do so, the responsibility to end 
atrocities and mass killing‟ is transferred to the wider „international community‟ 
(Bellamy and Wheeler 2011:512).  
 
Cunliffe (2011:1) contends that „at the core of the doctrine is the idea that states 
have to maintain minimal standards of human security with respect to the population 
on their territory‟. The R2P is a UN gazetted criterion of intervention in the domestic 
affairs of a state by the community of world states as adopted by the 2005 UN World 
Summit (Reus-Smit 2011:286). 
 
Sovereignty 
 
Krasner (1999:28) defines sovereignty as „the capacity to act within a territory‟. 
Sovereignty is an attribute of the state. In other words sovereignty is power to 
govern a state. Sovereignty can also be understood as the ability to „regulate 
relations across borders‟ (Krasner 1999:29). It is „a concept that denotes absolute 
power‟; power as exercised and possessed by the state (Hoffman 2007:171). 
Sovereignty is also the distinctive and distinguishing characteristic of international 
politics; „a defining characteristic of a sovereign-based system is the absence of 
authoritative central institutions‟ (Brown 2002:6).  The UN recognises the autonomy 
of each state and accepts that the final and highest arbitrator in a state is, in fact, 
that state‟s government (UN Charter: Article 2(7)); thus the UN affirms and 
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recognises the doctrine of sovereignty.  
 
State 
 
Mann (in Lauchmann 2010:1), defines a state as „a territorially demarcated area over 
which it [state] claims a monopoly of binding and permanent rule-making‟. In the 
realm of international politics, states are the primary subject matter and therefore 
international politics concerns itself primarily with the relations between states. The 
state, which is geographically defined and bound, also implies the people 
(masses/populace) of that particular state as represented by its head of state. 
 
1.7 Research Methodology 
 
International politics as a branch of the broader social sciences is very dynamic in 
the sense that it deals with constantly changing circumstances, interpretations of 
fluctuating circumstances and fluid human conditions.  Human beings are changing 
beings for „to be is to change‟ (Kegley 2009:31). Human circumstances and 
conditions are not static. These circumstances and societal conditions are 
sometimes quantifiable and other times not. Human beings have varying values, 
standards and cultures as well. These human elements cannot be negated in social 
science research if meaningful outcomes are to be achieved (Gibbs 2007:2).  
 
Mouton (2001:369) advances that a research design is defined as a „set of 
guidelines and instructions to be followed in addressing the research problem‟. In 
affirmation of this assertion, Kruger (2001:46) avers that a „research design is the 
plan according to which researchers obtain participants (objects) and collect 
information from them‟. As such, the research design of this work is presented in the 
form of a literature review which involves current literature on state sovereignty, R2P 
and Operation Murambatsvina.  
 
The research methodology that informs social science research/ers, must take into 
cognisance these social facts of human living. This research used the comparative 
genealogical approach. This study, respectively, investigated and analysed literature 
13 
 
on the doctrines of sovereignty and R2P, and Zimbabwe‟s Operation 
Murambatsvina, as was publicly available. Thus the study was primarily desktop 
research. The contents of books, reports, internet and web-based documents, 
journals, scholarly and scientific articles were analysed.  
 
1.7.1 Qualitative Research Methodology 
 
Qualitative research, among other things, emphasises the analysis of documents, 
methods of observation and interviews, and interrogation of primary and secondary 
sources such as newspapers and books (Gibbs 2007:3). This is the methodology 
that this research followed. The researcher made independent interpretations of the 
contents of these sources since qualitative research is axiological or value-laden 
(Herr and Gary 2005:5). It seeks to interpret and understand the background 
presented by social phenomena (Babbie and Mouton 2001:49; Gibbs 2007:2; Kant 
2011:70-72). This study is of a qualitative nature. As such the research was 
interested, not only in scientifically factual information, but values and cultural 
circumstances that surrounded those facts of social life. The goal of qualitative 
research, as contained herein, was describing, understanding and explaining, rather 
than prediction.  
 
This research used the genealogical approach and made primary use of the 
qualitative methodology as it better tackles issues of social phenomena. The 
genealogical approach helped to systematically track down the development of the 
doctrine of sovereignty as there was traceable comparison of the fluidity of 
sovereignty between different segments of time. Newspaper articles, books, reports 
of various Non-Governmental Organisations were consulted in the interrogation of 
Operation Murambatsvina. 
 
The main advantage of the genealogical approach was that it enabled the 
researcher to make a comparative analysis of the development of the doctrine of 
sovereignty across space and time. The major disadvantage of this approach was 
actually its strength. Its weakness was in its strength in that as it enabled and 
allowed the researcher to make a comparative study of sovereignty across time and 
space, the researcher tended to discard some vital information that was negated by 
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the approach itself as it does not exhaustively study accumulative phenomena in 
entirety. Therefore some articles and reports on Operation Murambatsvina that were 
deemed to not concern the main subject matter, were negated. 
 
1.8 Limitations of the Study 
 
The concept of sovereignty is very broad and detailed; it spans over at least four 
centuries and has undergone many phases and thus it has seen many changes. 
This study cannot therefore explore all possible meanings and implications of 
sovereignty on contemporary global politics. It will focus on the meanings of 
sovereignty as played out in the initial era of the doctrine‟s inception (modern era) 
and compare it to the contestations of sovereignty as played out in contemporary 
international relations forums, particularly the GoZ‟s stance from the year 1980 to 
December 2013. This is admittedly to the exclusion of otherwise valuable 
contributions and literature that the doctrine of sovereignty has to offer to the field of 
international politics.  
 
Another limitation that faces this study is that international relations‟ rational theories 
(realism, liberalism, Marxism) are premised on the very doctrine of sovereignty that 
this study seeks to investigate. Employing these theories will in some way hinder the 
effective scholarly inquiry on sovereignty as the theories affirm, by assumption, the 
principles of sovereignty.  
 
This study was carried out between 2012 and 2013 and the data it gathered was 
processed in the year 2014. Operation Murambatsvina was carried out in 2005. It is 
almost a decade since it happened and so the memories that people have of that 
event have somewhat altered and they are likely to remember it differently and 
sometimes with much less accuracy and clarity. In other words the passage of time 
alone since the operation was carried out is itself a limitation because that could 
result in respondents passing on inaccurate and non-factual information. It was with 
this in mind that the researcher opted for a desk top research, rather than interviews 
with victims of Operation Murambatsvina. 
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Operation Murambatsvina was carried out within the geographic space of Zimbabwe. 
As such the geography that was affected was primarily in the political demarcations 
and boundaries of the state of Zimbabwe. However the populace that was affected 
by the operation was of varied nationalities. Residents of Zimbabwe, who came from 
Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, Rwanda and Burundi among other countries11, were 
also affected and some were even forced to go back to where they originally came 
from. As such, it was impossible for this study to determine the extent to which 
Operation Murambatsvina affected such people. It was also beyond the scope of this 
work to investigate the effects of Operation Murambatsvina on the receiving 
countries of the people who left Zimbabwe and returned to their respective countries 
as a result of Operation Murambatsvina. 
 
Another limitation that was faced by this study was the political climate in Zimbabwe. 
It is almost taboo to discuss political issues that seem to challenge or question the 
status quo in Zimbabwe. As such one finds that there are not many respondents who 
are willing to discuss and reveal their experiences of the operation. There is 
generally a founded fear in Zimbabwe that political research could be used to „flash 
out‟ dissenting views to the status quo and this necessitated desk top research 
rather than field research. In Zimbabwe it is generally accepted that when one is 
asked about contentious political issues, one will tend to give the „correct‟ answer 
which may not always be the truth for fear of repercussions that may come as a 
result of telling the „unofficial truth‟ (Benyera 2013:258). 
 
1.9 Chapter Outline 
 
1.9.1 Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Chapter One introduces the rationale of the study. The statement of the problem and 
objectives of the study are articulated in order to demonstrate the contribution that 
the study seeks to make in the discourse on sovereignty and R2P. Key concepts that 
constitute the study are defined and limitations of the study are identified. In this 
                                                          
11
 The Tibaijuka (2005:35) report submitted that some tens of thousands people of Malawian, Mozambican, 
Zambian origin had established themselves for decades, and in some cases for generations in Zimbabwe. 
16 
 
chapter, the research methodology is outlined and the theoretical framework 
discussed. Overall Chapter One outlines the background of this research and 
explains why the research is important. It also outlines the problem that the research 
seeks to solve and/or provide answers to. 
 
1.9.2 Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework 
 
In Chapter Two, this study will explore, in detail, the theoretical framework that 
informs this research. This study acknowledges that realism is a dominant theory in 
the field of international relations. Thus, realism informs international political thought 
and action, and as such, this discourse begins its argument from realism. By way of 
critiquing realism the study will juxtapose it with liberalism and constructivism. That 
stated, Chapter Two will respond to questions such as: Does political realism 
sufficiently answer the questions and problems related to sovereignty in international 
politics? Or is realism perpetuating, and hence maintaining the status quo of anarchy 
in the international political realm? 
 
1.9.3 Chapter Three: Literature Review 
 
Chapter Three will outline the history and origins of the doctrine of sovereignty as it 
is popularly conceived. The chapter seeks to understand, explain and unpack the 
widely yet ambiguously articulated Westphalian doctrine of sovereignty. Sovereignty, 
as a concept and principle, has come to mean different things to different people, in 
different historical epochs operating under different socio-economic and geo-political 
circumstances. This chapter will highlight how the modern era influenced the 
understanding that sovereignty is unitary, inviolable, indivisible and absolute. The 
chapter will also discuss sovereignty as responsibility. Of necessity, the discussion 
on state sovereignty will evolve into the discussion on R2P. The Chapter will also by 
way of introducing Operation Murambatsvina, interrogate literature on Operation 
Murambatsvina. 
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1.9.4 Chapter Four: Situating Operation Murambatsvina in the History of the 
Zimbabwe Sovereign State System 
 
Chapter Four seeks to situate and articulate the position of the GoZ on sovereignty. 
The chapter will outline a brief history of Zimbabwe in demonstration that Operation 
Murambatsvina was a carefully orchestrated operation designed to enforce, in the 
view of the GoZ, its domestic and international sovereign authority. In the 
deliberations, it seeks to interrogate what informs the GoZ‟s stance and position on 
sovereignty. Is the GoZ‟s stance and position valid and justifiable according to the 
laws of nations as espoused by the UN? 
 
1.9.5 Chapter Five: The Analysis of Zimbabwe’s May 2005 Operation 
Murambatsvina 
 
Chapter Five seeks to analyse Zimbabwe‟s Operation Murambatsvina in and through 
the prism and frameworks of the doctrine of sovereignty. Furthermore, the chapter 
seeks to extract lessons that could be used in policy formulation and implementation 
of the state sovereignty/R2P framework, from the limitations of the application, or 
lack thereof, of R2P on the Zimbabwe Operation Murambatsvina of May 2005. 
Hence the research questions in this chapter are, among others: What was 
Operation Murambatsvina about? What were the objectives of Operation 
Murambatsvina and what means were used to achieve those objectives? Were the 
objectives of Operation Murambatsvina met? Was Operation Murambatsvina 
justifiable in legal, humanitarian, political and ethical terms? 
 
1.9.6 Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
Chapter Six will present the main research findings. It will also offer the conclusions 
of the whole discussion as contained and demonstrated in the study. It is in this 
chapter that the study will offer some recommendations for further research areas on 
the doctrine of sovereignty. In conclusion this chapter will, in light of the transpired 
research and arguments, ask whether or not the research has arrived at what it set 
out to do. Have the research questions been answered? What is the way forward? 
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
  
2.1 Introduction 
 
International relations as a field of study has various theories or paradigms of 
conceiving inter-state political phenomena. There is a wide array of divergent and 
convergent views proposed by various theorists such as, among others, realists, 
liberalists, institutionalists, Marxists, feminists, regionalists and constructivists. This 
study will make primary use of constructivism in the analysis of the doctrine of 
sovereignty. It will argue its case against the backdrop of realism and liberalism; 
thereby, situating the doctrine of sovereignty in international relations. In this chapter, 
the study seeks to inter alia highlight what each of the three theories is about in the 
field of international relations. Secondly, this chapter will show what each theory‟s 
assumptions and propositions are on sovereignty. Thirdly, this chapter seeks to 
highlight the relevance, or lack thereof, of the propositions and assumptions of each 
theory in the context of the doctrine of sovereignty. It should be borne in mind from the 
very onset of this study that the doctrine of sovereignty, chronologically, came into 
existence before the theories of political realism and liberalism.  
 
Popular literature on sovereignty, portray the doctrine of sovereignty‟s beginnings as 
in the year 1648, the year the Peace Treaty of Westphalia was signed. This study will 
demonstrate later in Chapter Three that the doctrine of sovereignty as is erroneously 
and popularly conceived did not begin with the Peace Treaty of Westphalia. 
Nonetheless, preliminarily, this study recognises that 1648 signifies the official 
codification of the doctrine of sovereignty. The academic study of international 
relations began only in the year 1919 (Ziegler 1987) as efforts to curb and mitigate the 
chaos of World War I. International relations theorising thus started only around the 
year 1919. However, it does not mean that intellectual origins of political realism and 
liberalism only started in 1919. Political realism and liberalism as theories of 
international relations are premised on and assume the very doctrine of sovereignty 
that this study seeks to analyse. This in itself could be a challenge. This study cannot 
effectively use these theories to analyse the very doctrine that they are premised on. 
Despite the fact that it is chronologically the newest and latest of the theories, 
constructivism proves to be an effective analytic tool as it is reflective and reflexive on 
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and of its own processes of epistemology, ontology and methodologies. 
Constructivism not only takes cognisance of its ontological and epistemological 
assumptions, but the cultural and political environments that inform its epistemology 
and ontology. Constructivism also recognises the cultural and political environment 
that surrounds the phenomena it seeks to investigate. Political realism and liberalism 
are used as forerunner theories of constructivism in this study. Thus, this chapter will 
logically and sequentially explore the theory of realism and liberalism first, before 
engaging in constructivism. 
 
2.2 Realism: Its Assumptions and Propositions on Sovereignty 
 
Realism is considered to be the historically dominant and oldest theory of 
international politics. Realism seeks to explain the frequent scenarios of war and 
conflict in the international realm of politics. Realism also seeks to understand the 
causes of war so as to find solutions, if any, to the issues of conflict (Elman 2007:11; 
Nau 2012:29). Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau are some of the founding figures of the theory of realism (Balogun 
2011:56-57; Dunne and Schmidt 2008:92; Kegley 2009:27). Realism as a theory is 
very broad with three main variations, namely classical realism, structural realism or 
neo-realism and contemporary realism12. Realism is „based on the premise that 
world politics is essentially and unchangeably a struggle among self-interested 
states for power and position under anarchy, with each competing state pursuing its 
own national interest‟ (Kegley 2009:27). According to realism states are the most 
important actors on the world stage and they answer to no higher political authority 
(Kegley and Wittkopf 1993:499). Litfin (1997:172) avers that „sovereignty is the 
bedrock assumption of realism‟. It is the distinguishing characteristic of states as it 
confers on them „supreme power over their territory and populace, and no other 
actor stands above them wielding the legitimacy and coercive capability to govern 
the global system‟ (Kegley 2009:27). Thomson (1995:213, 215) concurs with the 
view that realism assumes that sovereignty is the bedrock of statehood, conversely, 
„the essence of sovereignty is the state‟s ability to make authoritative decisions, in 
                                                          
12
 These distinctions or classifications of realism are based on ‘periodisation’: classical realism up to the 
twentieth century, structural or modern realism from 1939-79 and contemporary or neo-realism from 1979 
onwards, as articulated by Dunne and Schmidt (2008:95).  
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the final instance, the decision to make war‟. This alludes to what Makinda 
(2001:404) refers to as the anarchic nature of the international system under realism 
as each state recognises no higher authority. This study will briefly explore the 
different strands of realism before exploring its gist and its bearing on sovereignty. 
 
2.2.1. Classical Realism 
 
Classical realism explains that politics is but a show of what human nature is. 
„Politics, like, society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in 
human nature‟ (Morgenthau 1955:4). Human nature is competitive, power-hungry, 
egotistic and domineering. It is the nature of human beings to seek their own survival 
even in selfish ways. Elman (2007:12), similarly, notes that classical realism is 
saturated in the selfish human condition. Human beings, according to Hans 
Morgenthau (in Sullivan 1990:75; Kegley 2009:28; Balogun 2011:57), have an 
inherent „lust for power‟. The realist assumption on corrupt human nature is 
reinforced by Kegley (2009:28) noting that „people are by nature narrowly selfish and 
ethically flawed and cannot free themselves from the sinful fact that they are driven 
to watch out for themselves and to compete with others for self-advantage‟. In other 
words, it can be argued that realism perceives humanity as selfish, sinful and corrupt 
beyond redemption. 
 
Classical realism emphasises the negative behaviour of human beings. It is 
convinced of an innate and inherent evil human nature. However human beings can 
be caring, loving, protective and altruistic as Kegley and Wittkopf (1993:20) contend. 
It can be suggested that this is positive and good behaviour. Jean Jacques 
Rousseau argued that man (sic) was by nature good (Grimsley 1983:47). Is this not 
a direct contrast and in opposition to what realism claims and assumes about human 
nature? In the processes of socialisation one can on the one hand learn goodness, 
kindness, politeness, empathy and courtesy, and on the other hand one can also 
learn hostility, arrogance, impunity and evil. Good (positive) and bad (negative) 
behaviour is learnt. The social conditioning determines the outcomes of individuals‟ 
behaviours, hence social psychology argues that human behaviour is learnt. 
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Whether good or bad, human behaviour is learnt13.  
 
In line with social psychology‟s claim that all human behaviour is learnt behaviour, 
later in this chapter, this study will demonstrate that constructivism as a theory of 
international relations encapsulates and defensibly substantiates this claim. Not all of 
the human condition is evil and wretched in human beings‟ experience. In fact, 
Kegley (1995:4) argues that human nature is essentially good and altruistic. People 
are capable of collaboration and mutual aid. Part of the human condition is that 
human beings seek identity and belonging, thus, common purpose and unity. 
Admittedly human beings can be whim-some and precarious. In one moment they 
are caring and loving, and in another, cursing and fighting. It can therefore be argued 
that there must be some ethical standards to adhere to for both kinds of behaviours. 
Dunne and Schmidt (2008:96) concede that classical realism engages in moral 
philosophy and ethics as opposed to merely following the dictates of human nature 
without standards. Thus the argument made by realism on the corruptible and evil 
human nature cannot be consistently and logically sustained.  
 
2.2.2 Structural Realism/Neo-Realism 
 
Structural realism is also referred to as neo-realism in various literature (Dunne and 
Schmidt 2008:98; Balogun 2011:59; Behr 2010:197; Kegley 2009:30). Waltz 
(1990:58), arguably one of the chief proponents of structural realism, asserts that the 
absence of „social structure‟ that is, „institutionalised restraints and institutionalised 
methods of altering and adjusting interests‟, are fertile conditions that breed war. 
This position is similarly argued by Onuf (2011:89). Within states, there are 
structures for social, political, economic and cultural organisation. Yet between 
states there are no such mechanisms. As such the absence of such mechanisms is 
a structure in its own right.  Structural realism in some respects converges with 
classical realism as it evolves from classical realism. According to Dunne and 
Schmidt (2008:98), structural realism attributes „state-security competition and inter-
state conflict to the lack of an overarching authority above states and relative 
                                                          
13
 Social psychology argues that all of human behaviour is learnt, whether good or bad, or positive or negative 
(Baron et al 2002:85-90). 
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distribution of power in the international system‟. Elman (2007) and Griffiths 
(2007:13) concur with this view. It can be argued that structural realism is concerned 
with the lack of an overarching global governing structure or system; this points to 
the anarchic structure of the international system. 
 
Chris Brown (2002:6) argues that anarchy is the underlying factor in structural 
realism. There is a shift in structural realism from the position advanced by classical 
realism on human nature. Instead, it is the structure and system in which 
international politics is conducted that is flawed as it lacks an overall authority. 
Kegley (2009:27) avers that as anarchy is the „absence of a higher authority to which 
states can turn for protection and resolve disputes‟, this means that global politics 
becomes an arena for unending power struggles which is ruled by the dominating 
state(s). As such Wendt (1992) asserts that „anarchy is what states make of it‟. 
Balogun (2011:43) concurs with this view and argues that „a sovereign state cannot 
tell another how to conduct its business; neither could it be told how to conduct its 
own‟. It can be argued therefore that power struggles are the order of the day in the 
international domain of politics. This suggests that there is need for regulatory 
structures in international politics as the outcomes of the international order are 
determined by the structures that govern and regulate conduct in the international 
domain.  
 
Arguably, anarchy is a structure in itself14, as affirmed by some liberalists who 
advance the argument that anarchy is some form of order (Kegley 2009:36; Kegley 
and Wittkopf 1993:32). The possibility of states‟ use of force in order to advance their 
interests culminates in every state worrying about its own survival resulting in 
anarchy being perpetuated15; conversely anarchy perpetuates the notion of self-help 
as there is no central and effective authority to appeal to (Nau 2012:29). Hierarchy, a 
structure in its own right, is a basis for domestic order. In the presence of an 
overarching authority or world government, hierarchy follows. It is the duty of the 
hierarchy to distribute power in order to balance power (Balogun 2011:59). In line 
with this argument Dunne and Schmidt (2008:91-99) argue that super-powers 
                                                          
14
 Anarchy is referred to as ‘ordered’ anarchy because states follow commonly acknowledged standards 
[customary international law] even in the absence of hierarchical enforcement (Kegley 2009:36). 
15
 Kegley (2007:35) defines anarchy as ‘a system made up of competitive interacting actors in the absence of 
supervisory governing institutions to regulate the units’ competition’. 
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determine the structure of international politics thereby suggesting that super-
powers, as a way of balancing power, distribute power. Realists would argue that 
such kind of structural arrangement ensures security among states. Is security 
achievable by having an overarching global-governing system? If this were true, as 
Chandler (2011:29) would point out, would there be intra-state conflicts as the world 
has witnessed in Sierra Leone, Sudan and South Sudan or the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) and Ethiopia, for example? Hierarchy is not a sure guarantee for 
order, and also not a guarantee that war will be eliminated in the domestic realms of 
states and jurisdictions, and neither will hierarchy guarantee order and the 
elimination of war in the international realm. The reason states would want to seek 
and safeguard their own power is that they are solely concerned about their own 
survival. In affirmation of this line of thought, Sullivan (1990:76) advances the 
argument that: 
Throughout history the decisive factor in the fates of nations has usually been 
the number, efficiency, and disposition of fighting forces; national influence 
bears a direct relationship to gross national strength; without that, the most 
exquisite statesmanship is likely to be of limited use.  
 
This could present a challenge. The possibility of states‟ use of force in order to 
advance their interests culminates in every state worrying about its own survival. It 
can be suggested that in the midst of all the power politics, it is security that states 
seek more than power itself. In corroboration of this view, Waltz (1979:47) argues 
that states are rather „security maximisers‟ than they are „power maximisers‟. This 
position is similarly argued by Dunne and Schmidt (2008:99), with Reus-Smit 
(2001:211) sharing similar statements. As each state amasses power for its own 
protection, it inevitably threatens another. This leads to what Wheeler and Booth 
(2008:261) term the „security dilemma‟, as each state is only concerned with its own 
survival and security. Baylis and Rengger (1992:29) and Makinda (2001:404) concur 
with this position. Nau (2012:29) reinforces the view that states are in perpetual 
suspicion of one another, thus, they face the security dilemma. The assumption 
made by structural realism that all states have similar sets of interests, to maximise 
their own power and to ensure their survival, is suspicious. It is more the anarchic 
structure of international politics that conditions states to be inclined to pursue what 
they deem security for their survival than the position that all states have similar 
interests. 
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2.2.3. Contemporary Realism 
 
Contemporary realism argues that not all states have a similar set of interests and 
„places domestic politics as an intervening variable between the distribution of power 
and foreign policy behaviour‟ (Dunne and Schmidt 2008:99). Contemporary realism 
looks to the leaders‟ and statesmen‟s (sic) perceptions on political relations between 
states, as a means of balancing power. The perceptions of leaders of states have a 
bearing on the conduct of the particular leaders in the international political arena. 
States do not only differ in terms of their interest(s), they also differ in ways in which 
they „extract and direct resources from the societies they rule‟ (ibid). Leaders are 
informed by their environment and upbringing, hence not all leaders seek power for 
conquest. The leader‟s ability to rule and harness the necessary resources for the 
states‟ survival informs his/her interactions in the international political climate. 
 
2.2.4 Critique of Realism 
 
Realism in all its strands affirms the doctrine of sovereignty. It asserts that sovereign 
states are the principal actors in international politics and therefore „a state‟s survival 
is its first and ultimate responsibility which cannot be compromised or put to risk‟ 
(Kissinger: 1977:204; Dunne and Schmidt 2008:93). It also argues that sovereign 
states, as building blocks in the domain of international politics, must pursue power. 
They do so through the sovereign or statesperson who must „calculate rationally the 
most appropriate steps that should be taken so as to perpetuate the life of the state 
in a hostile and threatening environment‟ (ibid). This suggests a perpetually hostile 
environment, one without any cooperation and rapport. It can therefore be argued 
that realism does not account for cooperation on non-political power struggles or low 
politics. In divergence from realism, Sterling-Folker (2006:57) argues that in recent 
years there has been considerable collaboration between states on environmental 
and international trade and economic matters, for instance. It can also be suggested 
that as state-centric, realism primarily concerns itself with inter-governmental 
relations, yet the international stage of politics is shared by various non-state actors. 
 
Lakoff (2011:182) is of the view that war is always a looming danger in international 
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politics. Realism accepts that the use of military force to any magnitude (if 
necessary) is part of ensuring the survival and security of the state and therefore 
postulates that war cannot be ruled out. In affirmation of this position Jackson and 
Rosberg (1986:4) argue that „over several centuries the number of independent 
political entities has been remarkably reduced by force or by threats of force, as 
weaker states have been incorporated into stronger ones‟. In realism the element of 
statism becomes very apparent; „statism is a term given to the idea of the state as 
the legitimate representative of the collective will of the people‟ (Dunne and Schmidt 
2008:93). This further confirms its root assumption on the doctrine of sovereignty.  
 
Realism accepts that the „sovereign‟ or statesperson has legitimate power to act on 
behalf of, and over people of a particular state. This implicitly means that it 
recognises the need for some authority to govern over people in the domain of the 
state. Yet, it is sceptical of global institutions like the UN for realists „do not believe it 
is prudent for a state to entrust its safety and survival on another actor or 
international institution‟ (ibid). Hoogensen (2005:59) describes this realist notion as 
the refusal „to be contingent upon a moral code emanating from anything other than 
the tangible needs of the state‟. This conception of realism points to a condition or 
structure of anarchy in the international political realm. Anarchy is a „theory that 
opposes all forms of rule over individuals‟ (Hoffman 2007:6). The realist argument is 
that international politics is conducted in an arena without a sovereign, absolute 
state-person or government or authority and that therefore anarchy is at play. This 
seems to imply that, the international political arena is one of lawlessness and 
disorder. It distinguishes between domestic and international politics arguing that in 
the international domain of politics each state considers itself the highest power and 
arbitrator and it is not answerable to any other, hence anarchy exists. In the 
domestic domain, however, it is rather different because the state itself rules over 
everyone in its domain (Dunne and Schmidt 2008:93).  
 
Realism comes across as selective in the application and the enforcement of law. 
While it recognises the need for a sovereign and a hierarchy in the domestic domain, 
it fails to recognise that same need in the international domain. Hierarchy is believed 
to bring about law and order in the domestic domain. If this were true, would it not 
also bring law and order in the international domain? It can be argued therefore that 
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realism is selective when it comes to law enforcement. It refuses to be contingent on 
the idea of law enforcement in the international domain but adopts law enforcement 
through the sovereign in the domestic domain. Is this not why some governments get 
away with grievous crimes? Governments could very well argue that according to 
realism‟s line of thought whatever happens in the domestic jurisdictions has nothing 
to do with the international community. Yet the forces of globalisation are such that it 
is impossible for people not to stay interconnected even when separated by vast 
distances. It can be further argued that in some sense realism perpetuates the status 
quo of how international politics have been conducted traditionally. The realist stance 
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the international community to call to account 
states that abuse their citizens and hence their state sovereignty. It also makes it 
difficult for sovereigns to account to one another as there is no obligation on any 
party to do so. Yet in this global age, one of democracy and human rights, 
accountability is a necessity. 
 
States could abuse people in their domains as alluded to in Chapter One, and 
realism would blindly look away as it cannot question what happens in another‟s 
domestic jurisdiction. As will be demonstrated in Chapters Three, Four and Five, it 
can be argued that the GoZ may have benefited from the status quo of not being 
answerable to anyone in the face of the alleged human rights abuses it committed in 
the implementation of Operation Murambatsvina. 
 
While realism affirms the concept of sovereignty, it also challenges it. Is it possible 
that the same legitimacy and recognition given to the state, by realism, be accorded 
to a global/universal/international institution like the UN? In the event that the same 
kind of authority or power recognised to belong to a state by realism, be accorded to 
the UN, would that bring about peace and security to the world? In an anarchic 
environment war and disorder erupt. As confirmed by Dunne and Schmidt (2008:93), 
„self-help is the principle of action in an anarchical system‟. Yet anarchy causes war. 
The realist theory does not explain why in the domestic domains of states, religious, 
ethnical and tribal conflicts and civil wars break out even in the presence of an 
absolute and sovereign authority and government. It can thus be argued that the 
presence of a sovereign does not necessarily translate into the observation of law, 
order, peace and tranquillity in a state.  
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It is apparent that realism finds it irreconcilable for a state to trust any other state or 
institution when it comes to safeguarding state interest(s) (Dunne and Schmidt 
2008:93; Dunne and Schmidt 2011:95; Morgenthau 1955:25). This makes 
cooperation difficult if not impossible. Yet international political history including 
World War I and II, the Cold War and contemporary global challenges like terrorism 
and environmental degradation resulting in global warming, require and compel 
states and global civil society to cooperate and collaborate to mitigate the dire effects 
thereof. 
 
2.3 Liberalism: Its Assumptions and Propositions on Sovereignty  
 
The theory of liberalism prides itself as the contemporary alternative to the dominant 
realist theory. Some proponents of liberalism argue that it is a challenge and response 
to the unresolved issues that besiege realism (Kegley 2009:32). It is also referred to 
as idealism in various literatures (Balogun 2011:55; Kegley and Wittkopf 1993:20; 
Beardsworth 2011:227). John Locke, Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant are the three 
most prominent figures who represent classical liberalism. Sterling-Folker (2006:55) 
asserts that liberalism and realism converge „in their shared focus on nation-state as 
the central actor in contemporary world politics‟. Thus, by implication liberalism 
recognises and affirms the doctrine of sovereignty. Thomson (1995:213) observes that 
„for liberal interdependence theorists sovereignty is defined in terms of the state‟s 
ability to control actors and activities within and across its borders‟. Liberalism, like 
realism, assumes that the salient and primary actors in the international political realm 
are, in fact, sovereign states. 
 
2.3.1 Classical Liberalism 
 
Liberalism does not dismiss the starting premise of realism which states that politics 
has a lot to do with human nature. For liberalism human nature is self-seeking and 
acquisitive, but most importantly, human nature is rational (McCullough 2010). 
Rationality forms the basis of law. Law comes into play when people come into what 
28 
 
Immanuel Kant calls the „social contract‟16. Zacher and Matthews (1995:109) note that 
„international relations are gradually becoming transformed such that they promote 
greater human freedom by establishing conditions of peace, prosperity and justice‟. 
This is in line with what Kegley (2009:33) argues, that liberalism is about the 
promotion of human freedom and human rights ahead of national interests. Burchill 
(2001:33) argues that liberalism believes that the prospects for the elimination of war 
lie with a preference for democracy, collective security and free trade. 
 
Hoffman (1987:396) affirms that liberalism suggests that real political development has 
to do with human emancipation, freedom and liberty. He notes that „the essence of 
liberalism is self-restraint, moderation, compromise and peace‟ (ibid).  Instead of 
attributing international conflict to the inherent lust for power as proffered by realism, 
liberalism seeks to reform those conditions that promote peace. Roosevelt (in Kegley 
2009:33), a former American president guided by liberal values, asserted that „the 
continued maintenance and improvement of democracy constitute the most important 
guarantee of international peace‟. Burchill (2001:31) reinforces that democratic 
principles help „the spread of legitimate domestic political orders that will eventually 
bring an end to international conflict‟. It could be suggested that the application of 
democratic principles in the international political order would likely yield the same 
results as attained in the domestic political order in the form of legitimate authority and 
perpetual peace. Hobson (2000:65) agrees with Burchill‟s view arguing that since at 
the centre of liberalism are values of negotiation, discussion, dialogue and tolerance, 
peace and democracy are likely to be achievable in the international order. Nau 
(2012:36) further agrees with the view that these values seek to promote 
interdependence rather than independence as advocated by realism. Dunne 
(2008:112) concurs with most liberal exponents that liberalism is about personal and 
individual liberty, freedom, promotion of free trade in the world market, dignity, 
personal restraint, dialogue, discussion and equality. Liberalism, as opposed to state-
centric realism, is said to be individual-centric (Hobson 2000:65). This theory or 
conception of international relations has to do with individual freedom, rights and 
liberty. Yet, as argued by Hobson (2000:65), the essence of international politics is 
                                                          
16
 Social contract is entered into by individuals who are well informed of what the contract entails and 
therefore are legally bound and obligated to honour their part of the contract (Jansson 1994). The social 
contract will be discussed in some detail in Chapter Three, 3.5.1 Discontention and Opposition to Absolutism. 
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exactly the opposite: „troubled peace, at best, or the state of war‟. 
 
Liberalism is not blind to the anarchic world of international politics as described by 
realism. It accepts that anarchy is in fact part of the global political system and 
contends that anarchy is orderly and that it is some form of order (Kegley 2009:36). It 
also argues that in the anarchic environment of world politics, human beings must 
eventually take centre stage. This could suggest that cumulative progress is essential 
in human affairs (Keohane 1990:174; Burchill 2001:33). Liberalism recognises what 
realism describes, but contends that the anarchic and hostile situation can be 
transcended. Peace is possible and human beings should aspire to live in perpetual 
peace. The basis of liberalism is equality and liberty for all. On the one hand, realism 
argues that there can be no law and order in an environment that has an absence of a 
central authority and on the other, liberalism argues that the situation described by 
realism (on international politics) is only but as a result of ideas and that ideas can 
change17. The world can be re-created or re-invented in the conceptualisation of 
liberalism. Thus Kant (1927), as cited by Dunne (2008:112), argues that perpetual 
peace is at the centre of actualising liberal ideologies. It is vital for individuals to 
consciously choose the path to peace and equally essential for states to consciously 
enter federal contracts with other states to put an end to war and the need to create 
republican constitutions. It can be suggested that the formation of the UN is in some 
respects a result of such efforts. In agreement with Kant‟s consciousness, Woolf 
(1991:37) asserted that prosperity and peace needed some „consciously devised 
machinery‟. Luard (1992:465) agrees with this view. Dunne (2008:116) observes that 
liberal states tend to cooperate more with other liberal states, for example the USA 
and Canada converge on economic and political affairs. The principles that Immanuel 
Kant advocates for are basically that people should consciously agree to abolish war 
and that the agreements should be legally binding resulting in contracts/agreements 
becoming laws.  
 
Kant (1927:23) believed that to „act in such a way that you always treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in the person of another, never simply as a means, but 
always at the same time as an end‟ would ensure that human beings become salient 
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 Liberalism in this regard converges with constructivism which also asserts that ideas are social constructs 
and thus ideas can change (Barnett 2008:162). 
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agents and as such their interests and aspirations should be put first in all political 
dialogues, deliberations and considerations. This view is shared by McCullough 
(2010:22) who argues that the application of this principle in politics implies that „every 
action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual‟s will to 
exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right‟. 
The freedom of individuals can never be over-emphasised as far as liberalists are 
concerned. Liberalism is about progress in a peaceful manner, a proposition that is 
held in suspicion by realism. It also recognises that governments should not intervene 
to the extent of infringing on individuals‟ rights. It articulates basic human rights that all 
people have the right to education, free press, religious tolerance, freedom of 
association, freedom of expression and speech. The right to own property and the 
means of production are some issues advocated for by liberalism. Another distinctive 
feature of liberalism is its promotion of free trade which is market-based and market-
run, rather than controlled and therefore monopolised markets. Dunne (2008:118) 
argues that the state possesses some authority vested in it by the people whose basic 
rights it must uphold and not abuse. It can be argued that this is responsible 
sovereignty. It can be debated that the state should only regulate the processes and 
order in its domain and not control and abuse people in the process. Liberalism is 
about the rights of individuals. Community rights should not take precedence at the 
expense of individual rights. It is prescriptive as opposed to realism which is 
descriptive. Liberalism should be understood in the context that it is „domestic‟ in its 
origins18.  
 
In any given state, individuals have different preferences and options. Some are well-
nurtured and some ill-nurtured. Some are trigger-happy and some are peaceful 
(Dunne 2008:110). As such the securing and guaranteeing of the liberties of 
individuals in a society can be a huge challenge because at any given time individuals‟ 
liberties will clash and be in conflict with others. The outcomes of a state are 
determined by the state‟s identity. Liberal states tend to have a liberal outlook and 
therefore engage with the rest of the world on the premises of their outlook. However, 
this proposition does not always consistently play out in the practise of liberal states‟ 
foreign policies. Liberal states by and large engage with one another on relatively 
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 In order to ensure domestic order in the 19
th
 century governments had to come up with new strategies that 
included representative democracy, social contract and constitutionalism (McCullough 2010:9).  
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amicable grounds. When it comes to non-liberal and non-democratic states, liberal 
states are known to deal heavily with them. It could be argued that it renders liberal 
states hypocritical in the view of realists. Liberalism would differ with realism in that it 
uses the domestic paradigm to engage with the international. It is the state‟s 
prerogative to regulate and therefore foster toleration of individuals in the domestic 
domain; a model that can be applied to the international domain. States can create an 
environment of liberality and compromise when engaging with other states in the 
international domain. Whilst realism attributes war to anarchy, liberalism attributes it to 
imperialism. Imperialism „denotes political domination or economic exploitation‟ 
(Hoffman 2007:81).  
 
Liberalism emphasises the rights of individuals and that when governments intervene 
and intrude on these rights, conflict and war erupt. Will this not be the same when 
supranational structures intervene in sovereign states‟ jurisdictions? When states 
meddle in the domestic affairs (often in pursuit of dominating others by forceful means) 
of other states, conflict and war erupts. Liberalism underscores the principle of non-
interference in individual rights. However, one cannot help but notice the irony that 
riddles the ideology of liberalism as executed by the so-called liberal states. The 
United States of America, arguably perceived as the most liberal of states, still went 
ahead and invaded Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2002) for what it believed to be in the 
best interest of the USA even without the authorisation of the UNSC (McCormack 
2011:37). Since liberalism is about non-interference in the private lives of individuals, 
why not avoid interfering in the jurisdictions and domains of independent sovereign 
states?  
 
Liberalism argues that in an environment where free-markets exist, healthy 
competition flourishes where „free trade would create a more peaceful world order‟, 
(Dunne 2008:113). It is imperialism that causes war and tension and this in turn 
perpetuates anarchy. Economic emancipation of individuals as well as collectives is at 
the centre of liberalism. Does free-trade and free-markets equate to fair-trade? 
Seemingly liberalism assumes that free-trade translates to fair-trade and believes that 
free-trade opens competitive markets and that trade would bring individuals of various 
communities/nationalities together. As a conception of international politics, it makes it 
possible for states to enter into dialogue and discussion and it enables states to come 
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to mutual understanding. It fosters cooperation and respect for one another, whether 
state, individual or transnational/multinational corporations.  
 
2.3.2 Neoliberalism 
 
Neoliberalism, like classical liberalism, seeks to promote international cooperation. It is 
sometimes referred to as neoliberal-institutionalism (Kegley and Wittkopf 1993:31) or 
neo-idealism (Weber 2001:56). Neoliberalism, like neorealism, embraces the 
assumption that the creation of international structures can solve international disputes 
and foster international cooperation (Kegley and Wittkopf 1993:30; Hobson 2000:64). 
This seems to be Clark‟s (1999:76) point of departure when he argues that „it is thus 
not international relations that establish the condition of anarchy, but instead it is 
anarchy that gives birth to international relations‟. This view aligns with neo-liberalism 
in that Clark recognises that anarchy precedes international relations, and thus, 
anarchy compels states to work together for the common good. Overlapping interests 
of states could provide for an opportune environment for cooperation and collaboration 
by forming supranational institutions. It can be argued that commerce can reduce 
conflict as it fosters interaction. As such Kegley (2009:33) makes the observation that 
neoliberalism fosters cooperation and collaboration especially around issues of trade 
and commerce. Neoliberalism argues in favour of exploiting those overlapping 
interests19 to foster relations between states as espoused by the UN, and non-state 
actors as depicted by multinational corporations (Kegley 2007:37; 39; Kegley and 
Wittkopf 1998:140). While anarchy is central in realist perspective, reciprocity is the 
central notion that liberal ideology seeks to promote (Nau 2012:36). The more they 
interact the more states stand to cooperate and reciprocate one effort with another.  
 
2.3.3 Critique of Liberalism 
 
Comparatively, liberalism is prescriptive20 of the issues and problems arising in 
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 The overlapping interests include but are not limited to, capitalist markets, military technology, natural 
environment, education and knowledge (Sterling-Folker 2006:56). 
20
 Liberalism as a theory suggests alternative ways of thinking and engaging in interstate power politics 
contrary to what realism argues.  
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international politics, whereas realism is descriptive21. Liberalism is more appealing to 
progressive economies as it essentially emanates from economics more than it is from 
politics. The liberty of individuals is hailed as an achievement brought by the culture of 
human rights and embraced by liberalism. This liberty is not only for the individual who 
is said to be free or at liberty but also for other individuals within a community of 
individuals. It can be argued that it fosters collective emancipation and development. 
Liberalism is axiological, value-laden and value-based in nature. It seeks to instil 
values of mutual respect and tolerance both in the domestic order as well as in the 
international order. It also seeks to promote values of self-respect and respect of 
others including respect of property. Liberalism makes important contributions to the 
economic paradigms. Admittedly market-based systems are not immune from 
monopolies as market-based trade can be controlled by monopolies as well. There are 
many big conglomerates and franchisees that practically dictate market trends. Large 
firms have greater market power than smaller ones, a fact that remains unchecked by 
liberalism. Free trade does not necessarily translate to fair trade. Liberal democracies 
seemingly engage with one another on relative amicable grounds as they recognise 
each other‟s legitimacy. Kegley and Wittkopf (2008:143) affirm that „liberal 
democracies have not gone to war with each other‟. Sterling-Folker (2006:56) also 
reinforces this view that „democracies appear to be pacifist in their foreign relations 
with one another‟. The liberal pacific relations should be hailed, upheld and even 
adopted by all states. 
 
There are however, some inconsistencies within the liberal tradition. Burchill (2001:37) 
notes that, liberal democracies engage with non-liberal states on realist, amniotic and 
anachronistic terms. The rule of law is emphasised by liberalism and it is the impetus 
to economic growth and freedom. Liberal states pride themselves in stability internally 
and peace in their international relations (Fukuyama 1989:3-18 cited in Dunne 
2008:113). Yet history proves the contrary though, that liberal states are as ruthless as 
any other towards non-liberal states. Thomson (1995:229) posits that: 
 The end of the cold war has brought increasing calls for collective intervention 
on behalf of human rights. Yet, Great Powers have always violated the non-
intervention norm when it was in their interests to do so, acting collectively 
when possible (Holy Alliance, UN Security Council) but unilaterally when 
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 Realism describes phenomena as it appears in international relations. As a theory, realism is descriptive 
rather than normative or constitutive.  
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necessary. 
 
To confirm Thomson‟s observation, the USA (liberal state) for example, dealt heavily 
with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq in the wake of what it (USA) called terrorist attacks 
on the September eleventh (9/11) 2001. Where was the restraint that liberalism 
promotes? Where was the tolerance and dialogue in the case of the invasion of Iraq in 
2003? Thus the liberal ideology falls short when dealing with pragmatic issues. Taylor 
and Curtis (2008:323) argue that „there are fears of an increased tendency for the USA 
to act without UN authorisation‟ and the USA‟s National Security Strategy of 2002 
proves it. George Bush (cited in Taylor and Curtis 2008:323), the then President of 
America, is on record saying „we will be prepared to act apart when our interests and 
unique responsibilities require‟. This further proves the realist position that sovereignty 
as possessed by individual states breeds anarchy as each state wants to survive by 
furthering its national interest(s) and as it looks out solely for itself. Liberalism argues 
that anarchy and power politics can be curbed by economic and commercial 
collaborative activities given that competition subsides as markets take centre stage in 
global politics. Burchill (2001:37) affirms this proposition arguing that „free-trade would 
also break down the divisions between states and unite individuals everywhere in one 
community‟. This proposition seemingly suggests that sovereignty is not the salient 
element in international politics as realism contends. The liberal assumption 
downplays the importance of sovereignty whilst what liberalism advocates for in terms 
of global institutions of government is actually an affirmation of the doctrine of 
sovereignty. Creating supranational structures to regulate activities such as politics, 
trade, and economic activity, to mention a few aspects, assumes that those 
supranational structures are accorded sovereign power to enact and enforce the 
agreements that states become signatories to. 
 
Hierarchy is an affirmation of sovereignty.  Morgenthau (1948:259) cited in Rudolph 
(2005:2) supports this position and argues that the supreme authority implied by 
sovereignty logically means that „no two or more entities - persons, groups of persons, 
agencies - can be sovereign within the same time and space‟. Hierarchy is therefore 
reciprocally affirmed by sovereignty. In a hierarchy the top is the highest and hence 
the final authority beyond which there is no other. Hypothetically arguing, if the UN is 
to be the supranational structure to regulate and govern inter-state relations, it means 
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that the UN will have to be „sovereign‟ for it to be able to enact, enforce and arbitrate 
between states. This is not to suggest that liberalism envisions the UN as the world 
government. However, liberalism does not seem to answer these questions raised. It 
can be concluded that liberalism in fact operates on double standards, what it criticises 
in realism, is what it indirectly seeks for its consolidation.  
 
2.4 Constructivism: Its Assumptions and Propositions on Sovereignty  
 
This study has so far established that realism describes inter-state relations, while 
liberalism prescribes behaviour for inter-state relations. In this section of the study, it 
will be argued and demonstrated that constructivism is best suited to analyse the 
doctrine of sovereignty as constructivism investigates and seeks to understand 
phenomena in entirety. Constructivism is also referred to as social constructivism or 
the identity perspective in various literature (Barnet 2011:150; Reus-Smit 2001:215; 
Hobson 2000:145; Nau 2012:12). This study recognises and concedes that 
constructivism - as an analytic framework - is not itself unitary. Constructivism is varied 
and divergent. For the purposes of this research, this study will focus on the core 
ideas as proffered by various strands of constructivism. Constructivism recognises that 
states are the principal actors in world politics (Reus-Smit 2001:210) and thus affirms 
the doctrine of sovereignty. This work argues that the concept of sovereignty itself is a 
social construct and that constructivism endorses sovereignty. Alexander Wendt is 
one proponent who is considered the father of social constructivism in international 
relations discourse (Nau 2012:47-48). 
 
According to Barnett (2011:150) constructivism as a theory of international relations 
rose to prominence in the early 1990s after the demise of the Cold War. It can also be 
traced back to the 1980s emerging from the neo-neo debate. Reus-Smit (2001:210) 
and Nau (2012:47) concur with this view. As opposed to substantive theories of 
international relations such as realism, constructivism is more of a social theory. It is 
concerned with the relationship between agents and structures. Some scholars like 
Onuf (1998:58) even argue that constructivism is not a theory per se but „makes it 
feasible to theorise about matters that seem to be unrelated because the concepts 
and propositions normally used to talk about such matters are also unrelated‟. For the 
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purposes of this study, constructivism as a social theory is concerned with the 
relationship between states and non-state actors (agents), and conditions of 
international political relations (structures). 
 
Constructivism succinctly and boldly challenges rationalist theories22 (realism, neo-
realism, liberalism, neo-liberalism, institutionalism) and quips that rationalist theories 
are excessively materialistic. Rationalist theories in general erroneously assume that 
states/actors/individuals [collectively referred to as agents as proposed by Onuf 
(1998:59)] always „rationally pursue their power or utility-maximising preferences or 
interests‟ (Hobson 200:145; Reus-Smit 2001:211). Thus, rational theories assume that 
agents‟ preferences are exogenous and immune to social interaction. The implication 
of this rationalist position is that agents‟ preferences are external and pre-determined 
before actors (both individuals and states) are socialised. Constructivism argues that 
agents are socialised first and in the process of socialisation acquire identity. Onuf 
(1998:59) agrees with this view and argues that „people make society, and society 
makes people. This is a continuous, two-way process‟. Identity is acquired in and 
through, amongst other things but not restricted to, cultural structures, community 
association, and the external environment. Political rationalist theories seem to ignore, 
if not negate, the influences that such social norms, ideas, social structures and the 
environment play in the identity of agents and the external behaviour thereof. „States 
do not a priori know what their interests are‟ (Hobson 2000:146), meaning that states 
do not have knowledge of their interests prior to socialisation. Thus, socialisation and 
in the view of this study, enculturation play a salient part in the formation of agents‟ 
interests. States‟ interests, according to constructivists, are determined and informed 
by social normative structures (Barnett 2011:155; Hobson 2000:146; Nau 2012:46; 
Reus-Smit 2001:214). Structures come about as a result of intended deliberations and 
ideas that encompass such deliberations. It is worthwhile to discuss how ideas 
influence social action as contained in the structures that govern them. 
 
 
                                                          
22
 Political rationalist theory should not be confused with the English philosophical rationalism (Hobson 
2000:145). 
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2.4.1 Ideas 
 
According to Nau (2012:45), ideas „define or construct the identity of actors, and these 
identities in turn interpret or give meaning to the material capabilities and institutional 
behaviour of states‟. Ruggie (1998:856) concurs with this view and argues that 
„constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life‟. It can 
be deduced that the consciousness that Ruggie speaks of is actually ideas as they are 
contained in human beings‟ consciousness. This further suggests that reality is 
contained in consciousness. In other words reality is constructed, as Barnett 
(2011:155) would argue. Nau (2012:45) echoes the same view that „just as anarchy is 
a key concept in the realist perspective and reciprocity is a key concept in the liberal 
perspective, construction of identities is a key concept in identity perspectives‟. Reality 
does not exist exogenously somewhere as it is what an individual makes sense of and 
interprets. Reality therefore is relative and may appear objective to the individual who 
perceives it, but not necessarily so for the next person. To this effect Barnett 
(2011:155) argues that:  
Our mental maps are shaped by collectively held ideas such as knowledge, symbols, 
language, and rules. Idealism does not reject material reality but instead observes that 
the meaning and construction of that material reality is dependent on ideas and 
interpretation. 
 
 
Constructivism recognises that „actors are not born outside of and prior to society … 
actors are produced and created by their cultural environment‟ (Barnett 2011:155). 
Nau (2012:45) reinforces this view arguing that „identities are collective or shared, not 
autonomous, and can be constructed only through repetitive social interactions … 
these identities then shape or give meaning to material and institutional realities‟. 
Legro (2005:1) warns that „ideas do not always shift in the direction of harmonious 
engagement‟. This can be interpreted as the cause of disagreements, contention and 
contestations in international relations.  Legro‟s observation makes for an important 
contribution to international politics. He argues that even with noble ideas, differences 
of opinion on the implementation of such ideas still exist. Some things are dependent 
on human consensus and some are not. Constructivism is interested in issues that are 
dependent on human agreement and consensus as it is such issues that affect human 
society specifically and exclusively. Mountains, rivers, seas, trees and animals, to 
mention a few, exist independent of human agreement and consensus and these are 
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natural facts. Whether or not human beings are present or agree about them, natural 
facts remain.  
 
Issues of terrorism, war, conflict, refugees, nationality, sovereignty, state security, 
national interest(s) and globalisation are issues that are human-dependent. This 
„historically produced and culturally bound knowledge enables individuals to construct 
and give meaning to reality … existing categories help us to understand, define, and 
make sense of the world‟ (Barnett 2011:155). Similarly Nau (2012:45) contends that 
„power and institutions are not objective but subjective or intersubjective realities‟. 
These sorts of issues are social constructs of the human mind. It does not mean 
therefore that because such issues are social constructs of the human mind, they do 
not exist. They exist in so far as there is agreement and consensus among human 
beings. Human beings are not always in agreement, they sometimes differ, as such 
constructivists:  
Reject the unity of science thesis, that is, that the methods of the natural 
sciences are appropriate for understanding the social world … Humans reflect 
on their experiences and use these experiences to inform their reasons for 
their behaviour. Atoms do not (Barnett 2011:157).  
  
There are some social constructs „that now appear to us as natural and are now part 
of our social vocabulary. Sovereignty did not always exist; it was a product of historical 
forces and human interactions that generated new distinctions regarding where 
political authority resided‟ (Barnett 2011:156). Hobson (2000:157) echoes this view 
and argues that „sovereignty is not a material foundation but a social construction‟. 
Cognisant that socially constructed reality may not always be acceptable and 
legitimate everywhere all the time, there is a need for international political actors to 
engage with one another with an open mind.  
 
What realists may perceive as hostile treatment from a foreign state, liberals may see 
it as an opportunity to engage in dialogue. Constructivism sets the tone for dialogue in 
pursuit of understanding another‟s position. Barnett (2011:156) is of the view that „a 
world of Mahatma Gandhis will be very different from a world of Osama bin Ladens‟. 
Elsewhere Barnett (2008:163) argues „the social construction of reality also shapes 
what is viewed as legitimate action‟. Legitimacy follows social construction, or does it? 
Does the end justify the means? Or are there legitimate rules of engagement in 
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obtaining an end? Are there certain actions that are simply unacceptable? For 
example, was the invasion and violation of Afghanistan‟s state sovereignty, by the 
USA, in search of Osama Bin Laden a justifiable means of ending terrorism? Was 
violating the state sovereignty of Iraq in the belief and suspicion that Iraq had weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) a justifiable means of ensuring world security and peace 
by the USA? Constructivism will argue that there must be some actions that are 
unacceptable despite the end intended. The USA‟s decision to go into Iraq without the 
consent of the UNSC not only meant that the operation was to be costly for the USA 
because it did not have any other nation supporting and therefore financing the 
operation, as confirmed by Barnett (2008:163). The decision was illegal under 
international law. Could the actions of the USA be a reflection of the identity of the 
USA? An exploration of the concept of identity in constructivism beckons. 
 
2.4.2 Identity 
 
According to Wendt (1995:87), „identities are the basis of interests‟. Constructivists 
argue that culture informs the meanings that people give to their actions (Reus-Smit 
2001:217; Barnett 2011:156). „The norms of the international system condition the 
social identity of the sovereign state‟ (Reus-Smit 2001:217). Hobson (2000:146), in 
corroboration of this view avers that „norms constantly mould and re-mould states 
through processes of socialisation‟. Hence, it can be argued that constructivism can 
explain change and progressive development in the social sphere of human life in 
general, and the political sphere in particular (the end of World War II and the Cold 
War for example). Identities inform interests and, in turn, actions (Reus-Smit 
2001:217). As such, „identities change in line with normative structural changes‟ as 
affirmed by Hobson (2000:146). Reus-Smit (2001:221) asserts that „ideas change, 
norms evolve, and culture transforms‟ and by so saying encapsulates the contention 
regarding the doctrine of sovereignty. State and sovereignty are mutually defining 
concepts/entities. Thus, as maintained and explained by constructivism, these two 
concepts (state and sovereignty) can change, evolve and transform. Weber (2001:60) 
echoes this view that identities and interests in international politics are not stable but 
that they have no pre-given nature. „This is as true for the identity of the sovereign 
nation-state as it is for the identity of international anarchy‟ (ibid).  
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Sovereignty did not always exist, and „weapons of mass destruction‟ (WMD) are fairly 
recent phenomena. Concepts such as sovereignty are „orienting concepts that can 
have any number of meanings‟ (Barnett 2011:157). In other words, domestic and 
international domains of states are imaginary social constructs. To this effect Hobson 
(2000:159) contends: 
„Normative statecraft‟ refers to the processes by which the state creates an 
imaginary domestic political community or nation that appears as unified and 
harmonious. The political community or nation is according to Benedict 
Anderson (1983) imagined because it does not exist as a complete or unified 
totality, given that it is incoherent and constantly fragmented.  
 
 
Hence social constructs or socially created reality, such as the doctrine of sovereignty, 
have the propensity and capacity to evolve and change. As such „states and non-state 
actors have rival interpretations of the meanings of these concepts and will fight to try 
to have their preferred meaning collectively accepted‟ (Barnett 2011:157). Additionally 
socially constructed reality depends on consensus. This means therefore that the 
interpretation of socially constructed reality can and will vary depending on who 
interprets it and for what purposes. 
 
As will be demonstrated later in this study sovereignty can be interpreted from various 
angles and for various objectives. Some argue that sovereignty is responsibility, 
others that it is supremacy and yet others contend that sovereignty is power and self-
rule. While all these interpretations can be validated and corroborated, it remains then 
that sovereignty is in fact dynamic as it can mean various things to different people in 
different historical epochs. To confirm and substantiate this position, Barnett 
(2011:160) advances the argument that: 
The Peace of Westphalia helped to establish sovereignty and the norm of non-
interference, but in recent decades various processes have worked against 
the principle of non-interference and suggested how state sovereignty is 
conditional on how states treat their populations, best known as a 
responsibility to protect.  
 
 
This observation by Barnett epitomises what this work subscribes to, that sovereignty 
is best understood in the frameworks of constructivism. What constructivism 
emphasises is that social constructions come and go. Alternative ways such as 
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engaging in dialogue and communication are imperative as advocated for by Barnett 
(2011:164) and Nau (2012:45). Constructivism also holds the view that the 
environment „can construct the actors‟ identities and interests‟ (Barnett 2011:159). The 
logic of appropriateness is what constructivism proffers. In other words; given who 
(state) we are (identity), what is it (action) that we do (appropriate action) under the 
circumstances is what informs constructivist thinking. Agere sequitu esse is a Latin 
axiom meaning „action follows being‟ – one acts in accordance with one‟s identity as 
one‟s identity influences choices and shapes one‟s actions. Nau (2012:47) echoes this 
view that „actors behave on the basis of how they construct their identities‟. Reus-Smit 
(2001:218) in agreement with the constructivist view contends that ideas „define the 
meaning and identity of the individual actor and the patterns of appropriate economic, 
political, and cultural activity engaged in by those individuals‟.  
 
Constructivism esteems the logic of appropriateness as opposed to the logic of 
consequences proffered by the rational choices theory. Identity informs what actions a 
state (agent) undertakes in given circumstances (structures). As such, the social 
structures and individual identity have the potential of curtailing agents‟ behaviour. 
Nau (2012:45) contends that „states have independent or internal identities that allow 
them to think creatively and shape or change the social discourse in which they are 
involved‟. In other words, these identities influence states‟ behaviours in their external 
relations. Thus, constructivists as argued by Reus-Smit (2001:219), emphasise „the 
social determinants of social and political agency and action‟. 
 
2.4.3 Agents 
 
People, as active participants in society, are agents (Onuf 1998:59). For the purposes 
of this study, agents will also mean states as these are governments and are 
representatives of various peoples in their jurisdictions and respective political border 
demarcations. Thus in this study, people, states and agents are concepts that will be 
used interchangeably. In essence these concepts point to one reality - that of agency. 
 
As such, agents and structures are interlinked through „the mean‟ or put differently 
through rules. Onuf (ibid:80) further states that:  
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The co-construction of people as social beings and of society is a continuous 
process. Rules are central to this process because they make people active 
participants (or agents) in society, and they give any society its distinctive 
character (or structure). Rules define agents in terms of structures, and 
structures in terms of agents … As rules change in number, kind, relation and 
content, they constantly redefine agents and structures, always in terms of 
each other. 
 
Thus rules are emphasised as the link between agents and structure. On the one 
hand the issue of rules suggests that the agents have choices to make; implying that 
one may follow rules or ignore them with consequences, sometimes unintended. On 
the other hand, it is the structure of society that gives rise to, and informs rule-making. 
Hence, „rules link agents and structures in a common process of constitution‟ (Onuf 
1998:81). This brings this discussion to focus in some detail on the structures that 
constructivism investigates, discusses and advocates for. 
 
2.4.4 Structure 
 
According to Wendt (1995:58), „structures of human association are determined 
primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces‟. Nau (2012:48) echoes similar 
statements. In line with Wendt‟s thought, Onuf (1998:61) asserts that „rules and 
related practises frequently form a stable (but never fixed) pattern suiting agents‟ 
intentions, regardless of whether those rules are followed by design or accident‟. As 
such, both Wendt and Onuf argue that social structures are premised on rules, and 
rules are a result of ideas. Rules form and shape institutions and hence structure is a 
construct of the mind. As affirmed by Gould (2003:83), „structures exist because 
agents see patterns to which they impute structure‟. Elsewhere Wendt (1995:73) 
asserts that constructivists „argue that material resources only acquire meaning for 
human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded‟. 
Normative and ideational structures shape the social identities of political actors 
(Reus-Smit 2001:217).  
 
Rationality forms the basis of law. Law comes into play when people enter into what 
Kant calls the „social contract‟23. Zacher and Matthews (1995:109) note that 
                                                          
23
 Social contract is entered into by individuals who are well informed of what the contract entails and 
therefore are legally bound and obligated to honour their part of the contract (Jansson 1994).  
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„international relations are gradually becoming transformed such that they promote 
greater human freedom by establishing conditions of peace, prosperity and justice‟. 
This is as a consequence of the changing attitudes resulting from ideas that are born 
out of, and in turn shape, social societal structures; a phenomena that constructivism 
calls the mutual or substantive definition of terms. Cumulative progress is essential in 
human affairs as affirmed by Keohane (1990:174) and Burchill (2001:33). In line with 
this thought, constructivism acknowledges and recognises what political rationalist 
theories, particularly realism and liberalism, describe. But constructivism believes that 
the anarchic and hostile situation of international politics can be transcended. Peace is 
possible and human beings should aspire to live in perpetual peace. On the one hand, 
realism argues that there can be no law and order in an environment that has an 
absence of a central authority. On the other, constructivism in agreement with 
liberalism argues that the situation described by realism (on international politics) is 
but a result of ideas and ideas can change. The world can be re-created or re-invented 
in the conceptualisation of social constructivism. It can hence be argued that „anarchy 
is what states make of it‟ (Wendt 1992).  
 
According to Weber (2001:60), „if states behave conflictually toward one another, then 
it appears that the „nature‟ of international anarchy is one of conflict. If states behave 
cooperatively towards one another, then it appears that the „nature‟ of international 
anarchy is cooperative‟. As espoused by scholars like Barnett (2011:159), „the cultural 
context shapes not only identities and interests of actors but also the very strategies 
they can use as they pursue their interests‟. This position confirms the fact that the 
external environment, be it culture, politics, and social norms, inform, shape and 
determine the possible routes that agents can follow. It can be suggested that the 
trajectory that an agent follows is determined by the societal structures created by 
human consensus. Barnett (2011:151) intones that, of the various plausible 
explanatory frameworks and theories:  
Some drew from sociological theory, emphasising how structures constrain 
and constitute (or construct) the identities and interests of actors. Other drew 
from critical theory and the desire to uncover the power behind seemingly 
value-neutral concepts such as sovereignty and recovering the meanings that 
actors give to their activities. 
 
For a long time international relations theorising has been dominated by political 
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rational theories. Ruggie (1983:201) affirms that - in line with the view proffered by 
constructivism - the state system „has been organised according to alternative 
principles‟. This position is corroborated by Barnett (2011:152) who argues that 
perhaps most critically, „the modern international system begins with the end of 
feudalism and the emergence of sovereignty‟. According to Waltz (1979:59), 
sovereignty is the „defining organising principle of the modern states-system‟. Ashley 
(1984:33) avers that neo-realism treated „basic concepts of international relations, 
such as sovereignty, as if they are natural and thus fails to recognise how they are 
socially and culturally produced within a historical context‟. Nau (2012:46) concurs with 
this view and submits that „we cannot touch sovereignty the way we can a tank or 
building. But sovereignty still exists and exerts a powerful influence on international 
behaviour and outcomes‟.  
 
To further corroborate this view, Kratochwil (1991:47) argues that: 
 
The rules of sovereignty not only regulate state practices but also make 
possible the very idea of a sovereign state. Furthermore, rules are not static 
but are revised through practice, reflection and arguments by actors regarding 
how they should be applied to new situations.  
  
Thus rules should be interpreted, and we „cannot know the meanings of rules from the 
outside looking in, but rather need to see the world as it is understood by the 
participants‟ (Barnett 2011:153). The basic claim that constructivism is premised on is 
that „social forces such as ideas, knowledge, norms, and rules influence states‟ 
identities and interests, and the very organisation of world politics‟ (Barnett 2011:150). 
Nau (2012:45) shares this view and argues that shared knowledge „shapes shared 
identities that define them [actors in international relations] and their counterparts‟. In 
turn, as corroborated by Barnett (2011:150) „societies shape identities, interests and 
capacities of individuals‟. Nau (2012:45) further contends that „these identities may be 
adversarial and distrustful, or they may be friendly and cooperative‟.  
 
For social constructivism „anarchy in international affairs is not fixed‟ hence, the 
argument advanced by Wendt (1992) „anarchy is what states make of it‟. Barnett 
(2011:150) further reinforces the position that „ideas define the international structure‟ 
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and it is that structure [anarchy24] that „shapes identities, interests, and foreign policies 
of states‟. Conversely, „states and non-state actors reproduce that structure – and at 
times transform it‟ (ibid). Onuf (1998:62) argues that scholars who call international 
relations anarchic are not arguing that anarchy is an absence of rules, as that would 
be chaos not anarchy; „instead, they seem to be saying that structure and especially a 
stable pattern of unintended consequences, rules the day‟. Elsewhere Barnett 
(2011:152) argues that „structures are also defined by ideas, norms, and rules‟. In 
other words, structures contain normative and material elements. 
 
2.4.5 Critique of Constructivism 
 
Realism and liberalism both rely on causal reasoning; X causes Y. The constructivist 
approach on the other hand relies on constitutive reasoning; „X and Y constitute or 
mutually cause one another rather than one factor causing the other sequentially‟ 
(Nau 2012:13). As such, in constitutive reasoning, „causes emerge from cumulative 
practices and narratives, not from independent and sequential events‟ (ibid:47). 
Reus-Smit (2001:218) concurs with the constructivist view that „agents and 
structures are mutually constituted. Normative and ideational structures may well 
condition the identities and interests of actors, but those structures would not exist if 
it were not for the knowledgeable practices of those actors‟. In corroboration of this 
view, Gould (1998:80) asserts that agents and structures „each constitute the other‟ 
and „simultaneously, agents and structures enable and constrain each other‟. 
Constructivism, thus, is a befitting analytic framework to analyse the doctrine of 
sovereignty. Following the path paved by constructivism, the doctrine of sovereignty 
is constitutive; sovereignty and the state are mutually defining concepts. State 
defines sovereignty, so too is state defined by sovereignty. Constructivism is 
axiological in nature. It is value-laden and value-based. Like liberalism, it seeks to 
instil values of mutual respect and forbearance both in the domestic order as well as 
in the international order. It also promotes values of self-respect, respect of others 
and respect of property. It can be argued therefore that constructivism presumes that 
world politics can change for the better as opposed to realism that makes no room 
                                                          
24
 Waltz argued that the structure of the international system had amongst other elements ‘anarchy’. Realism 
and liberalism converge on this point that the structure and environment of international relations is anarchic, 
thus, anarchy defines international relations theories (Barnett 2011:151). 
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for change and advancement from evil and the pervasive and corrupted human 
nature. 
 
Sovereignty as possessed by individual states breeds anarchy as each state wants to 
survive by furthering its national interest(s) and looks out for itself alone as argued by 
realism. Constructivism counter-argues the position of realism and advances the idea 
that anarchy and power politics are as a result of the manner in which actors think 
about them. It can be suggested that actors can choose to think about anarchy 
differently as an opportunity of collective engagement and thus change the view that 
world politics is about conquest, power and domination. International political actors 
can also embrace that world politics is about what is important to society, peace, 
prosperity, progress and the good of all concerned.  
 
Hobson (2000:157) advances a challenge to constructivism. He argues that state 
identity formation „necessarily leads to exclusion, repression, violence and the 
marginalisation of minorities‟ (ibid). In this sense, it can be argued that constructivism 
views the construction of state identity in negative terms. The argument that Hobson 
advances reveals that the logic of representation makes arbitrary distinctions between 
„us‟ and „them‟ and between „self‟ and „other‟. This can be argued as a limitation of the 
social constructivist/identity perspective theory. Domestically states „draw boundaries 
within society in order to repress those groups that do not conform to the pure notion 
of the self‟ (ibid:159). In the international domain states create „the appearance of a 
threatening other‟ and by so doing „the state is able to confer the appearance of unity 
upon the self‟ (ibid). The international realm of politics is a result of the constructed 
self-identity of states. As such anarchy is not an external factor but a projection of the 
internal factors of states. In other words, anarchy of necessity constitutes the 
international order. 
 
The creation of supranational structures to regulate activities such as politics, trade, 
and economics, to mention a few aspects, assumes that the created supranational 
structures are accorded sovereign power to enact and enforce the agreements that 
states become signatories to. This suggests hierarchy and it is an affirmation of 
sovereignty.  Morgenthau (1948:259) cited in Rudolph (2005:2) supports this position 
when he argues that the supreme authority implied by sovereignty logically means that 
47 
 
„no two or more entities - persons, groups of persons, agencies - can be sovereign 
within the same time and space‟. Thus hierarchy is reciprocally affirmed by 
sovereignty. In a hierarchy, the top is the highest and the final authority beyond which 
there is no other. It can be argued that if the UN is to be that supranational structure to 
regulate and govern inter-state relations, it means that it will have to be „sovereign‟ in 
order to be able to enact, enforce and arbitrate in and between states. This suggests 
that there is need for law and legitimate authority to enforce order in inter-state political 
relations. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter argued that realism seeks to explain phenomena as observed in the 
political world. It demonstrated that realism upholds that human nature is corruptible. 
Since human nature can be corrupted, realists cannot trust anyone else but 
themselves in the way they conduct politics in the international realm. It was noted, 
however, that realism does not account for altruistic humanitarian action.  
 
This chapter also argued that liberalism is prescriptive of the issues and problems 
arising in international politics, whereas realism is descriptive. It is more appealing to 
progressive economies as it emanated from international markets. The liberty of 
individuals is hailed as an achievement brought by liberalism and such liberty is not 
only for the individual, but for other individuals as well. As such, liberalism promotes 
peace and liberty for all. The rule of law is emphasised by liberalism and is the 
impetus to economic growth and freedom. It was observed that even though liberal 
states pride themselves in internal stability and pacific foreign relations, history 
proves the contrary as liberal states can be as ruthless towards non-liberal and non-
democratic states.  
 
The chapter also argued that constructivism emphasises ontology as opposed to 
epistemology which is emphasised by rational theories (realism, liberalism, 
Marxism). Comparatively, constructivism is both descriptive and prescriptive of the 
issues and problems arising from international politics. Constructivism is axiological 
in nature; it is value-laden and value-based. Like liberalism, it seeks to instil values of 
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mutual respect and tolerance both in the domestic order and international order. It 
seeks to promote values of self-respect, respect of others and respect of property. 
Thus, constructivism, like liberalism, promotes peace and liberty for all.  
 
It was also observed that sovereignty is a social construct. Therefore it is not 
materialistic or atomist and hence it is best examined and analysed through the lens 
of constructivism. Realism and liberalism are premised on the doctrine of 
sovereignty. Constructivism, although it recognises and affirms the doctrine of 
sovereignty, goes further by analysing not only the essence of sovereignty, but 
investigating the context in which the doctrine of sovereignty arises.  
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CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The conceptualisation and execution of the concept of sovereignty has undergone a 
lot of changes in various historical epochs meaning that sovereignty cannot be 
conceived a-historically (Clark 1999:70). Seemingly there is a shift in the meaning of 
sovereignty from the traditional, all powerful, supreme and absolute notions that 
were premised on the Peace Treaty of Westphalia (1648). Contemporary 
international norms, particularly the human rights notions upheld by some interest-
groups, governments and individuals, present sovereignty as inclusive, transitional 
and dynamic. As discussed in Chapter Two, the social conditions, societal 
structures, social environment and the passage of time have an impact on social 
realities and social constructions such as the doctrine of sovereignty. Both the 
conception and practice of sovereignty span over, at least, 400 years, thus it has a 
very long and rich history.  
 
Contemporary international relations theories and practices are premised on the 
doctrine of sovereignty as informed and influenced by the Westphalian system of 
1648 (Krasner 2006:86; Makinda 2001:406; Osiander 2001:251). Principles of 
sovereignty form the basis of international political relations. Despite the various 
arguments and challenges posed by the proponents (Thomson 1995:215; Zacher 
1992; Gottlieb 1993; Fowler and Bunck 1995; Lyons and Mastanduno 1995) and 
processes of globalisation respectively - that seem to suggest the demise of it - 
sovereignty remains central and vital to international relations. Emerich De Vattel 
(1883:154) cited in Rudolph (2005:1) asserted that „of all rights that can belong to a 
nation, sovereignty is doubtless the most precious‟. Sovereignty is an indispensable 
concept and feature of the European state system and of contemporary international 
politics. Chris Brown (2002) affirms that sovereignty is the distinctive and 
distinguishing characteristic of international politics. It is integral to international 
political thought and action. As international relations theories are premised on the 
doctrine of sovereignty, it has over the years been the template that informs 
international political thought and action.  
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There are various views and definitions of the term sovereignty as proffered by 
various entities that include, among others, academia, governments, 
intergovernmental organisations and non-governmental organisations. This chapter 
will explore the etymology and origins of the doctrine of sovereignty. The chapter will 
also explore various divergent and some convergent views, understandings and 
assumptions of sovereignty. It will also propose a working definition of sovereignty 
which is informed by the UN as enshrined in its Charter, Articles 2(1)25, 2(7)26 and 
7827. In so doing, it is the hope of this study, that the doctrine of sovereignty will be 
treated with some circumspection.  
 
3.2 Defining Sovereignty 
 
The standard definition of sovereignty that will be used in this study is one informed 
by the UN. In spite of the weaknesses and biased composition28 of the UNSC 
(Chandler 2008:27; Chomsky 2008:12, 16; Mhiripiri 2008:153), most governments 
and inter-governmental organisations and institutions view the UN as a neutral 
arbiter of international grievances of its member-states. Zimbabwe is a member-state 
of the UN, and as such, it makes fair sense to adjudicate and assess whether or not 
Zimbabwe in its May 2005 Operation Murambatsvina was indeed justifiable as it 
claimed under the doctrine of sovereignty.  
 
Rudolph (2005:2) argues that sovereignty is complex and multi-faceted; to that 
effect, there is no single, universally accepted definition of the concept of 
                                                          
25
 Article 2(1) of the UN Charter reads: ‘The Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of 
all its Members’ (http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/).  
26
Article 2(7) reads: ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll (ibid). 
27
 Article 78 of the UN Charter reads: ‘The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become 
Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of 
sovereign equality’ (ibid). 
28
 This assertion is informed by generally accepted norms and principles of representative democracy as 
espoused by the UN. As an institution of multilateral democracy, the UN seeks to instil, in institutions of global 
governance, these norms and principles such as democracy. Given the principles of democracy and equality, 
the UN should reflect these in its conduct, processes and practices. Africa constitutes more than half of the 
sovereign states that comprise the UN; yet this factor is not reflected in the decision-making mechanisms of 
the UN, particularly the Security Council. It can be argued that the current state of affairs can be interpreted as 
unwillingness on the part of the permanent members of the Security Council to transform and conform to the 
internationally accepted standard of representative democracy.  
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sovereignty. Krieger (2006:78) agrees with the view that sovereignty is not a unitary 
and singular concept but that it is multi-dimensional. In corroboration of this view, 
Hobson (2000:161) and in line with Biersteker and Weber (1996:104) argues that:  
Sovereignty is not an objective category which acts as a referent for the state. 
Sovereignty itself must have a referent – that is, it must be grounded in a 
foundational „truth‟, such as God or „the people‟ that must be „written‟ by the 
state through statecraft. And because such referents are themselves 
constructed, so sovereignty is, ultimately a social construct. 
 
Some argue that sovereignty is an absolute principle. For example, Keene (2002:44) 
quotes Hugo Grotius‟ argument that „sovereignty is a unity, in itself indivisible‟ and 
Lake (2003:305) confirms this position. Grotius‟ position sharply contrasts with that of 
Wilde (1919:658), who contends that sovereignty is not an absolute principle, 
arguing instead that sovereignty is contested, configurable, and flexible. This view is 
in line with the argument espoused by this study that sovereignty is contested and 
dynamic. In confirmation of this view, Sir Geoffrey Howe (1990:676), a British 
international relations practitioner, argues that „sovereignty is not some pre-defined 
absolute, but a flexible, adaptable, organic notion that evolves and adjusts with 
circumstances‟. Howe‟s assertion converges with the notion of constructivism that 
socially constructed concepts must evolve and accumulate in meaning over time as 
societies become aware of new realities around them.  
 
Nau (2012:46) argues that sovereignty consists of procedural and regulatory norms 
as opposed to substantive norms such as human rights. Nau‟s position contrasts 
with both Howe‟s and Grotius‟ arguments. On the one hand Howe contends that the 
concept of sovereignty is not unitary, proposing that sovereignty changes and 
evolves. On the other hand, Grotius‟ argument contends that sovereignty is 
inviolable, absolute and a unitary concept. Nau goes further to position an argument 
that has little to do with the opposing assertions of unitary and flexible notions of 
sovereignty. He contends that sovereignty has more to do with the regulation of 
social relations between individuals in society and between the society and its 
government. In other words Nau suggests that sovereignty consists of procedural 
norms that govern a society, between its individual members as well as between the 
collective of individuals and their government (sovereign). Sovereignty equates to 
practices and procedures used for regulating society. The implication of Nau‟s 
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argument is that sovereignty is not unitary. Nau does not necessarily argue that the 
notions or principles of sovereignty are contested. Nau, however, implies that not 
only is sovereignty not absolute –therefore possibly contestable - it is not unitary 
either. If sovereignty was a unitary concept, it would mean that sovereignty has one 
particular standard operating procedure. But, Nau explicitly declares that sovereignty 
equates to regulatory procedures (plural), as opposed to a regulatory procedure 
(singular), thereby implicitly endorsing that sovereignty is not a unitary notion. 
Despite the various positions proffered by the various proponents of the discussed 
contrasting views, there are however, some implicit and explicit defining 
characteristics of the concept of sovereignty deducible that include, but are not 
limited to, authority, legitimacy, legality, autonomy (non-interference by external 
forces), supremacy, power and territorial control.  
 
Sovereignty implies some sort of autonomy, claiming a sense of autonomy of the 
political unit involved. States are politically independent of one from another. In the 
domain of international politics it is states, strictly speaking, that are sovereign. 
Sovereignty can also be seen as a claim by a state to be free and independent of 
another‟s jurisdiction. Hence the call made by Wight (1977:135) cited in Clark 
(1999:76) that „it would be impossible to have a society of sovereign states … unless 
each state, while claiming sovereignty for itself, recognised that every other state has 
the right to claim and enjoy its own sovereignty as well‟. Wight‟s assertion clearly 
articulates the importance of a state‟s autonomy as entrenched in the principles of 
sovereignty. Hence, the jurisdiction of a state is exercised only over its citizenry 
within the geographic demarcations (political borders) of that particular state, and of 
course, on foreigners who are within that state.  
 
In a sovereign state there is a central governing authority (central/federal, national 
government) which is the final and highest arbitrator in that state. A sovereign state 
can only exert and enforce its laws on its citizens. A sovereign state therefore cannot 
exert and enforce its laws on a neighbouring state‟s citizenry. In the event that a 
state imposes its ideologies, policies and laws on a neighbouring state, the imposing 
state transgresses international law. It follows that part of the problem of international 
politics is the absence of such an authority that ensures cooperation and guarantees 
compliance of every state, and at all times. The contemporary international system of 
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states, which is modelled on the European state-system of the modern era, lacks a 
central legitimate authority that occupies the highest and absolute office to govern, 
regulate and arbitrate between independent sovereign states. To that effect, Brown 
(2002:6) argues that „a defining characteristic of a sovereign-based system is the 
absence of authoritative central institutions‟; this Brown makes in reference to the 
realm of international politics. This is precisely what anarchy is; an absence of a 
central governing authority and arbitrator in world affairs. 
 
There exists not a universal or world government and so there really is no highest 
and final arbitrator in the realm of inter-state relations worldwide as was discussed in 
Chapter Two and proffered by realism. The question of how power (implied by 
sovereignty) in transnational or supranational structures is exercised, and by whom 
the power is exercised, and over whom power is exercised, already surfaces. This is 
where the bone of contention is in international relations. The above discussion on 
the attempt to explore and gather definitions of sovereignty helps one to realise and 
appreciate that while it is difficult, challenging and complicated to define sovereignty, 
the attempt to define actually helps to circumscribe the discourse. From these 
populist and precursory definitions, one can deduce that power is a constitutive 
component of the definition of sovereignty. The power to govern a state is vested in 
the representative of that particular state, a statesperson or head of state - or as 
literature from the modern era referred to statesmen (sic) – „sovereign‟ (Rudolph 
2005:4; Agnew 2005:439). But where does the power of the sovereign come from? 
Is power constitutive of sovereignty? If so, why is power constitutive of sovereignty? 
Why should a sovereign‟s authority translate into material power? When does the 
authority of a sovereign become or get associated with absolute power and 
consequently, control? Can a sovereign have authority without material power? 
These are some of the questions that this particular chapter and the research as a 
whole will attempt to simultaneously answer in the course of its deliberations. 
 
3.2.1 The Working Definition of Sovereignty 
 
In line with the understanding of Ayoob (2002:82), that „sovereignty as authority (the 
right to rule over a delimited territory and the population residing within it)‟, this study 
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contends that a feature that runs consistently in all the facets of sovereignty 
discussed in this study is authority. Legitimate authority is the general and common 
defining factor of sovereignty as a principle. For individual sovereignty, one has and 
is the only legitimate authority to decide what s/he wants with and for his/her life. 
One has authority to make choices about his/her life, thus, authority is a factor that is 
implicitly and explicitly endorsed in individual sovereignty. With regards to domestic 
sovereignty or national sovereignty, like individual sovereignty, it has authority as a 
defining factor at its core. To use Croxton‟s (1999:570), words „sovereignty is an 
assumption about authority‟.  
 
The municipality (domestic sovereign) is given the mandate by the populace to 
adjudicate and arbitrate between individuals in a society as espoused and enshrined 
in the social contract. It is only because the sovereign has the authority conferred on 
him/her by the people s/he serves that s/he has authority to intervene and arbitrate 
on society‟s matters. The enforcement of rules and laws by domestic representatives 
of the sovereign is secondary. Without the primary authority to do so (enact and 
enforce rules and laws) given and recognised by individuals in society, such 
enforcement of rules and laws is tantamount to brute-force imposition of foreign 
ideologies on society. Thus, power and control do not necessarily and primarily 
define sovereignty as a concept. Power and control are as a result of individuals‟ 
recognition of and voluntary subjection to the sovereign. Anyone or any subgroup in 
a state can have power and control sections of the state or even all aspects of the 
state. But such an individual or group may not have the authority to do so. All they 
may have is raw or material power that enables them to control certain behaviours 
and manipulate situations and systems within a state.  
 
Often warlords in conflict areas have material power that is often abused in 
controlling certain parts of a state and the populace falling in the affected sections of 
that particular state. But the control and power that such a warlord possesses is 
illegitimate for it is not authorised by the society. Society has soft power to confer 
authority to societal representative(s) who then become legitimate dischargers of raw 
or material power. This observation points to another definitive factor of sovereignty, 
legitimacy. Legitimacy flows from authority. Ruggie cited in Croxton (1999:570) 
affirms this position when he argues that sovereignty „signifies a form of legitimation‟. 
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The authority conferred on the sovereign by society forms the basis for a sovereign‟s 
legitimacy. The sovereign is only legitimate in so far as s/he is accorded authority by 
his/her society.  
 
The PToW shaped and helped to establish sovereignty as a political organising 
principle in general and in particular, the norm of non-interference in the domestic 
affairs of a state. In recent decades, however, various international norms and 
processes have worked against the principle of non-interference and the exclusion of 
foreign political forces in a state‟s domestic jurisdiction and thus, suggested how „state 
sovereignty is conditional on how states treat their populations, best known as a 
responsibility to protect‟ (Barnett 2011:160). This observation by Barnett epitomises 
what this study argues, that sovereignty is best understood via the lens of 
constructivism which suggests that sovereignty is essentially a social construct and as 
such, is dynamic. Former UN Secretaries General, Kofi Annan and his predecessor, 
Boutros Boutros Ghali, are on record for declaring that „state sovereignty is not 
absolute and exclusive and can be circumscribed, even overridden, in special 
circumstances‟ (Ayoob 2002:83). This demonstrates that principles of sovereignty are 
capable of change and reconfiguration over time. Sovereignty as a socially 
constructed reality has a propensity to change and adapt to changing and evolving 
social realities of particular timelines of temporal history.  
 
This chapter will now focus on the most contentious aspect of sovereignty – non-
intervention in the domestic realm of a sovereign state and the exclusion of foreign 
actors, as opposed to foreign forces, in the domestic authority structures of a 
sovereign state as implied by the Westphalian doctrine of sovereignty. The chapter 
argues that the absolute, inviolable, and indivisible principles of the Westphalian 
sovereignty are results of the social, cultural and political contexts of the modern times 
as a historical epoch. The modern historical epoch is the stretch of time in which the 
doctrine of sovereignty first received official codification. This position is also affirmed 
by Croxton (1999:570) who argues that the PToW signalled a „formal statement of the 
principle of sovereignty‟ although the practices around the principles of sovereignty 
were established earlier than 1648. As such, since then (modern era), the social, 
political, environmental and economic contexts, to mention some aspects, have 
changed. Times have lapsed and cultures have evolved. Thus, the Westphalian 
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understanding of sovereignty has been affected, shaped, informed by the passage of 
time, and has evolved - reflecting the change of worldviews and particularly the human 
emancipation that has transpired from the modern era - to contemporary, „global 
village‟ (present) times. This chapter contrasts the political and social understanding of 
the modern era to that of the 21st century‟s understanding of global socio-politics. The 
comparison is in demonstration of the dynamism and change that the doctrine of 
sovereignty has undergone. In conclusion, this chapter will highlight some 
contemporary trends, norms and processes of globalisation that have affected the 
Westphalian understanding of the doctrine of sovereignty; particularly the doctrine of 
R2P.  
 
3.3 The Westphalian Sovereignty 
 
The Westphalian sovereignty, according to Krasner (2001:232; 2006:72), refers to 
political organisation premised on „the exclusion of external actors from authority 
structures within a given territory‟. Litfin (1997:169) concurs with this view; he argues 
that sovereignty denotes „the state‟s exclusive authority within specified territorial 
boundaries‟. The Westphalian sovereignty is also referred to as „Vattelian 
sovereignty‟ named after Emerich de Vattel who was a prominent proponent of the 
Westphalian sovereignty in the 18th century, and helped shape rules of engagement 
for the Westphalian sovereignty (Krasner 2001:232-233, 245). Krasner (2001:232), 
quoting Wolff (in Thomas and Thomas 1956: 5) stated that „to interfere in the 
government of another, in whatever way indeed that may be done is opposed to the 
natural liberty of nations in its action‟. Krasner goes on to quote Vattel‟s application 
of Wolff‟s argument on some European and non-European states which asserts that:  
The Spaniards violated all rules when they set themselves up as judges of the 
Inca Athupa. If that prince had violated the law of nations with respect to them, 
they would have had a right to punish him. But they accused him of having put 
some of his subjects to death, of having had several wives ... things, for which 
he was not at all accountable to them; and, to fill up the measure of their 
extravagant injustice, they condemned him by the laws of Spain (ibid:232).   
 
The above-mentioned position that the nation-state of Inca Athupa took would have 
today, warranted the invocation of intervention of the UN. Krasner‟s observation 
demonstrates that interstate relations have always been affected by some 
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interference from foreign actors and forces for various reasons and motivations. 
Foreign actors have always sought to influence or intervene in the domestic authority 
structures of sovereign states. As such, and as argued by Nau (2012:13), „monarchs 
who existed in Europe prior to Westphalia gathered together to assert their 
independence from the pope in Rome and Holy Roman Emperor in Vienna. They 
created the treaty to establish (cause) the practice of sovereignty‟. Thus, the PToW 
asserted and recognised each state as independent of the Holy Roman Empire (the 
Roman Catholic Church in essence); it also asserted the independence of states. 
The result of the convention of the European monarchs is what is known today as 
the PToW. In order to understand and fully appreciate the Westphalian doctrine of 
sovereignty and the intricacies thereof, this study will briefly articulate what the actual 
PToW specifically entailed, stated and sought to achieve.  
 
3.3.1 Peace Treaty of Westphalia (1648) 
 
The peace of Westphalia proper was an agreement between three signatories (the 
Holy Roman Empire, France and Sweden), consisting of two treaties signed on 24 
October 1648. The first treaty called the Treaty of Munster (Instrumentum Pacis 
Monasteriense or IPM) was signed between the Holy Roman Empire and the king of 
France. The second treaty called the Treaty of Osnabruck (Instrumentum Pacis 
Osnabrugense or IPO) was signed between the Holy Roman Empire and the Queen 
of Sweden (Osiander 2001:266). Balogun (2011:43) concurs with Osiander that the 
sovereign state emerged on the 24th of October 1648 with the ratification of the 
PToW. To that effect, Balogun declares that „the treaty formally recognised each 
sovereign‟s freedom to govern the territory under his/her control – without any 
external prodding or interference, but subject to his/her ability to hold the territory 
and command the allegiance of the people therein‟ (ibid:43). In affirmation of 
Balogun‟s viewpoint, Agnew (2005:440) contends that „the importance of the peace 
of Westphalia in 1648, for example, lay in the mutual recognition among elites of the 
new European territorial states as a set of neutral centres of public power in the face 
of devastating religious war‟. The treaty recognised the autonomy of each state in as 
much as a state recognised another‟s autonomy, thereby each state affirming 
another‟s legitimacy. This alludes to the notion of mutual recognition, now 
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entrenched in international legal sovereignty as articulated in the UN Charter, Article 
2(7). 
 
While the PToW (1648) was primarily an agreement between religious authorities 
(Roman Catholic Church and the Pope) and territories of the then France and 
Sweden, it can be deduced that non-intervention in the domestic affairs of a state by 
another is as a result of the 1648 Peace Treaty. Thus, illegitimate, illegal and 
unsolicited intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state is, to date, 
contested and unacceptable. This position is in line with what Brown (2002:79) 
argues, that „since the beginning of the Westphalia system the assumption has been 
that sovereign status implies non-intervention, that is to say that external bodies 
(including other states) have no right to intervene in the affairs of a sovereign state‟. 
 
From the 1648 Westphalian Peace Treaty, it can also be deduced that the only 
legitimate authority to govern and preside over a sovereign state‟s territory and 
population is in fact the domestic sovereign. Authority and legitimacy are implied by 
the Westphalian sovereignty as contained in and by the domestic sovereign. 
Authority concerns rule-making (Thomson 1995:223). This position points to the 
mutual and inclusive definition of concepts as proposed by social constructivism. By 
defining domestic sovereignty, one mutually defines Westphalian sovereignty as 
well. The Westphalian sovereignty is viewed as under attack and threat by various 
analysts (Balogun 2011:139; Clark 1999:34; Krasner 2001:236; 2006:71) as a result 
of processes of globalisation. Such an observation is in lieu of control as a 
component of sovereignty more than it is a component of the authority of 
sovereignty. Global trends have trivialised the Westphalian sovereignty in so far as 
the control component of sovereignty is concerned, without necessarily eroding the 
authority component of sovereignty. Like political realism and liberalism, the 
Westphalian doctrine of sovereignty is state-centric. It assumes that the primary and 
salient actors in the field of international relations are states. The Westphalian 
sovereignty leaves little room for non-state actors such as individuals and non-
governmental institutions. Yet with the contemporary culture of human rights and 
freedom, this position is difficult to sustain as rightly noted by Krasner 2001:237; 
2006:72). In corroboration of Krasner‟s observation, Chopra and Weiss (1992:113) 
argue that „as sovereignty and the prohibition against outside intervention protecting 
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it have been eroded, human rights have grown in clarity, strength and breadth. The 
evidence of 40 years suggests that this trend will continue‟. Thus, global politics 
today is saturated by issues that surpass states‟ jurisdictions and competencies 
such as environmental and climatic issues. Is it not high-time that international 
relations explicitly and inclusively accommodated non-state and individual actors in 
the practice of international politics? This position is endorsed and complimented by 
social constructivism, a theory informing this study. At this juncture, this study will 
systemically extrapolate, in detail, some of the implications of the PToW and notions 
associated with the broader Westphalian understanding of sovereignty.  
 
3.3.2 Non-Intervention 
 
It can be deduced that the Westphalian doctrine of sovereignty recognised and argued 
for the non-interference of other states in the domestic affairs of another. Ayoob 
(2002:83), in corroboration of this principle, argued that „non-intervention in the 
domestic affairs of states is an essential corollary of sovereignty‟. The notion that the 
Westphalian sovereignty is about self-determination, can also be deduced from such a 
rule that precludes foreign forces from the legitimate domestic authority structures. A 
person who is self-determined is independent of another. Likewise, a self-determining 
state must and has to be independent of any other so as to determine its own course 
of action, thought and trajectory. Despite the understanding and convention there is on 
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, „strong states have 
routinely intervened, even forcibly, in the affairs of weaker ones‟ Ayoob (2002:83). 
According to the Westphalian understanding of sovereignty a state had to prove that it 
could defend and maintain its sovereignty, as noted by Nau (2012:31). 
 
Historically, the proof of maintaining sovereign rights was by way of conquest. Thus, 
the Westphalian doctrine of sovereignty in that sense encouraged and promoted 
conquest and war. This is a position endorsed by realism‟s notions of power, self-help 
and anarchy in the realm of international relations. The defence of a sovereign territory 
was by way of force, and when deemed necessary, by way of full scale war. At the 
inception of the Westphalian sovereignty, the modern era was at its peak. Absolutism 
as an ideology, informed the social and political organisation of society; it was popular. 
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As such, the exclusion of foreign forces in the domestic of a sovereign state may, at 
that time, had been upheld without much resistance, contestation and contention. It 
was absolute. That position, however, is difficult to sustain - if not impossible - as 
international law or the law of nations, in particular cases and under certain 
circumstances, the community of states (international community) can now, and 
legally so, intervene in a sovereign state‟s territory. The autonomy and self-
determination of a state no longer necessarily exclude foreign forces in the domestic 
jurisdiction of another. International norms and multilateral agreements have made it 
possible for a state to implicitly and inversely influence another state‟s domestic and 
foreign policies. 
 
To this effect, the rules of exclusion of foreign actors‟ influences in the domestic 
affairs of a state and the prohibition of intervening in the domestic affairs of another 
state by a foreign state are, in fact, results of efforts by De Vattel and Wolff 
(Osiander 2001:232). The exclusion of external elements from domestic structures is 
what Clark (1999:72) calls the „great divide‟. He argues that „sovereignty is presented 
as demarcating the internal from the external and does so by locating supreme 
authority within the state, but only contested power claims without‟ (ibid). Thus, the 
Westphalian sovereignty is sometimes treated as dualistic in nature – expressing 
itself as supreme within the state and independent outside the state (Bull 1977:8; 
Clark 1999:73; Williams 1996:112). Interference in the domestic affairs of a 
sovereign state, according to Brown (1996:108) cited in Balogun (2011:43), is 
interpreted as aggression on the part of the interfering state and as such, it is 
illegitimate and can invoke a hostile and forceful response. At the centre of most 
literature on the doctrine of sovereignty, the most common and well-articulated is the 
Westphalian doctrine of sovereignty, yet it remains elusive to fully grasp and 
comprehend. Since the European ethnic wars in general, and German wars in 
particular, and religious wars - which lasted for about thirty years (1618-1648) - were 
halted at the signing of the Westphalia treaty in 1648, sovereignty as a principle of 
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of another state, has played an important 
part in interstate affairs (Agnew 2005:440; Armstrong 2008:46; Krasner 2001:240; 
2006:71; Osiander 2001:252; Rudolph 2005:4). The principle of non-intervention has 
mitigated in ensuring some degree of autonomy of states. Autonomy is a necessary 
corollary of the principle of non-intervention. 
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3.3.3 Autonomy 
 
The recognition of a state as sovereign by others makes it possible for all states to 
enjoy some degree of autonomy. Autonomy implies that even when a state may be 
interdependent or even dependent on another on particular issue areas, it is still 
within the rights and possibilities of that state to uncompelledly engage with another 
as an equal or – if it so chooses - not engage at all. Waltz (1979:96) in affirmation of 
this view argued that „to say that a state is sovereign means that it decides for itself 
how it will cope with its internal and external problems‟. Thus, autonomy is a 
fundamental requisite of a sovereign state. Balogun (2011:43) observes that the 
doctrine of sovereignty as enshrined in Article 64 of the 1648 treaty:   
implies exclusive power to take autonomous decisions concerning the 
maintenance of internal order; enforcement of laws and contracts; 
preservation of the society‟s cultural, moral, and religious norms; provision of 
an environment conducive to orderly exchange of goods and services; 
defense against external invasion; and conduct of relations with other 
sovereign states. 
 
In other words, Balogun argues that the exclusive power possessed by a state, makes 
it possible for that state to be autonomous. Autonomy is another crucial aspect of the 
Westphalian sovereignty. What this study extracts and deduces is that the 
Westphalian sovereignty implies that a sovereign state is one that has authority and 
power to determine its own trajectory; one that has power and authority to control what 
transpires within its territorial borders as well as enact and enforce law and order 
within its domestic jurisdiction. Autonomy and self-determination are aspects of 
independence, thus, they equate to the exclusion of foreign forces‟ meddling in the 
domestic confines of a sovereign state.  
 
Krasner (2001:242; 2006:71) affirms this view that: 
The Westphalian model asserts two principles – territoriality and autonomy, 
defined by the exclusion of external actors from exercising authority or 
effective control29 within the borders of a given state.  
 
Thus, at the core of the Westphalian interpretation of sovereignty is the notion of 
autonomy predicated by the notion of non-intervention. No other state has the 
                                                          
29
 According to Thomson (1995:223) control equates to rule-enforcement, as opposed to authority which 
equates to law enactment. 
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legitimate authority to intervene in the domestic affairs of another. This study can 
deduce then that, according to the Westphalian doctrine of sovereignty, a state, and it 
alone, can determine its course of action for it enjoys autonomy. Independence is 
emphasised by the Westphalian sovereignty. Ideally speaking, no other external actor 
or authority should intervene or meddle in the affairs of another state. 
 
From the above deliberations on sovereignty, it still does not explain why sovereignty, 
and particularly the Westphalian interpretation of it, has been interpreted and 
presented as absolute, inviolable, static, indivisible and final. This is a particular 
junction that, social constructivism as a theory, can shed better light on this study, in 
order to better appreciate the intricacies and depth of the notions of sovereignty. The 
core ideas of the Westphalian sovereignty as such - explored thus far - do not suffice 
as a comprehensive and satisfactory explanation as to why the Westphalian 
sovereignty in particular is portrayed as absolute, indivisible and inviolable. 
Constructivism would suggest that a study such as this one should explore and 
investigate the structures around the inception and creation of sovereignty. Hence, 
unpacking and understanding the principles of sovereignty born out of the PToW 
(1648) without the understanding of the cultural, social, political, religious and 
environmental circumstances surrounding its creation and inception, is understanding 
only part of the story.  
 
The Westphalian sovereignty has domestic sovereignty as its corollary. What is 
evident as Westphalian sovereignty in the international domain is national sovereignty 
in the domestic domain. It follows then that, what happens in the domestic jurisdiction 
of a given state, affects the international domain. As such, Operation Murambatsvina 
was meant to be confined to the domestic terrain of the GoZ, but it drew the ire of the 
international community of states. This study will discuss something about domestic 
sovereignty in the following section.  
 
3.4 Domestic Sovereignty 
 
This form of sovereignty is also referred to as national or state sovereignty in various 
literatures (Howe 1990:677; Clark 1999:71; Jameson 1890:193). Krasner (2001:231) 
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asserts that domestic sovereignty refers to „authority structures within states and the 
ability of these structures to effectively regulate behaviour‟. By both definition and 
description, domestic sovereignty as a principle, is border-determined or rather 
border-specific. It equates to the enforcement and application of legitimate 
authoritative decisions and laws in the domestic confines of a particular state. In 
other words, domestic sovereignty is territorially bound, to the exclusion of other 
political territories that do not fall under a particular politically independent state. 
Elsewhere, Krasner (2001:231; 2006:72) echoes Hobbes‟ view and argues that 
domestic sovereignty is about „the formal organisation of political authority within the 
state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the 
borders of their state‟. Thus, it is „a concept that denotes absolute power‟ (Hoffman 
2007:171) as exercised and possessed by the state within the territorial borders of a 
given state. In the modern era, the period accredited for constructing the notions and 
principles of sovereignty, the legitimacy and authoritative principles of sovereignty 
were „personated‟ in the sovereign (king, queen or monarch). Initially, all power and 
authority that, in the contemporary era, is vested and conferred on the state, was at 
some stage conferred and vested in a particular person or group of persons, known 
as the „sovereign‟. Thus at times people fail to distinguish the sovereign (person) and 
sovereignty (principle). Hobbes (Leviathan 1561:157, 227 in Shelton 1992:205) 
succinctly gives an account of the etymology of the sovereign: 
The only way to erect such common power, as may be able to defend from the 
invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another … is, to confer all their 
power and strength upon one man, or upon an assembly of men, that they 
may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will … This is more 
than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same 
person, made by the covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, 
as if every man should say to every man, I authorise and give up my right of 
governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition 
that thou give up thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner. 
This done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a 
COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. 
 
In other words, what Hobbes gives account for, is a consolidation of the social 
contract, only it adds that - in that particular contract and with specific wording - 
every person is to recognise, authorise and confer on the one person vested with 
such power by consensus and consent, the authority and power to be „sovereign‟. 
Two observations can, thus, be made here: The first observation is that there is an 
established agreement, by every person concerned, to the creation of a sovereign, 
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as such there is consensus. The second observation is that there is a willingness to 
submit to the sovereign once the agreement has been passed and adopted. It can 
be argued that this alludes to contemporary principles of democratic representation. 
It can further be argued that this converges with John Locke‟s call that individuals 
should consent to commonly agreed standards. It can be suggested that the notion 
of commonwealth, following from the Social Contract, as expounded in part II of the 
Leviathan (1561), is a binding formal contract. It can be viewed as a formal political 
tool to organise society and common social practices and standards since it is 
premised on legitimate authority that is conferred by the agreement of the members 
of civil society. This is precisely what this study argues and contends to have shaped 
the modern common understanding of the doctrine of sovereignty; that of 
absoluteness, sacrosanctity, indivisibility, finality, inviolability, inseparability and 
binding. 
 
In order to ensure domestic order in the nineteenth century, governments had to 
come up with new strategies that included representative democracy, social contract 
and constitutionalism (McCullough 2010:9). The legitimate and authority-based 
power implied by sovereignty is exercised over that particular state‟s populace alone, 
hence domestic sovereignty. Klink (1990:2 in Thomson 1995:227) affirms this 
position and argues that the state‟s „scope is limited to the people and resources 
found within a set of geographic boundaries‟. Howe (1990:677) concurs with this 
view that state sovereignty is „the notion that a country has the unique right to control 
its own destiny, and that sovereignty is infringed if any other country or outside 
pressure exercises an unauthorised influence on its affairs‟.  
 
On the one hand, domestic sovereignty implies the ability to control, enact and 
enforce law and order in the domestic confines of a given state. The absoluteness of 
the power exercised over the populace is because the state is the highest point of 
recourse. The state (government) is the final arbitrator and the highest authority in 
that particular land. On the other hand, domestic sovereignty presumes legitimate 
authority that results in material power to enact laws, and enforce law and order as 
vested in the sovereign. By implication, it is the population that renders a sovereign 
supreme by recognising and accepting the sovereign as the highest authority and 
final arbitrator in the land (Rudolph 2005). In other words sovereignty as possessed 
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by the state obliges the state to be responsible to its citizens, hence the idea of 
sovereignty as responsibility. Boucher and Kelly (1994:17) assert that: 
The use of contract and concomitant idea of consent is, as we have seen, 
common currency among writers, many of whom invoked the language to 
legitimatise political obligation and establish its limit.  
 
Howe (1990:690) concurs with this view and asserts that „sovereignty does in the 
last resort depend upon the consent of the democratic electorate, who alone endow 
their governors with the necessary authority, and who alone can enable what pattern 
of consent to change over the years‟. In the event that individuals‟ preferences 
conflict, it is this recognised highest authority in the land that can and will arbitrate. A 
sovereign, or statesman/woman, represents the state and it follows therefore that 
much of the material and soft power of the state is exercised and discharged by a 
person - the sovereign. Janice Thomson (1995:216) disagrees with the view that 
states‟ control is absolute; she argues that, „in point of fact, there never was a time 
when state control over anything, including violence, was assured or secure‟. As 
such, Thomson contends that sovereignty is about authority more than it is about 
control. This contribution by Thomson exposes the limitation of the supremacy to 
control claim as deduced from sovereignty. It can be argued that even in the best of 
circumstances (domestic jurisdiction) sovereignty has its limitations. 
 
Domestic sovereignty by implication is border-determined and specific. A sovereign 
state can only exercise its power over a population in a particular border or territory 
(Bull 1977:8). Balogun (2011:43) concurs with this view and argues that „a sovereign 
state cannot tell another how to conduct its business; neither could it be told how to 
conduct its own‟. In interstate relations, as noted by Waltz (1979:88) „none is entitled 
to command; none is entitled to obey‟; a view that Lake (2003:305) shares. Thus, 
states can best engage one with the other on equal terms and reciprocal courtesy. A 
hypothetical example can help to succinctly make this point: The Republic of South 
Africa (RSA) as a sovereign state can only exercise its legitimate sovereign powers 
over and within the political borders of the Republic of South Africa. Its neighbours 
for example, Zimbabwe or Botswana, sovereign states in their own respective rights, 
can only exercise their sovereign and legitimate powers over and within the territorial 
borders of Zimbabwe and Botswana respectively as politically demarcated.  
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Domestic sovereignty operates on the principle of exclusion of foreign forces in the 
domestic territory of a sovereign state. It esteems and upholds the convention of non-
interference, by another, in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. What domestic 
sovereignty idealises may have at some point in history been certain, valid and thus, 
binding. However, in contemporary society, even though states are sovereign and 
cannot explicitly be told by another how to run their affairs, common purpose and 
common interest have somewhat circumscribed the practice of domestic sovereignty. 
Common interests have certainly curbed the rhetoric thereof used by diplomats, 
statesmen and women such that foreign influences and inclusion are eminent and 
inescapable. Implicitly states are known, especially super powers, to have sometimes 
dictated to and influenced other states not only in their domestic policies but their 
foreign policy positions as well. In confirmation of this observation, Ayoob (2002:83) 
asserts that powerful „states have routinely intervened, even forcibly, in the affairs of 
weaker ones‟. 
  
3.4.1 The Modalities of Domestic Sovereignty 
  
Domestic sovereignty has more to do with the internal ordering, regulation, 
arbitration and control of a state‟s population and a state‟s machinery and organs 
within the territorial confines, hence, within the geo-political jurisdiction of the state. 
In that sense it is intro-focused and introspective. The authority vested in the 
sovereign is geared towards the effective regulation and control of the citizens and 
the whole population in a given state including foreigners in that particular state. The 
external outlook of a state‟s domestic sovereignty eminently becomes interstate. As 
such, the exogenous outlook of domestic sovereignty remains as such but at the 
same time it becomes sovereignty in the Westphalian sense. Once a state engages 
with any other on issues of trade, politics, culture, sport, economics, environmental 
and social spheres, it eminently engages as an equal with another equal. By the 
mere fact of recognising one and the other as domestic and the claim of one‟s 
domestic sovereignty, the implication is that the domestic sovereign is one among 
many domestic sovereigns. By claiming domestic sovereignty, one does so with the 
awareness of another who is not in their confines, household, jurisdiction and 
territory.  
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The silent implication of the domestic sovereignty position is that there exists a 
foreign other who is not part of the domestic. The domestic sovereign is the highest 
authority in the land. The domestic sovereign is the only legitimate authority to 
engage with another sovereign. As such, the domestic authority that has the legal 
power and legitimacy to engage with a foreign other cannot engage with the foreign 
other as though the foreign other is part of its subjects, territory and jurisdiction. 
Kant, as recorded by Dunne (2008:112), argued that perpetual peace is at the centre 
of actualising liberal ideologies. It is vital for individuals to obtain „consciousness‟, for 
states to enter federal contracts with other states to put an end to war and the need 
to create republican constitutions. As stated earlier in this work, the UN in some 
respects is seen as a result of such efforts. In the view of constructivism, the UN is a 
socially constructed institution arising from the need to regulate and channel efforts 
to mitigate international relations challenges. In agreement with Kant‟s 
consciousness, Woolf (in Luard 1992:465) asserted that prosperity and peace 
needed some „consciously devised machinery‟. In agreement with Kant‟s position, 
Wight (1977:135) makes a compelling statement with regards interstate relations, 
arguing that „it would be impossible to have a society of sovereign states … unless 
each state, while claiming sovereignty for itself, recognised that every other state has 
the right to claim and enjoy its own sovereignty as well‟. Clark (1999:76) echoes 
similar sentiments. 
 
Principles of domestic sovereignty are necessary elements and conditions to 
adjudicate and arbitrate between clashing, and safeguarding individuals‟ choices, 
preferences and at times outright barbarity and immorality by individual members of a 
civil society. Thus, this study argues that individual sovereignty and domestic 
sovereignty are intertwined. The former depends on the latter for its guarantee and 
security, and the latter is a necessary consequence of the former; such is the nature of 
constituted concepts as proclaimed by constructivism. In other words, individual 
sovereignty requires domestic sovereignty for its continued existence, security and 
maintenance. Initially, domestic sovereignty was as a consequence of safeguarding 
and upholding individual sovereignty. But once in motion, it actually became a 
necessary condition to actualise individual sovereignty. Conceptually and abstractly 
so, individual sovereignty, as argued by this study, may very well had been the cause 
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of domestic sovereignty, but as the wheels of time rolled, it has become a necessary 
condition for the continued existence, security and guarantee of individual sovereignty. 
It can be argued that these two strands of sovereignty are mutually defining, thus, 
constitutive of one another. This study suggests that individual and domestic 
sovereignty are intertwined concepts. They are intrinsically connected in both the 
conception of them and the practice thereof. This observation and conclusion is 
reflected in the notion of mutual inclusion in each‟s definition as espoused by the 
constructivist framework of international relations. It can therefore be concluded that 
the creation of the social contract is also the creation of both the state and 
sovereignty. Hence the state and sovereignty are mutually defining concepts. This is 
not surprising, nor hard to comprehend given that states are the primary actors in 
international relations. 
 
From the above deliberations on sovereignty, it still does not explain why sovereignty, 
and particularly the Westphalian interpretation of it, has been interpreted and 
presented as absolute, inviolable, static, indivisible and final. This is a particular 
juncture that, social constructivism as a theory, can shed better light on this study, in 
order to better appreciate the intricacies and depth of the notions of sovereignty. The 
core ideas of the Westphalian sovereignty as such - explored thus far - do not suffice 
as a comprehensive and satisfactory explanation as to why the Westphalian 
sovereignty in particular is portrayed as absolute, indivisible and inviolable. 
Constructivism would suggest that a study such as this one should explore and 
investigate the structures around the inception and creation of sovereignty. Hence, 
unpacking and understanding the principles of sovereignty born out of the PToW 
(1648) without the understanding of the cultural, social, political, religious and 
environmental circumstances surrounding its creation and inception, is understanding 
only part of the story. In order to fully appreciate the depth and breadth, and the length 
and width of the doctrine of Westphalian sovereignty, this study will briefly explore 
those very social structures that gave birth and shaped the principles of sovereignty, 
even as practiced today. 
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3.5 The Age of Absolutism 
 
The political, cultural and societal context, in which the PToW (recognised as the 
onset of the official codification of the doctrine of sovereignty) was orchestrated and 
crafted, is known as the „age of absolutism‟. Various pundits have professed various 
dates of the age of absolutism. Reus-Smit (2001:217) posits that it was between the 
years 1555 to 1848. Beloff (1996) contends the age of absolutism was between the 
years 1660 to round about the year 1815. Yet Shimko (2010:10) argues that the age 
of absolutism was between the years 1648 to 1789. Another time frame that has 
been advanced by Ashley (1974:20) as the age of absolutism is between the years 
1648 to 1775. From the dates proffered by these various scholars, it remains that the 
age of absolutism is contested and as such there are no specific dates that everyone 
agrees on. However, what is clear is that the year 1648, the year of the signing of the 
PToW, is at the very core of the dates advanced by the aforementioned pundits and 
scholars of international relations and world history. According to Retslag (1854:26), 
absolutism developed as a theory in the 15th century. Absolutism asserted the divine 
right of kings and queens that they ruled in the name of God; a view point also 
shared by Krasner (2001:232; 2006:78), and Duiker and Spielvogel (2013:439; 431). 
Sir Robert Filmer cited in Thomson (2001:76) echoed the views of Hobbes who 
ascribed and endorsed, through the social contract, the absolute authority of 
monarchs and argued that „kings had the divine right to rule over their subjects‟. 
Filmer actually believed that the liberty of people was unnatural. It is wrong to 
commit suicide, argued Filmer, and as such it indicates that in the natural realm „a 
person is not the owner of his or her life. Only God is‟ (Thomson 2001:76). The 
discretely disguised implication here is that, the sovereign as they stand in place of 
God, own a person‟s life. 
 
In the views of Filmer and Hobbes cited in Thomson (2001:76), people were as good 
as subjects of the sovereigns. This position reduced people to mere subjects that 
were meant to serve the sovereign. In fact, Dunn (1984:29) has it on record that „a 
subject in the face of the unjust commands of his (sic) sovereign was clearly 
asserted to be to obey these commands passively‟. Kings, queens and monarchs 
represented God‟s authority as „the [natural] owner of all‟ and as such they were „not 
subject to the laws that govern ordinary people‟ (Thomson 2001:76). In other words, 
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in the natural realm ordinary people are subject to the laws of God; and because 
monarchs represent God, ordinary people are subjects of God, thus, by implication 
are subject of monarchs as well. Reus-Smit (2001:217) contends that: 
In the age of Absolutism (1555-1848) the norms of European international 
society held that Christian monarchies were the only legitimate form of 
sovereign state, and these norms, backed by the coercive practices of the 
community of states, conspired to undermine Muslim, liberal or nationalist 
polities.  
 
This view is corroborated by Hobson (2000:162) who argues that „many of the states 
within the Concert of Europe in the early 19th century developed a mode of 
representation based on monarchical absolutism‟. The power and authority 
possessed by the sovereign was absolute, sacrosanct, unquestionable, final and 
binding. Hobbes, cited in Shelton (1992:226), in his famous work, Leviathan (186, 
252) reiterated this observation and argued: 
His [sovereign] power cannot, without his consent, be transferred to another: 
he cannot forfeit it; he cannot be accused by any of his subjects, of injury: he 
cannot be punished by them; he is judge of what is necessary for peace; and 
judge of controversies; and of the times, and occasions of war, and peace: to 
him it belongeth to choose magistrates, counsellors, commanders, and all 
other officers, and ministers; and to determine of rewards, and punishments, 
honour, and order. 
 
Jean Bodin, cited in King (1974:145), a French renaissance philosopher, in 
corroboration of the views expressed by the theory and „age of absolutism‟, argued 
that „kings should not be under the power of the Holy Roman Empire, which 
governed much of Europe from the 9th century until early in the 19th century‟. To 
consolidate his arguments, Bodin (cited in Franklin 2009:38) further argued that 
„kings had the right to rule over all of their subjects and their political institutions‟. 
Bodin was aware that kings and monarchs derived their authority, thus, sovereignty 
from religious beliefs. However, Bodin‟s argument can be logically and coherently 
sustained on non-religious grounds as well. In his work, Six livres de la République 
(1576; Six Books of the Republic, 1606), Bodin (cited in King 1974:141) asserted 
that a state possess „supreme power over citizens and subjects unrestrained by 
laws‟. Thus, Bodin‟s understanding of state was a community of families governed by 
a „supreme and perpetual power‟. 
 
It is precisely these notions - absoluteness, sacrosanctity, indivisibility, inviolability, 
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inseparability, finality, thus, binding - as espoused by the sovereign that, from its 
inception and creation, shaped and presented sovereignty as a doctrine, as opposed 
to the contemporary understanding of the doctrine of sovereignty – as configurable, 
transitional and dynamic. The societal structure and context as described by 
absolutism have a bearing on how the PToW and subsequent doctrine of 
sovereignty were crafted. Given the absolute divine right of rule for kings, queens 
and monarchs – collectively referred to as sovereigns in this study - literature about 
sovereignty has, for a long while, presented sovereignty as an absolute, inviolable 
and indivisible principle. Absolutism, as argued in the frameworks of constructivism, 
provides a plausible and sturdy explanation of the static perception of sovereignty as 
a doctrine in the modern era initially, and to some extent, currently. The political and 
social environment – as informed by absolutism as an ideology - in which the 
principles of sovereignty were born, represents the structures of social reality in 
accordance with assertions of social constructivism. However, times have moved 
and progressed, contexts have changed and environments have evolved. This study 
argues that contemporary international norms and principles as current trends and 
ideology that inform the political, cultural and social context of contemporary times 
have necessitated the reconfiguration and/or expansion in the meaning of the 
doctrine of sovereignty. The social structures of contemporary society have changed 
in comparison to those of the „age of absolutism‟. Thus, the contemporary 
conception of sovereignty is influenced, affected, shaped and reconfigurable as 
informed by current social structural dynamics such as notions and principles of 
human rights and democracy, to mention a few. 
 
3.5.1 Discontention and Opposition to Absolutism 
 
Absolutism as an ideology and political position and even theory has, from the 
Westphalian treaty, been challenged and contested as attested to by Locke‟s 
arguments. Locke (1632-1704) published his work entitled: Two Treaties on 
Government in the year 1689, exactly 41 years after the signing of the PToW, in 
which Locke, cited in Thomson (2001:76), argued that the public/community/society 
had the „right to resist an unjust authority‟. According to King (1974:263; 279), the 
late 17th century presented pressure for democracy - in defiance of absolutism - in 
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England‟s North American colonies, as well as in many parts of Europe, a view 
shared and affirmed by Thomson (2001:74-75). This position sharply contrasts with 
Hobbes‟ notion of absolute authority of the sovereign. Locke (cited in Woolhouse 
1983:1), who later became known as an advocate of democracy, emphasised two 
positions; namely, that human nature was basically good and that the social contract, 
in the Hobbesian sense, had significant limits. Clearly Locke‟s arguments are in 
contrast and sharply so, with the views put forward by Hobbes, cited in Green 
(1993:99-103), who argued that people were motivated only by selfish interests, so 
much that life in a „state of nature‟ would equate to „solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short‟. Hobbes, cited in King (1974:230), in his pessimism, argued that human nature 
was evil and corrupt and unless controlled by some exterior and overwhelming force, 
humanity is doomed to conflict, thereby ensuring perpetual chaos. That is how the 
domestic sovereign endowed with absolute authority – as enshrined in the social 
contract - became a necessary construct or formation for municipal or domestic law 
and order. It can be observed that this is what is argued by realism. 
 
In contrast, democratic theorist and English philosopher Locke (cited in Thomson 
2001:76) argued that „government must be by consent of those governed and that a 
ruler without the confidence of the people has no right to govern‟. Locke‟s argument 
is premised on his belief in the essential goodness of people and as such, there was 
no need, therefore, for an all-powerful, absolutist government. Human beings are 
rational and capable of comprehending - in the bigger picture - some common good. 
It means then that the only way to justify an absolute and imposing government over 
rational and essentially good people is through the people‟s consent. Thus, the 
social contract is a limited social contract. This, again, sharply contrasts with 
Hobbes‟ assertion that the sovereign has absolute authority conferred upon him by 
the people through the social contract. Through the Lockian limited social contract, 
people give their consent to particular governmental powers, yet they retain basic 
individual rights and those basic human rights, the government cannot take away or 
invade. This tallies with what Friedman (2009:28) argues that: 
A key democratic idea is that people who govern must accept limits to their 
power. They are meant to do what voters want and obey the rules that ensure 
power is wielded for society rather than over it.  
 
Thomas Jefferson and other American thinkers who wrote the declaration of 
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independence and the bill of rights did that on the basis of Locke‟s assertions about 
the social contract, thus, Locke is hailed as a democracy champion (Ashley 1974; 
Duiker and Spielvogel 2013; Franklin 2009; King 1974). It can be observed that this 
is what is underscored by liberalism. 
 
Absolutism as an ideology and political tool for community or societal organisation 
was so restrictive on individual human rights that there was no recourse whatsoever, 
especially if one‟s rights were infringed upon particularly by the sovereign. The 
sovereign had the ultimate authority and power and as such no other power could 
arbitrate between individuals within a particular territory, let alone across territories. 
International intervention was unthinkable except if it was full scale war. 
 
It can be observed that in the Lockian understanding of the social contract, human 
rights are upheld and sovereign monarchs‟ powers are limited and curtailed such 
that today there can be open talk and conception of international humanitarian 
intervention that is legal and lawful according to the law of nations (international law). 
Barnett (2011:162) affirms this observation and asserts that: 
Several decades ago many scholars and jurists objected to the very idea of 
humanitarian intervention because it violated sovereignty‟s principle of non-
interference and allowed great powers to try to become sheep in wolf‟s 
clothing.  
 
This position speaks directly to the notions of the Westphalian sovereignty, 
particularly the notions of non-interference or non-intervention and autonomy. 
Barnett (2011:162), however, is quick to concede that: 
Over the past fifteen years, though, there is a growing acceptance of 
humanitarian intervention and a „responsibility to protect‟ – when states are 
unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the international community 
inherits that responsibility.  
 
Of the numerous legal frameworks there are today that permit state intervention in 
another‟s jurisdiction and territory, this study will single out a particularly 
controversial one: The Responsibility to Protect, as this intervention tool bears 
directly on the principles of Westphalian sovereignty. The R2P will be interrogated in 
the following sections.  
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3.6 Sovereignty as Responsibility and Equality 
 
According to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
report (ICISS 2001:xi), the responsibility to protect lies with the state. The report 
declares the two basic principles: 
State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for 
protection of its people lies with the state itself.  
 
Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, 
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling 
or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the 
international responsibility to protect. 
 
According to this view, sovereignty as a principle, is not only a legitimate authority in 
the jurisdiction and territory of the sovereign (the person or government), it is also 
the sovereigns‟ responsibility to ensure the safety and security of the domestic 
population in a given territory; Branch (2011:116) concurs with this view. According 
to Ayoob (2002:84) sovereignty as responsibility was: 
The prevailing political wisdom in Europe until the end of the nineteenth 
century, only those countries that had reached a certain standard of civilised 
behaviour had the right to attain sovereign status and interact with each other 
on the basis of mutual recognition of sovereignty.   
 
While this trend may have had provided some positive reinforcement in ensuring 
states complied with „civil standards‟, the inverse opposite was that states who 
championed this notion were saturated in self-righteous perceptions, and thus, stood 
on a moral high ground.  
 
States that were deemed as not conforming to „civil standards‟, by implication 
suffered ostracization and exclusion in „civil‟ inter-state relations. Ayoob (2002:84) 
argues that „the others [non-complying states to civil standards], being barbarians if 
not savages, were to remain subject to, or under the tutelage of, sovereign 
(European) powers‟. To this effect Jackson and Rosberg (1986:5) argued that:  
Consequently, many non-European governments failed to qualify for full 
membership in the international system and became vulnerable to European 
colonisation. Virtually all of Africa, consisting of hundreds of weak political 
systems, was put in this position.  
 
This demonstrates that sovereignty did not equate to equality in the concert of 
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European states. Equality as hypocritically presented and falsely proffered as a 
predicate of Westphalian sovereignty is a misnomer, if not a blatant lie. Ideally, the 
notions of non-intervention, autonomy, independence and self-determination as 
espoused by the doctrine of state sovereignty presume and predicate equal entities 
(states) that mutually and reciprocally engage one with the other on such a basis.  
 
The Westphalian sovereignty erroneously, hypocritically and deliberately so, 
presumes state equality. The Westphalian system of states had no intention of 
accepting all states as equals at the inception of the Westphalian system in 1648. 
Europe created a hierarchy of states, thus creating a Global World Order (GWO), 
which they had dominion over. Europe was the standard of which (state) was 
sovereign and which (state) was not. Hence, as Ayoob (2002:84) contends that 
those states thought to fall short of complying with „civil standards‟ were less 
sovereign than the so-called European „civil‟ powers. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012:422) in 
corroboration of Ayoob‟s position argues that „the colonised were defined as inferior 
and obstacles to modernity (in economic, religious, or other terms), in many cases 
justifying the suspension of normal ethical conventions, and so use violence, to 
„modernise‟ colonised peoples and places‟. In essence European „modernisation‟ 
meant that – in respect to Africa particularly - „Africans lived in colonies that were 
essentially European enclaves‟ (Jackson and Rosberg 1986:6). Thus, the 
Westphalian state system privileged European nation-states to the expense of non-
European nation-states. European standards were and are accepted without 
scrutiny, yet non-European standards are viewed as suspect and even termed 
„barbaric‟ (Ayoob 2002:84; Mignolo 2009:16). This position aided and perpetuated 
imperialism. It provided rationale and justification for colonialism which, according to 
Howe (1990:678), „aided Britain to deploy its sovereignty with a worldwide versatility, 
subtlety and complexity. We have been able to scatter it, generously and usefully, 
into a diversity of imperial, sub-imperial and post-imperial arrangements‟.  
 
While Europe claimed to take responsibility of „civilising‟ and „modernising‟ the 
„uncivilised‟ and „barbaric‟, their method of colonialism was, for Africa and much of 
the global south, „an encapsulation of political and economic relations in which the 
sovereignty of a nation or people rests on the power of another nation, which sets up 
direct colonial administration‟ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012:422). This stands in 
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contradiction to what the purported sovereign equality stands for. Thus, as argued by 
Jackson and Rosberg (1986:5) „Europeans had become convinced of their cultural 
superiority and their manifest destiny to rule the world‟. 
 
Mignolo (2009:11) echoes Howe‟s argument and further posits that while the British 
entered the „third world‟ countries, particularly Asian and African countries, under the 
pretext of commercial purposes in the 18th century, by the 19th century they had 
politically intervened and gained control and dominion over those territories. In 
agreement with Mignolo‟s view, Howe (1990:679) admits that „throughout Asia and 
Africa and in other parts of the globe protectorates, annexations, condominia, trucial 
states, federations, partnerships and leases proliferated‟. Howe‟s admission of 
European domination through colonialism and imperialism is what Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
(2012:423) contends that „Western Modernity was the source and motive force of 
expansion of European particularism into universal claims, and these claims were 
supported by the violence of imperialism and colonialism‟. Ndlovu-Gatsheni contends 
that, what is regarded as the standard and norm about sovereignty is, in fact, a 
particular European practice that was forcibly imposed as a universal standard 
through colonisation. Hence, norms and standards brought and advocated for by the 
West are held suspect by the Global South in general and Africa in particular.  
 
The R2P doctrine is thought to be an instrument of the West to re-colonise and 
intervene in the affairs of former colonies, particularly former African colonies 
(Mamdani 2011). As such, there is founded fear and paranoia that the West may 
have sinister intentions even with the doctrine of R2P. Thomson (1995:229) argues 
that: 
The end of the cold war has brought increasing calls for collective intervention 
in behalf of human rights. Yet, great powers have always violated the non-
intervention norm when it was in their interests to do so, acting collectively 
when possible (Holy Alliance, UNSC) but unilaterally when necessary.  
 
This demonstrates that R2P is at the risk of abuse and misappropriation by powerful 
countries, particularly the West. Chandler (2011:26) notes in the UN Report on 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect that:  
The twentieth century was marred by the Holocaust, the killing fields of 
Cambodia, the genocide of Rwanda and the mass killings of Srebrenica … the 
brutal legacy of the twentieth century speaks bitterly and graphically of the 
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profound failure of individual States to live up to their most basic and 
compelling responsibilities. 
 
This exposes the argument of sovereignty, particularly state sovereignty as 
responsibility, weak and limited. To further reinforce the foundational scepticism of 
weaker states and mistrust of the West by the global south, during the bombardment 
of Kosovo in 1999 by NATO) the then Secretary-General of that organisation, Solan 
(in Cunliffe 2011:37) posited that:  
We must halt the violence and bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe 
now unfolding in Kosovo … We have a moral duty to do so. The responsibility 
is on our shoulders and we will fulfil it. 
 
Thus, the West (in the form of NATO) unilaterally and autocratically assumed moral 
responsibility that it projected as „humanitarian intervention‟ in Kosovo, at a time that 
the state of Kosovo could not protect its populace. This was an unsubstantiated 
claim made by NATO. This stance, however, is questionable because the application 
of R2P as a moral duty (of the West particularly) is sporadic and selective. As such, 
McCormack (2011:37) argues that „America under the 2001-2009 Presidency of 
George W. Bush is widely seen to have damaged the moral consensus in favour of 
intervention‟.  
 
Some African governments and leaders are sceptical of the doctrine of R2P. The 
Sudanese Government makes it clear that it is sceptic of R2P when it argues that:  
Since the 9/11 and US-led interventions in Afghanistan and especially Iraq, 
many states have become increasingly suspicious that the West‟s 
humanitarian justifications mask neo-imperial ambitions. This has also helped 
to cast doubt upon The Responsibility to Protect project, since one of its 
authors, Michael Ignatieff (2003), was a vocal supporter of the case for war in 
Iraq, albeit in order to prevent WMD proliferation within „rouge states‟ rather 
than on humanitarian grounds. Sudan voiced this suspicion in the UN 
Security Council when its representative asked whether the Council‟s „lofty 
humanitarian objective‟ in Darfur was a „Trojan horse ... embraced by other 
people who are advocating a different agenda‟ (in Cunliffe 2011:39). 
 
In agreement with the views expressed by the Sudanese government, the President 
of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, in his address of the UN General Assembly‟s 67th 
Session, in defiance of the principles of R2P as applied to Libya (2012), argued that 
„NATO‟s deceitful intervention under the sham cover of Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations and the phoney principle of responsibility to protect‟ was a 
unilateral decision which undermined the African Union. In the words of President 
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Mugabe, uttered in reference to the bombardment of Libya by NATO, „the African 
Union and its peace-making role was defied, ignored and humiliated‟ (New 
Zimbabwe 2012: Online). What President Mugabe accused NATO (the West) of, was 
the hypocrisy that Griffiths and Griffiths (2006:224) spoke of, the same as the 
Sudanese government‟s argument. When it suites them, the West upholds notions of 
non-intervention and autonomous decision-making in the domestic affairs of states; 
and when convenient for them, they intervene in other states‟ domestic jurisdiction in 
the purported interests of achieving „humanitarian objectives‟ as argued by Ayoob 
(2002:85).  
 
What the USA fails to see, as contained in President Barack Obama‟s address to the 
UN General Assembly‟s 67th Session on the 25th of September 2012, is that while 
they decry the killing of their diplomat Chris Stevens in Libya 2012, they violently 
committed the same crime against the sovereign integrity and principles of Libya‟s 
sovereignty. Is this not the hypocrisy that Stephen Krasner (2001; 2006), whose 
categorisation of sovereignty, this study adopted, speaks about? The USA-led 
military invasion of Iraq in 2003 lacked the authorisation of the UNSC; thus, it 
crippled the principles advocated by proponents of humanitarian intervention as 
echoed by Jurgen Habermas of Germany (McCormack 2011:38; O‟Connell 
2011:74). 
 
As such Africa‟s fears and paranoia particularly, and fears and paranoia of the 
Global South generally, on political concepts, such as R2P, that emanate from the 
West is understandable, if not justifiable. In the recent past powerful states (militarily 
and economically), as is the case with the USA, the United Kingdom (UK) and 
France, have abused the notions of intervention in the domestic affairs of others and 
the intervening states have, almost always, evoked R2P‟s notions for the justification 
of their behaviours. Devetak (2011:39) bares testimony to this observation and 
argues that:  
The trouble for critical international theorists is that Kant‟s writings have been 
influential in strains of liberal internationalism that give expression to 
belligerence and neo-imperialism. This „Wilsonianism with boots‟, as some 
have named it, which has been associated with the administrations of Bill 
Clinton, George W. Bush in the USA, and with Prime Minister Blair in the UK, 
uses liberal notions of freedom and human rights to defend the extensive use 
of military force. 
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Ayoob (2002:83) argues that more often than not, „states that undertake intervention 
portray themselves as acting agents of the international community‟. Thus, the 
intervention that the „powerful‟ engage in, is of necessity, if they are „to achieve 
humanitarian objectives‟ (Ayoob 2002:84). While this position is hard to defend, this 
study has however, in line with the core ideas of constructivism, sought to 
understand and unearth the ideas, rationale, structure and justification, if any, of the 
R2P doctrine. 
 
3.6.1 The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine 
  
The R2P in effect violates principles (as contained in the doctrine of Westphalian 
sovereignty) such as non-intervention in the domestic authority structures of another 
state, autonomy, self-determination and the exclusion of coercive force in the 
jurisdiction of another state. What does the development of R2P say about the 
Westphalian sovereignty? The R2P was endorsed by the UN (UN Summit 2005). 
The UN is the custodian of international law, global multilateral agreements and 
international cooperation. Given that the UN through the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) endorsed R2P, what then does the 
UN say about the upholding of sovereignty as affirmed by the UN Charter, Articles 
2(1), 2(7) and 78? Sovereignty has been viewed as responsibility and it has been 
argued that it is the responsibility of the government towards its populace. This 
position is supported and upheld by the UN. It can be argued that the doctrine of 
R2P in its present formulation is nothing but a disguised tool of the West to intervene 
in the domestic affairs of particularly states in the Global South. The West can no 
longer legally sustain their grip and hold on African countries particularly as they did 
in colonial times. This study argues that in the perspective of the Global South, 
Westphalian sovereignty is cosmetically applied and does not necessarily equate to 
„equal‟ stature with the first-world countries.  
 
Since its adoption by consensus, at the UN World Summit of 2005 (Chomsky 
2011:13, 19), the notion of R2P has been a cause of both reassured collective 
security for some and discontent for others in international relations. Some like, 
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Chomsky and Hehir (2011:97) argue that R2P is a reformulation and even a sub-
case of humanitarian intervention under international law. Yet others, like Chandler 
and Branch (2011:119), argue that the promise of the doctrine of R2P is desirable 
and quite noble but the implementation of it is a cause of great concern. According to 
some advocates of the notion of R2P, such as Chandler (2011:20), it emerged as 
some solution to the failure of the international community of states as embodied by 
the UN to agree on what constitute grounds for military intervention for humanitarian 
purposes in another state, citing the genocide of Rwanda (2004) and Bosnia-
Herzegovina (1992-1995) as examples of their cause. In the year 2001 the ICISS in 
its report – The Responsibility to Protect – stated in its foreword that the concept of 
R2P:  
was about the so-called „right of humanitarian intervention‟ – the question of 
when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular 
military – action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at 
risk in that other state (ICISS 2001:vii). 
 
According to Chandler (2011:20), it is the ICSS report of 2001 that gave birth to the 
idea of R2P. Though of the same etymology, stock, and essence, R2P principles 
discretely differ from humanitarian intervention as espoused by international 
humanitarian law. International humanitarian law permits the use of force in 
intervention without the authorisation of the UNSC (Chomsky 2011:13), while R2P 
permits intervention only with the authorisation of the UNSC. The ICISS (2001:xii) 
report states that: 
Security Council authorisation should in all cases be sought prior to any 
military intervention action being carried out. Those calling for an intervention 
should formally request such authorisation, or have the Council raise the 
matter on its own initiative, or have the Secretary-General raise it under 
Article 99 of the UN Charter. 
 
As such, whether it is humanitarian law invoked or R2P, the Westphalian sovereignty 
is violated, compromised and trivialised none-the-less. R2P stands in direct 
contradiction and sharp contrast to notions of non-intervention, autonomy, self-
determination and independence as espoused by the 1648 PToW. The position that 
is argued by R2P is precisely that which portrays the doctrine of sovereignty as 
obsolete, unbinding and facing its demise.  
 
Chandler (2011:41) argues that the ICISS (2001) report intentionally shifts the focus 
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from „right to intervene‟ as this is already contained and well-articulated in 
international humanitarian law, to „responsibility to protect‟. This moral endeavour is 
thought and meant to help to focus on the victims of conflict. This view concurs with 
what Phillip Cunliffe (2011:53) argues, that R2P embraces „the victims‟ point of view 
and interests‟. But even this position - in the current form of R2P - is besieged with 
challenges and a lot of unanswered, if not unanswerable, questions. If the R2P 
doctrine places the victims first as purported by Cunliffe (2011:53), do the so-called 
„victims‟ or beneficiaries get consulted and give their consent to the intervention of 
the international community? Does it then mean that the victims are consulted prior 
to intervention? Who consults, if at all there is or should there be consultation? If the 
so-called „victims‟ are not consulted, how then do the interveners intervene from the 
victims‟ point of view? If the intervention is to take the victims‟ point of view in 
protecting the victims, should it, then, not be the victims who initiate and call for 
intervention in the first place? What means are there of ensuring that the victims‟ 
points of view are considered and adopted in an intervention? This position is 
supported by Cunliffe‟s (2011:55) assertion that:  
Of all the iterations of the „responsibility to protect‟, not a single formulation of 
the doctrine to date is able succinctly to express and logically demonstrate 
that there is a single, identifiable agent formally obligated to act or intervene 
in a particular situation. There is no „automaticity‟ in the doctrine - no 
governmental machinery or legislation that spontaneously comes into effect 
once the „duty‟ is breached by a state. 
 
While this study applauds the efforts at formally codifying the doctrine of R2P, the 
doctrine still lacks clarity and precision as to who is to act and intervene in crises that 
require immediate and decisive action. For example the so-called „international 
community‟ is not defined. Since this study is essentially a conceptual analysis, it will 
briefly explore some views expressed by proponents of R2P as well as identify its 
challenges. 
 
3.6.2 The Ideals of R2P 
 
According to McCormack (2011:37), former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in 
his 2002 report on Threats, Challenges and Change asserted that R2P represented 
an:  
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Emerging norm that there is a collective responsibility to protect, exercisable 
by the Security Council authorising military intervention as a last resort, in the 
event of genocide and other large scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious 
violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments 
have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent. 
 
In the view of the UN as expressed and endorsed by the former Secretary-General, 
Kofi Annan, R2P is an effective tool that is insulated against legal contestation in the 
event of intervention in the domestic affairs of a given state. The justification is that a 
state that fails to protect its citizenry or is unwilling to do so, forfeits its sovereign 
supremacy. As such, the international community of states take up the responsibility 
to protect the vulnerable of a failing state. Yet the „international community‟ is not 
categorically defined. This further raises the question: who is the international 
community? If the promulgators of the R2P concept are sincere, why did the UN not 
intervene in Zimbabwe‟s OM given that Tibaijuka (2005:67), the UN‟s envoy, 
postulated that 700 000 people were „directly affected through loss of shelter and 
livelihoods‟ and explicitly recommended that „the international community has a 
responsibility to protect those affected‟? Does this not expose the limitations of R2P 
as it lacks a definition of „international community‟? R2P is about protecting 
„populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity‟ as argued by Cunliffe (2011:1). This falls back on the issue of sovereignty 
as responsibility. The UN‟s Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (UN 2009:14) 
cited by Chandler (2011:27) declares that: 
The responsibility to protect first and foremost, is a matter of State 
responsibility, because prevention begins at home and the protection of 
population is a defining attribute of sovereignty and statehood…the 
international community can at best play a supplemental role. 
 
The Secretary-General‟s follow-up report of 2009 reinforced and consolidated the 
assertion that the state remains the bedrock of the responsibility to protect, the 
purpose of which is to build responsible sovereignty, not to undermine it (UN 
2009:13). Thus, sovereignty can be interpreted as responsibility of the sovereign 
(government/administration) towards the security and safety of citizens in any given 
state. Elsewhere, the 2009 Secretary-General‟s report argues that „the responsibility 
to protect does not alter, indeed it reinforces, the legal obligation of Member States 
to refrain from use of force except in conformity with the Charter‟ (Chandler 
2011:23). This study cannot but observe the inconsistency imbedded in the R2P 
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doctrine. How can the R2P doctrine reinforce the idea of curbing the use of military 
force, yet much of the forcible interventions are by use of armed and military means? 
The Westphalian doctrine of sovereignty strictly prohibits illegitimate, illegal and 
unsolicited intervention in the first place. It can be argued that because the West has 
lost its grip, control, manipulation and dominion over the once „colonised‟ and 
therefore it cannot afford to be seen as upholding impunity, it makes out for the 
shortfall by introducing the R2P doctrine. The R2P doctrine, thus enables the West 
to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states and still remain quasi-insulated by 
the legal rhetoric the R2P purports itself to be.  
 
Chandler (2011:23) observes that paragraph 139 of the Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect clarifies that the international community of states must 
ideally be prepared: 
To take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-
case basis … should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities 
are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. 
 
Informed by the UN‟s position, the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) asserts 
that it is within „the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a 
decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity‟ (AU 2002:5). Like the doctrine of 
sovereignty, the principle of R2P is a contested one. This is somewhat expected and 
not shocking nor surprising, given that the latter is premised on and potentially a 
challenge to the former. There is no single universally accepted definition of R2P as 
echoed by Chandler (2011:20). To bear testimony to the ambiguity and contestation 
of definitions of R2P, and by the same token, reinforce the notions of R2P, the 
former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan argued that R2P was a norm to challenge 
state sovereignty, arguing that: 
This developing international norm in favour of intervention to protect civilians 
from wholesale slaughter will no doubt continue to pose profound challenges 
to the international community. Any such evolution in our understanding of 
State Sovereignty and individual sovereignty will, in some quarters, be met 
with distrust, scepticism, even hostility. But it is an evolution that we should 
welcome. Why? Because, despite its limitations and imperfections, it is 
testimony to a humanity that cares more, not less, for the suffering in its midst, 
and a humanity that will do more, and not less, to end it (in McCormack 
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2011:36). 
 
The principles of R2P resonate so closely with what Chomsky refers to as R2P‟s 
„cousin‟: humanitarian intervention. Gareth Evans, former Australian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, cited in Chandler (2011:19), asserts that the 2005 UN Summit that 
endorsed the R2P marked „the really big step forward in terms of formal acceptance 
of R2P‟. Indeed the formal acceptance and codification of R2P is seen as an 
achievement and an assurance of collective security and responsibility. Bellamy 
(2011:19) concurs with the view that there is a seeming consensus and agreement 
on adopting and implementing R2P as a means of ensuring human security 
everywhere, and the curbing and mitigation on governments who abuse their 
domestic and Westphalian sovereign principles. Bellamy (2011:19) argues that:  
The summit [UN General Assembly 2005] marked a transformation of R2P 
from a „concept‟ to a „principle‟ – a fundamental truth based upon a; shared 
understanding‟ and a „sufficient consensus‟ – making the right of intervention 
no longer subordinate to the other key international principle: the right of 
sovereignty.  
 
As such, Bellamy‟s position consolidates Gareth Evans‟ that the UN Summit of 2005 
marked the beginning and formal codification of the R2P notion. This study, thus, 
concludes that there is a general acceptance that the notion of R2P as formally 
codified, emerged from the UN 2005 Summit. The R2P notion is not without 
controversies and challenges. While the codification and formalisation is hailed as a 
step in the right direction, it can also be argued that even the doctrine of R2P can be 
used for particular states‟ parochial and self-serving interests despite that R2P is 
enshrined in the AU‟s Constitutive Act. Hence, R2P‟s seemingly noble intentions and 
ideals can be seen as a disguise of Western/Euro-American interests to intervene in 
the domestic affairs of their former colonies, protectorates, annexes, condominia and 
trucial states. In agreement and affirmation of the view expressed by Krasner (2001; 
2006), the doctrine of sovereignty is thus, trivialised and is a conceited hypocritical 
expose of the West. This necessitates an exploration and investigation of some 
discontentions of the R2P concept. 
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3.6.3 The Discontention of R2P 
 
Chomsky (2011:11) argues that the principles of R2P have been rattled by what he 
calls the „skeleton in the closet‟. But history proves that the enacting and adoption of 
a new principle or convention has always been met with both enthusiasm and 
resistance. Chomsky contends that „virtually every use of force in international affairs 
has been justified in terms of R2P, including the worst monsters‟ (ibid). This position 
is not far from the truth, in the view of this study, thus it renders the principle of R2P 
susceptible to abuse. Thomson (1995:228) contends that „states have from the 
beginning intervened in one another‟s „internal‟ affairs to prevent the persecution of 
particular groups‟ yet, again in the words of Thomson (1995: 228), „nobody did much 
of anything to prevent the genocide in [1994] Rwanda‟. Thomson‟s observations 
succinctly and conspicuously reveal the irony, if not hypocrisy, of R2P. Hence, 
Africa‟s particular position as expressed by Mahmud Mamdani, the Sudanese 
government and Robert Mugabe discussed in this chapter under 3.6 Sovereignty as 
Responsibility and Equality makes for a compelling case. Chomsky (2011:11) 
echoes the maxim of Thucydides and argues, „the strong do as they wish while the 
weak suffer as they must‟. In other words, Chomsky argues that the abuse of the 
principle of R2P is so rampant that the execution and implementation of R2P cannot 
be separated from the motive behind its invocation and application in the first place. 
 
R2P allows military intervention, under certain circumstances, and with the 
authorisation of the UNSC. O‟Connell (2011:71) asserts that many proponents of 
R2P support it in sincerity to promote human rights, yet they also support „the use of 
force in violation of international law‟. Human rights are inscribed in international law. 
Thus, supporters of R2P appear to be self-contradictory if not hypocritical. They 
appear to want to uphold human rights as inscribed in international law and at the 
same time support military intervention in sovereign states. State sovereignty, 
particularly the Westphalian sovereignty, is part of international law. R2P is in direct 
violation of state sovereignty thus, the doctrine of R2P violates international law. 
Inherent in the idea of humanitarian intervention is acceptability to „kill and injure 
some, even wholly innocent people; to preserve the human rights of others‟ as 
affirmed by O‟Connell (2011:79). It can be argued that this is outright hypocrisy. 
Does it then mean that the killing of a few people is less of a crime than the killing of 
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many? 
 
The UN „Charter Article 2(4) is a general prohibition on the use of force‟ as recorded 
by O‟Connell (2011:72) and makes only two exceptions to Charter 2(4). Charter 
Article 51 speaks of self-defence, it permits „individual and collective self-defence if 
an armed attack occurs‟; and Charter Articles 39 and 41 make leeway that forcible 
intervention is permissible „to restore international peace‟ with the authorisation of 
the Security Council. 
 
According to the ICISS (2001:xiii) report the international community of states as 
represented by the ICISS30 report asserts that:  
If the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a 
reasonable time, alternative options are: 
 
Consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency Special 
Session under the „Uniting for Peace‟ procedure; and  
 
Action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organisations 
under 
Chapter VIII of the Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent authorisation 
from the Security Council. 
 
Hehir (2011:84) argues that in essence, R2P is a reactionary tool to intra-state 
humanitarian crises arguing that what needs most attention is the „responsibility to 
react‟ component of R2P as it poses the greatest controversy in humanitarian 
responses. The UNGA Resolution 2131 in 1965 „affirmed the Assembly‟s opposition 
to all forms of intervention „for any reason whatsoever‟ and declared that, „armed 
intervention is synonymous with aggression‟ (Hehir 2011:85). Now R2P is a direct 
challenge and contravenes resolution 2131 of 1965. Again R2P stands in direct 
contravention of UNGA Resolution 2625 which affirmed resolution 2131 and averred 
that „no threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence 
of any state‟ (Hehir 2011:85). Thus, both the UN Charter and international law 
„explicitly recognise the inviolability of the state and outlaw the use of force‟. But it is 
the same UNGA (2005 Summit) that adopted, by consensus (Chomsky 2011:13, 19), 
the notion of R2P, thus, by implication the UNGA 2005 reassessed and opted 
                                                          
30
 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was set up at the 
recommendation of the UNGC, suffice to deduce that the international community of states, ascended to the 
creation of the ICISS. 
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instead for the relaxation of resolutions 2131 and 2625. The UNGA has powers 
vested in it through the Uniting for Peace Resolution (Hehir 2011:89).  
 
3.7 Challenges of R2P 
 
As noted by Wheeler (cited in Hehir 2011:91) the R2P notion „fails to address the 
fundamental question of what should happen if the Security Council is unable or 
unwilling to authorise the use of force to prevent or end a humanitarian tragedy‟. The 
idea that R2P is a preventative measure and tool is irreconcilable with its premise 
that it is a response by the international community of states to „mass atrocities‟ in a 
particular state. If it is to prevent „mass atrocities‟, it necessarily means that those 
isolated and at times insignificant cases that could potentially spiral into „mass 
atrocities‟ should be decisively curbed. In that light, it can be argued that Operation 
Murambatsvina warranted such an intervention, yet it was not invoked. Mass 
atrocities do not occur ex nihilo31 as argued by Chandler (2011:25). Seemingly there 
is a contradiction of terms, R2P as such, cannot be a preventative tool and measure, 
and at the same time be a responsive criterion in times of crisis. The shift from the 
intervention criteria to that of preventative criteria does not remedy the situation for 
the doctrine of R2P. In the interest of specificity and particularity, at this juncture this 
study will extract, name and explore some specific challenges presented by the 
doctrine of R2P. 
 
3.7.1 Abuse 
 
O‟Connell (2011:77) argues that „some proponents of humanitarian intervention 
believe that opponents of it are most concerned that states will „abuse‟ a right of 
humanitarian intervention‟. They believe that some countries will further their national 
interests in the guise of humanitarian intervention. They argue that there are no 
empirical cases of altruistic humanitarian intervention. The position that O‟Connell 
adopts is indefensible and exposes the ignorance and injustice denied to Africa in 
particular. The cases of Rwanda, Darfur, Somalia, Sudan and the Democratic 
                                                          
31
 Ex nihilo is a Latin phrase meaning ‘out of nothing’. 
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Republic of Congo (DRC), to mention but a few, would be starting points in 
exploration of the abuse there is of R2P. Žižek (2008:3) cites that about 4 million 
people have died in the past decade in the DRC as a result of war, civil unrest and 
politically-motivated violence. Yet not even the slightest notion of R2P was invoked. 
At the 67th UN General Assembly the President of Zimbabwe expressed serious 
concern at the abuse that abounds in the R2P doctrine. He argued that: 
We are concerned by the clear mad growing evidence that the concept of 
„responsibility to protect‟ has begun to be applied and seriously abused, thus 
inevitably compromising and undermining the cardinal principle of the 
sovereignty of states and the United Nations Charter principles of territorial 
integrity and non-interference in the domestic affairs of countries (Mugabe 
2012: internet).  
 
The concern here could be that the doctrine of R2P is seemingly applied in some 
cases and not others. Why was there military intervention in Libya in 2011 (Bellamy 
2013:111) that ousted and violently killed its leader Gaddafi in the year 2012? And 
why was the same R2P not applied in the case of the DRC 2012, or in the case of 
Zimbabwe‟s Operation Murambatsvina? It can be suggested that this is tantamount 
to selectiveness in responses to crises that require international intervention. As 
such, powerful states could see an opportunity in the crises of other countries and 
plant a Trojan horse. This poses a limitation on international humanitarian law. Some 
argue that the UNSC prohibits the use of force on functional sovereign states and 
this has been used to counter the grounds of humanitarian intervention. But 
sovereignty can be forfeited by states that cannot ensure protection entitled to 
citizens of a sovereign state (Bellamy and Wheeler 2011:513). It therefore remains, 
on the grounds of customary international law (which is binding to all states in the 
international community whether or not states consent), that forcible intervention that 
is authorised by the UN is legal and credible ground for humanitarian intervention. 
Common humanity would suggest that „all individuals have basic human rights and 
duties to uphold the rights of others‟ (ibid). If these are abused, surely some form of 
intervention would be necessary. 
 
3.7.2 Selective Application and Response 
 
Besides the problem of abuse by states of intervening in others, there is also a 
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problem of selective response. This renders the principle of intervention on 
humanitarian grounds inconsistent. The case in point is that of NATO. „NATO‟s 
intervention in Kosovo could not have been driven by humanitarian concerns 
because the alliance has done little to address the very much larger humanitarian 
catastrophe in Darfur‟ (Bellamy and Wheeler 2011:514). Chomsky (2011) concurs 
with this view that NATO did not intervene when Kurds were killed in Kosovo in 1999 
and yet Kosovo fell under NATO‟s own jurisdiction. The conflict between the state of 
Palestine and Israel is a long standing one. It can be argued that there is no 
evidence of concrete and tangible results of the various interventions of mediation in 
the war, terror and conflict in that region. Chomsky (2011:14) rightly questions and 
argues that „there is no thought today of protection of the people of Gaza, which is 
also a UN responsibility, along with the rest of the „protected population‟ (under the 
Geneva Conventions), defined fundamental human rights‟.  
 
Much of Africa has been plagued by conflicts that merited assistance and 
intervention of the international community. Zimbabwe‟s Operation Murambatsvina 
was one such case that merited the R2P intervention. Yet nothing much was done 
by the „international community‟ and the powerful Western allies did little to mitigate 
and protect the multitudes of people who have suffered violent wars, starvation, 
plagues, diseases and conflicts. Chomsky (2011:15) further contends that „there is 
no thought of invoking even the most innocuous prescriptions of R2P to respond to 
massive starvation in the poor countries‟, for example Zimbabwe in 2008 as argued 
by O‟Connell (2011:76). There is apparent selectiveness in the responses that the 
„international community‟ has rendered in situations meriting humanitarian 
intervention. This compounds the paranoia and scepticism that besieges R2P. 
 
3.7.3 Moral Principles 
 
In today‟s pluralist international society, it is difficult to reach a consensus on what 
and which moral principles should govern the world. While pluralism is sensitive to 
human rights concerns, it contends that „humanitarian intervention should not be 
permitted in the face of disagreement about what constitutes extreme human rights 
violations‟ (Bellamy and Wheeler 2011:514). In other words the lack of consensus on 
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the grounds of intervention opens up further situations of abuse of weaker/smaller 
states by powerful states as they tend to determine moral values informed by their 
own cultures. The issue of concern for some scholars of international relations is not 
the principle of R2P per se but rather the arbiter of it – the UNSC in general, and the 
United States of America in particular – as insinuated by Chomsky (2011:12). 
Chandler (2011:27) shares this point of view and argues that „for the UN, and for 
R2P as it exists today, it is not the intervention (reaction) aspect which is central but 
the institutionalisation of international cooperation coordinated through the UN‟. In 
the view of this study, the UNSC is marred by the presence of powerful states that 
manipulate and control its trajectory, mandate and decisions. This position is 
affirmed by Chomsky (2011:16) who argues that „the Council [UNSC] is controlled by 
its five permanent members, and they are not equal in operative authority‟.  As such, 
the UNSC as a neutral arbiter in the words of Chandler, „plainly is not‟ (ibid). The 
USA is dominant in the UNSC resolution by its veto power. The USA alone has 
vetoed 45 UNSC decisions since the mid-1960s „including even resolutions calling all 
states to observe international law‟. As such, „the USA is far in the lead in vetoes‟ 
(Chomsky 2011:16) and that goes to demonstrate and prove its influence and power 
even in the UNSC. This affirms the realist maxim of Thucydides that „the strong do 
as they wish while the weak suffer as they must‟. Thus, the UNSC cannot provide 
certitude and assurance that it is a fair arbiter of international political relations.  
 
3.7.4 Non-Compliance 
 
In the event that there have been no established grounds for humanitarian 
intervention and yet a country intervenes in another on the claims of humanitarian 
intervention, is there any recourse for the intruded country? Will such intrusion be 
criminal activity? Who/what enforces international humanitarian law? What punitive 
measures are in place for non-complying states? Despite the challenges facing 
international humanitarian law, order, justice and coordination would be much worse 
without it. In principle the R2P takes away from the classical, Westphalian sense of 
sovereignty. Yet it calls on governments to be responsible in securing their 
populations. The problem of R2P is that it comes as a Western endorsed concept, 
and the West has no moral high-ground when it comes to matters of international 
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politics given for example that colonialism and imperialism still resonate freshly in the 
global south, particularly in Africa and most certainly in Zimbabwe. Thus, by 
accepting R2P as indicated by the UN 2005 consensus, the risk is that the 
conventions of sovereignty are trivialised, particularly the Westphalian sovereignty as 
it would be rendered only but a myth (Osiander 2001). 
 
Yet, the Westphalian sovereignty can be suspended and violated, if not discarded 
and ignored, by the „international community‟ of states in order to protect citizens in a 
state that is unwilling or has failed to provide security for its citizens. The 
international community that should assume the responsibility to protect is not clearly 
defined in the frameworks of R2P. In practice, the application of R2P not only 
violates the notions of non-intervention, self-determination, juridical independence 
and autonomy entrenched in the Westphalian sovereignty, it allows for powerful 
states to legally and therefore openly abuse weaker states, in the name of 
humanitarian intervention. Despite the formal and official codification, the R2P is not 
clearly articulated as to its intentions; it argues for intervention even militarily, yet it 
wants to make believe it upholds human rights. R2P wants to make believe it 
upholds principles of national integrity, hence sovereignty, yet it is in direct violation 
of the basis of principles of sovereignty. The R2P doctrine exposes, while it 
challenges and compounds the intricacies of sovereignty in general and Westphalian 
sovereignty in particular, it does not articulate anything constructive in itself. The 
intentions it carries, if sincere, are noble; but the abuses that have plagued 
interventions of many kinds and of various „humanitarian‟ reasons, are a cause of 
great concern for Africa and much of the global south, particularly the GoZ. 
 
The R2P sovereignty issue is larger than the issue itself theoretically or scholarly 
judged. Operation Murambatsvina is a great way of coming to the issue in a concrete 
and practical way. However, R2P is under-developed. Scholars reflect the 
preferences of the states in which they reside or as is the case with the President of 
Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, his views represent decolonialism of Africa in general, 
and the armed struggle of Zimbabwe in particular. This work aims not to argue the 
logical or philosophical incompatibility of the R2P and sovereignty, rather it sought to 
discuss the contentions and contestations there are on both the doctrines of 
sovereignty and R2P. 
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The GoZ generally and the President of Zimbabwe in particular are seemingly 
arrogant and are unapologetic for their views on the biased nature of the R2P 
doctrine and they seem to favour the state sovereignty doctrine in its current form. 
While the African perspective that embraces the scepticism that surrounds the R2P 
concept is founded, it remains that even the utterances by the President of 
Zimbabwe and the Libyan government of 2011 may very well be politicisation of the 
R2P/sovereignty nexus. These utterances could have been stated as a distraction 
and decoy to divert attention from the real issues and challenges of democratic 
governance that have become synonymous with the GoZ and Libya. Colonialism and 
imperialism are condemned by the strongest sentiments and terms, but to blame 
everything and hold everything that comes from former colonial powers suspect is 
tantamount to unfounded and uninformed bias. The biases that these entities hold do 
not take away anything from the discourse of sovereignty and R2P neither do they 
add any value. 
 
 3.8 Operation Murambatsvina 
 
As alluded to in Chapter One, with little if any warning at all, the GoZ embarked on 
an operation it called Operation Murambatsvina (henceforward OM) on the 19th of 
May 2005 (Chari 2008:105; IDMC 2008:18; Mhiripiri 2008:149; Nyamanhindi 
2008:118; Tibaijuka 2005:12). The GoZ claimed that OM was officially ended on the 
25th of June 2005 (Chari 2008: 110), some 37 days after its official commencement, 
yet the negative effects of the operation were arguably still felt and experienced in 
December 2013. The then Vice-President, Mujuru, is also on record announcing that 
OM „was now complete‟ on the 28th of July 2005 (COIS 2006:165; NAONGO 
2007:14). This exposes the uncertainty that surrounded OM.  
 
OM was proffered as a legitimate government operation to rid urban areas of clutter 
and „dirt‟, claimed the GoZ in the person of Ms Sekesai Makwawarara, Chairperson 
of the then government-appointed Harare Town House (Nyamanhindi 2008:119, 
citing The Herald, 19 May 2005:1; Tibaijuka 2005:12). The GoZ further claimed that 
it was within its sovereign rights to determine Zimbabwe‟s trajectory concerning 
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urban dwelling structures and commerce. As quoted by the United Nations Human 
Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat 2005) in Chibisa and Sigauke (2008:31), the 
GoZ argued that it was:  
arresting disorderly or chaotic urbanisation including its health consequences; 
stopping illegal, parallel market transactions, especially foreign currency 
dealing and hoarding of consumer commodities in short supply; and reversing 
damages caused by inappropriate urban agricultural practices.  
 
However, the effects of OM on vulnerable groups of Zimbabwean societies, 
particularly the poor, women and children, necessitates an inquiry into and analysis 
of what transpired in Zimbabwe in the winter of 2005. The United Nations Human 
Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), the Labour and Economic Development 
Research Institute of Zimbabwe (LEDRIZ), the Country of Origin Information Service 
(COIS) in its 2006 report (p 68), and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
(IDMC) in its report, are some of the organisations that have publicly and vehemently 
spoken out against OM, citing its multiple human rights abuses and contraventions. 
The Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops‟ Conference (ZCBC) and the Zimbabwe Association 
of Doctors for Human Rights (ZADHR) are some of the institutions within Zimbabwe 
that have provided opposing voices to the operation (Ncube et al 2005:8). Even 
Professor Jonathan Moyo (Minister of Information at the time this research was 
undertaken), and a member of the ruling party ZANU PF himself, revealed that OM 
was „an inhumane, barbaric demolition of properties belonging to the weak and poor 
in our society‟ (ibid).  
 
The then Secretary General of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), Mr 
Lovemore Matombo, argued that „the reason for Murambatsvina was purely a 
punishment for the urbanites for rejecting ZANU PF in the elections [2005]‟ (in Bright 
2008). Mhiripiri (2008:150) expressed a similar view. In other words, contrary to the 
GoZ‟s denial of committing human rights abuses and contraventions in its OM, as 
described by the aforementioned NGOs and civil society organisations, the impact 
and consequences of that unethical operation indicate gross human rights abuses, 
as have been claimed and proven by various other international, regional and local 
civil society organisations. „The intention of Operation Murambatsvina, as argued by 
the government [GoZ], was to rid the country of illegal structures, crime, filthy stalls 
and squalor‟ (Musiyiwa 2008:65). In doing so, the operation „evicted thousands of 
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people deemed squatters country-wide, particularly in urban centres‟ in a bid to 
„restore order in the country since hundreds of thousands of people displaced by the 
1970s war of independence had settled illegally in urban centres and commercial 
farms‟. These included large numbers of the „squatters and vagrants in Epworth, 
Mbare Musika and other parts of greater Harare‟ (ibid).  
 
Emeritus Archbishop Desmond Tutu on several occasions lashed out at the GoZ for 
its failure to protect its citizens, especially the poor. Tutu argued that Zimbabwe‟s 
policies demonstrated: 
 The incomprehensible greed, appalling lack of compassion, and 
unspeakable cruelty demonstrated by the Zimbabwean elite contradicts the 
classical African concept of Ubuntu – the essence of being human. Ubuntu 
speaks particularly to the fact that you cannot exist as a human in isolation, 
since we are all interconnected. The spirit of Ubuntu is diminished when 
others are humiliated or diminished and when others are tortured or 
oppressed (Tutu 2013:35). 
 
OM was a clear violation of international law (Mwanaka 2013:21) as evidenced by 
the damning UN report drafted by Tibaijuka (2005). Making reference to OM the 
Tibaijuka (2005:9) report advances the argument that: 
OM breached both national and international human rights law provisions 
guiding evictions, thereby precipitating a humanitarian crisis. The 
Government of Zimbabwe should pay compensation where it is due for those 
whose property was unlawfully destroyed. 
 
Tibaijuka (2005:56-57) based the breaches and infringements committed by the GoZ 
in its OM on the basis that Zimbabwe is a signatory country to international 
regulations governing evictions. She argues that although the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe „provides protection under Chapter III, Declaration of Rights, OM infringed 
upon many of these rights. The forced evictions and resultant displacements have 
rendered thousands of people homeless and thus vulnerable to the violations of a 
number of other rights‟ (Tibaijuka 2005:62). 
 
Although denied by the then Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, 
Patrick Chinamasa, David Coltart a Member of Parliament from the MDC, argued 
that „the Government was committing a crime against humanity in terms of Article 7 
of the Treaty of Rome on the forcible removal of people‟ (Tibaijuka 2005:89). 
Zimbabwe is a signatory of this international agreement. 
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In the face of mounting pressure from civil society organisations and arguments and 
protests raised, the GoZ insisted that it was within its sovereign rights to carry out an 
operation such as OM. Since OM was justified on the basis of the doctrine of 
sovereignty, as claimed by the GoZ32, this necessitates an inquiry into the definition 
and understanding of sovereignty by the GoZ. This inquiry will follow in Chapter Four 
of this work. 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter also demonstrated that the concepts of state and sovereignty shape 
and reshape each other and can evolve over time. The environmental context, 
cultural setting, societal understanding and worldview shaped by the global world 
order, all have a bearing on agents‟ identities. Thus, the social constructions 
„architectured‟ in those conditions will reflect those particular conditions in the agents‟ 
character and substance.  
 
The chapter also argued that absolutism was the dominant political system in the 
modern era, and as such the state system which developed in that era is reflective of 
absolutism in the form of the absolute, indivisible and inviolable principles of the 
Westphalian doctrine of sovereignty. However, the 21st century has shown that the 
wheels of time have indeed rolled; the sacrosanctity and absoluteness of the 
doctrine of sovereignty have been greatly curtailed by international norms and 
processes of globalisation. Thus, absolute state sovereignty has diminished.  
                                                          
32
 This is evidenced by the remarks made by President Robert Mugabe in response to critics of his 
Government-led Operation Murambatsvina at the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the 
18th of September 2005 barely three months after the infamous Operation Murambatsvina. The basic 
justification was that it was within the sovereign rights of the state of Zimbabwe to carry out an operation such 
as the ‘Murambatsvina programme’ to use the words of President Mugabe in that address. For the full text of 
Mugabe’s UNGA 2005 speech refer to: 
(http://www.zanupf.org.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=74).   
 
This position was further mirrored in President Mugabe’s 26th Independence Celebrations Address on the 
18th of April 2006 arguing that Operation Murambatsvina was a success as it was meant to be succeeded by 
Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle meant to resettle displaced people as a result of the former operation. 
Mugabe argued that the operations that his government carried out were a consolidation and actualisation of 
the sovereign people of Zimbabwe’s independence. For the full text of that speech please refer to: 
(http://www.zanupf.org.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=71). 
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This chapter has demonstrated that in principle, the Westphalian sovereignty is 
about the self-determination of a state. It is about upholding a state‟s autonomy and 
independence. Westphalian sovereignty‟s key and distinct feature is the notion of 
non-intervention by foreign actors and forces in the domestic domain of a sovereign 
state. 
 
The chapter also demonstrated how R2P evolved from the doctrine of state 
sovereignty. It argued that in principle, R2P is noble and if accompanied by good 
intentions, can be an effective tool to curb governments‟ abuse of their citizens. The 
uncertainty that surrounds the definition of international community and agency is 
worrisome.  
 
The chapter introduced Operation Murambatsvina and highlighted some criticism 
that the operation met from NGOs, church leaders, leaders of opposition parties in 
Zimbabwe and representatives of civil society organisations. It discussed how the 
GoZ insisted and maintained how the operation was credible under the doctrine of 
state sovereignty. This alludes to the subject of inquiry in the next chapter, the 
interpretation of sovereignty by the GoZ. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SITUATING OPERATION MURAMBATSVINA IN THE 
HISTORY OF THE ZIMBABWE SOVEREIGN STATE SYSTEM 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will argue that Operation Murambatsvina was just one of the many 
episodes of politically-motivated violence in the history of the modern state of 
Zimbabwe. Pre-colonial Zimbabwe‟s political landscape was marred by conquests 
and conflicts between the ethnic groups of Zimbabwe; these can be equated to the 
kin-based nation states of the European concert of states that Campbell (2003:7) 
talks of. The arrival of British explorers and settlers, that later turned into 
colonisation, in Zimbabwe was through brutal, insincere and violent means. 
Zimbabwe‟s „hard-won‟ independence from Britain was achieved through violence 
and outright war. Zimbabwe continues to be ruled by violence and threats of 
violence. A continuum of violence and contestations for power over vast spaces of 
time are factors that feature prominently in the history of the Zimbabwean state 
system. These factors affect and shape the GoZ‟s comprehension of sovereignty. It 
is with this in mind that this chapter seeks to situate and articulate the position of the 
GoZ in the international domain of politics. The chapter will argue that the position of 
the GoZ on its domestic arena has some bearing on the international realm of global 
politics. This work will argue that Operation Murambatsvina was a carefully 
orchestrated operation designed to enforce, in the view of the GoZ, its domestic 
sovereign authority and its implied international sovereign authority. This chapter will 
demonstrate that sovereignty is not given, it is taken. 
 
4.2 Sovereignty in the Modern State of Zimbabwe 
 
Zimbabwe as it is known today has at different historical epochs been known by 
different names. It has been commonly referred to as Southern Rhodesia from 1890 
to 1965, with present day Zambia known as Northern Rhodesia. From 1965 to 1979 
Zimbabwe was known only as Rhodesia. Upon attaining its independence from 
Britain on the 18th of April 1980, it was named Zimbabwe (Bond and Manyanya 
2002:1). The name Zimbabwe is derived from the Shona phrase dzimba dza 
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mambwe, which means houses of stone (Campbell 2003:7). At independence 
Zimbabwe inherited a method of state governance based on the European modern 
state system from the British. Thus the various divergent kin-based nation-states that 
existed in Zimbabwe before colonialism were done away with by the new nationalist 
government, yet „the Modern European state developed out of a kin-based state‟ 
(Campbell 2003:9). The European state system, after the Peace Treaty of 
Westphalia (1648), recognised each state with a central authority and a particular 
given territory.  
 
Sovereignty is presented as a privilege of the state and the ruler who possesses 
power over the ruled or subjects. The existence of class differences can be inferred 
from the modalities of the concept of sovereignty, particularly between the rulers and 
the ruled. Beach (1984:26), in line with this idea, asserts that the social differences 
between „the rulers and the ruled were at their most distinct in Great Zimbabwe, with 
contrasts in housing, living space, diet and imported goods‟. This gives the idea that 
the rulers or the state occupied a privileged position over the ruled or its subjects. As 
such what was of paramount importance and emphasised was the state‟s 
sovereignty over that of an individual. Hence the discussions of this work state 
sovereignty. 
  
At the centre of the history of Zimbabwe is the contentious and turbulent issue of 
sovereignty. The various nation-states that have existed in the history of Zimbabwe, 
in their survival, pursued and preserved their sovereignty by all means including 
conquest and violence. The use of violence in the preservation of state sovereignty 
is well documented in the history of Zimbabwe as this work will demonstrate. Thus 
violence cannot be negated in the cohesion and governing of the various nation-
states in the different historical epochs that have existed in Zimbabwe. Violence has 
almost become a corollary of sovereignty in Zimbabwe, which saw its escalation in 
Operation Murambatsvina in May 2005 - the main subject of assessment for this 
work. 
99 
 
4.2.1 Pre-colonial era 
 
The various ethnic groupings in Zimbabwe can be summed up in two main 
categories, the Shona and the Ndebele. In the Shona group one finds the Torwa, 
Rozvi, Changamire, Mutapa and the Toutswe states. In the Ndebele group belongs 
the Kololo and Gaza states (Beach 1984:24). In affirmation of the idea that violence, 
in pursuit and preservation of sovereignty has been a preferred tool of governance 
before the advent of colonialism, Mudenge (1988:134) argues that „in pre-colonial 
times for a state to survive it required defensive [military] forces and to expand it 
needed offensive [military] forces‟. It is also documented that the Changamire and 
Ndebele states „simply took over the states that existed there before including many 
of their personnel‟ (ibid), suggesting conquest. Conquest essentially is a hostile and 
violent takeover of one state by another.  
 
4.2.2 The Shona States 
 
The Great Zimbabwe state existed between the 13th and 15th century 1250 CE 
(Beach 1984:24). It is also referred to as the Changamire state. In fact, as Beach 
(1984:24) argues, the Mutapa, Changamire and Ndebele states were conquest 
states. This fact is mirrored by Mudenge (1988:37) who argues that the 
Munhumutapa Empire was „a conquest state founded by one Prince Mutota, also 
known as Nyatsimba or Nemasengere‟. The Mutapa and Changamire belong to the 
majority Shona ethnic grouping. Mudenge (1988:134) further posits that the Mutapa 
state was in existence for about 500 years. Of those years, the Mutapa state enjoyed 
300 years of control of the highly-coveted highlands of central and northern 
Zimbabwe. It can be deduced that the controlling was done through cohesion and 
violence. The Changamire state existed between the 17th and 19th century, and the 
Mutapa state existed between the 15th and 17th century (Beach 1984:24). Violence in 
pursuit of sovereignty has been engrossed in Zimbabwean cultures before the onset 
of colonialism.  
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4.2.3 The Ndebele States 
 
The Ndebele originated from the Zulu state in Natal (present day South Africa) in the 
1820s and can also be traced to Ndwandwe of the Zwide state (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2009:iii; Beach 1984:54). The Ndebele states (comprising the Kololo and Gaza 
states), in pre-colonial times in the history of Zimbabwe, existed between the 17th 
and 19th century (Beach 1984:24) and these are the same dates as those of the 
existence of the Changamire state. Since these two states (Ndebele and 
Changamire) shared the same spatial, geographical and temporal space, one could 
deduce that they would share the same resources and therefore inevitably seek 
control of those resources.  
 
King Lobengula launched „full-scale raids on the Shona in the period 1890 to 1893‟ 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009:143) seeking control of the resources and the subjugation of 
the population. This is evidenced by Beach (1984:54) who argues that the Ndebele 
took over, entirely with the whole population of the Changamire state in about 1840, 
only to be defeated in further conquest by the Rhodesians in the 1890s‟. To the 
same effect Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:113) argues that „the Ndebele hegemonic 
project was not scattered on barren land. They worked very hard to establish 
themselves at the expense of prior Shona forms, which they yet failed to totally 
supplant‟.  
 
In cherishing their cultural and political independence argues Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
(2009:vi), the Ndebele responded „violently to equally violent imperialist forces which 
were intolerant of their sovereignty and cultural autonomy‟. This further attests to the 
view that violence has been used as a tool to achieve sovereignty in the history of 
nation-states in Zimbabwe. So forceful were the Ndebele that they retained their 
cultural identity and „converted many of their Shona subjects to that identity, so that 
by 1893 about 60% of the Ndebele were of Shona origin‟ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2009:113). This further attests to the conquests that existed in Zimbabwe before 
colonialism.  
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4.2.4 Colonialism 
 
Rhodesia is a name adopted in 1895 (Wood 2011:4) after Cecil John Rhodes. The 
Rhodesian state and structures were established on Zimbabwean soil after the 
military conquest of 1892-1897 (Campbell 2003:9). The Union Jack (British Flag) 
was raised at Fort Salisbury (named after the British prime minister of the day) on 
the 12th of September 1890 (Moorcraft and McLaughlin 2008:22; Hill 2003:42). 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:119) concurs with the dates posited by Campbell and 
advances that Matabeleland was colonised in 1893 through the aid of Christian 
missionaries. Colonialism was not a single event. It was a protracted process which 
involved violence, strife and resistance. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:141) further argues 
that the „colonisation process took the form of a catalogue of violence committed with 
impunity‟. The sovereignty of the indigenous peoples of Zimbabwe was disregarded 
and negated. Commentators on Zimbabwean political and historical discourses have 
shown that colonisation was indeed a violent process. In affirmation of this 
observation, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:141), arguing from an Ndebele nationalist 
perspective, states that: 
 The Ndebele state became a direct victim of imperial violence and destruction 
in the period 1893-1896 as the advocates of Victorian aggrandisement beat 
the colonial drums to a crescendo, arguing that the independent Ndebele state 
was a barrier to the advances of „civilisation‟, commerce and Christianity. 
 
The view expressed by Ndlovu-Gatsheni may resonate with the experiences of many 
people of Zimbabwe on the one hand and on the other hand, others are not 
sympathetic to it. For example Peter Godwin (in Hill 2003:45) argues that the 
Ndebele King Lobengula was a blood-thirsty tyrant whom and his people arrived as 
colonists in the land of the Shona. This view by Godwin seeks to downplay the fact 
that Zimbabwe was colonised by imperial violence. While it is true that the Ndebele 
had violently conquered the Shona, the British were equally guilty, if not more guilty 
than the Ndebele given that they (as Europeans) already devised the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648. The British could have very well argued that their occupation of 
Zimbabwe was done amicably and legally through the Rudd Concession of 1888. In 
the view of the Ndebele, through their king Lobengula, the British tricked them in 
selling off their land (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009:142). These arguments reveal the 
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contestability of sovereignty in the history of Zimbabwe. Violence was used amongst 
ethnical Zimbabwean nation-states in pursuit of each nation-state‟s sovereignty.  
Violence was again used as colonists made their way forcibly on Zimbabwean soil, in 
the process trampling on Zimbabweans‟ sovereignty. 
 
4.2.5 The Rhodesian War 
 
British colonialists who had imposed themselves on Zimbabwean soil and formed 
their state called Rhodesia began, through brutal means, to expropriate indigenous 
people of Zimbabwe of their land, cattle, and imposed exorbitant taxes such as a 
cattle-dip tax and grazing fees. African peasants were forced off their arable land 
and forced into mines run by the colonialists and worked as manual labourers on the 
new white-owned commercial farms (Bond and Manyanya 2002:3). This argument is 
corroborated by Moorcraft and McLaughlin (2008:21) who argued that „African 
peasant farmers were moved off their land to make way for Europeans‟. Beach 
(1984:60) further affirms the facts of colonialism and argues that Rhodesia‟s 
countryside was turned into towns, roads and railroads were erected, mines dug and 
land divided into „commercial‟ farms for the colonialists and „traditional‟ reserves for 
the African peasants. 
 
As if colonialism was not enough the Rhodesians had the audacity to keep fighting 
the Shona and Ndebele to hold onto their conquest. When the indigenous African 
population resisted colonialism, they were met with violence and further subjugation. 
Selous, who had led the first group of pioneers to Salisbury, cautioned Rhodes and 
Jameson that white settlers were taking up all the resources in the land and that 
such would inevitably lead to war. Selous‟ concerns were dismissed to the detriment 
of the Rhodesian state. The Ndebele who were referred to as Matabele in the 
meantime regrouped in the hills of Matobo and the Shona became „increasingly 
restive over the loss of their land‟ (Hill 2003:44). Despite being warned by Selous, 
the Rhodesians held on to their new found loot, and were adamant to remain in the 
colony as Ellert (1989:1) would call it. In fact so adamant were the Rhodesians in 
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keeping grip over Zimbabwe that the then Prime Minister of Rhodesia, Ian Smith, on 
the 17th of April 1961 declared that „there would be no African nationalist rule in his 
life time‟ (Ellert 1989:3). However, ironically 16 years down the line, on the 17th of 
April 1980, the Union Jack was to be lowered to usher in on the 18th of April 1980 a 
new dispensation of nationalist rule. 
 
In 1960 Southern Rhodesia experienced a fresh wave of violence as a result of 
African nationalists‟ resistance to colonial masters. This kind of violence had last 
been experienced in the 1890s at the onset of colonialism in Zimbabwe. The 
violence was exerted by both the African nationalists and the Rhodesian forces and 
spread to both the urban and rural areas (Ellert 1989:1). The violence led the then 
Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, Sir Edgar Whitehead to ban the National 
Democratic Party (NDP) citing that „the organisation was largely responsible for the 
civil unrest in the colony‟ (ibid). In that year and month the NDP was banned, the 
Zimbabwe African People Union (ZAPU) was formed on the 18th of December 1961, 
and for the first time the name Zimbabwe actually dominated in reference to 
Southern Rhodesia (ibid). At this time a war that had been declared by the British in 
1890, who now called themselves Southern Rhodesians, was again reignited, only 
this time it was to lead to black majority rule. The following year, December 1962, 
saw the Rhodesian Front a political party that was sympathetic to the minority white 
supremacists elected (Moorcroft 2008:26). The Zimbabwe African National Union 
(ZANU) was formed on the 8th of August 1963 (Ellert 1989:2). ZANU broke away 
from ZAPU in 1963 because the views that were espoused by Joshua Nkomo – who 
was the leader - were considered moderate on the armed struggle for Zimbabwe‟s 
independence (Bond and Manyanya 2002:6). Another allegation levelled against 
ZAPU by some Shona intellectuals was that the „old Party‟ ZAPU, insinuating that 
ZANU was the new party, sought to „perpetuate an ethnocentric leadership clique‟ 
(Ellert 1989:3). While ZANU and ZAPU were fighting a common enemy, the British, 
their own survival was a stimulus that made each seek to dominate the other; 
sovereignty being the chief aspiration.  
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4.2.6 The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)  
  
In following international trends of the time, the British Government of the day under 
Sir Edgar Whitehead, and in seeking re-election, made it clear that they would 
change laws and allow equal participation of blacks in society (Hill 2003:55). This 
was welcomed by many African nationalists, but it was not to be easily accepted by a 
few white supremacists. In 1959 Harold Macmillan, the British Prime Minister, 
brought forward the process of relinquishing power to the indigenous peoples of their 
colonies by more than ten years. In the view of some British descendants who had 
settled in these so called colonies, it meant that independence was to be granted to 
countries „which lacked the skills of government. Power was handed to demagogues 
who immediately created one-party states‟ (Wood 2011:3). In an attempt to avert this 
situation, in 1962 Ian Smith and Winston Field formed a new party, „the Rhodesian 
Front and were seeking a mandate to keep power in white hands indefinitely‟ (ibid).  
 
On the 11th of November 1965, Ian Smith, the then Prime Minister of Southern 
Rhodesia claimed the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain 
(Ellert 1989:1; 124; Bond and Manyanya 2002:6; 15; Wood 2011:9; 24). Hill 
(2003:60) confirms this date that „on 11 November 1965, the cabinet agreed to a 
unilateral declaration of independence (UDI)‟. Moorcraft and McLaughlin (2008:15) 
confirm that „Rhodesia broke away from Britain to avoid black rule. From this time to 
1979 Southern Rhodesia was only referred to as Rhodesia‟ (Bond and Manyanya 
2002:1). Bond and Manyanya (2002:6) aver that the British descendants in the 
colonies feared the forthcoming British decolonisation of Africa and were nervous at 
the thought of African nationalists‟ rise to political power. Thus Ian Smith was elected 
as the new Prime Minister of the new state of Rhodesia in 1965. The UDI lasted for 
fifteen years (Ellert 1989:24; Moorcraft and McLaughlin 2008:27; 28), and the 
Rhodesians „finally surrendered at the 1979 Lancaster House peace talks in London‟ 
(Bond and Manyanya 2002:9). After 90 years of colonial subjugation and domination 
in Zimbabwe, the British ceded power to the black majority. 
 
It was not a voluntary relinquishing of power that brought black majority rule in 
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Zimbabwe. It was after a series of revolutions and confrontations with the 
Rhodesians that African nationalists finally ascended to political power. It was a 
protracted struggle that was violent, bloody and an outright revolution. Listed below 
are some operations that were carried out by the Rhodesian forces in pursuit of their 
sovereignty and domination: 
Operation Mardon was a series of ground attacks against the Zimbabwe African 
National Liberation Army (ZANLA) bases close to the Mozambican border in 1976 
(Wood 2011:2). 
Operation Dingo was a military air strike by Rhodesians on ZANLA camps in 
Mozambique November 1977 (ibid).  
Operation Uric/Bootlace was carried out in September 1979, where Rhodesian 
forces in conjunction with South Africa helped launch airborne attacks designed to 
cut ZANLA's lines of communication in Mozambique (Wood 2011:2). 
Operation Dice was carried out in October 1979 and was designed to force the 
Zimbabwe African People Revolution Army (ZIPRA) in Zambia to settle with 
Rhodesians and this was done under Kaunda‟s pressure (ibid). Violence and warfare 
were seen as tools to maintain power and domination and thereby safeguard white 
minority sovereignty. 
 
4.2.7 Anti-Colonialism 
 
Mbuya Nehanda who was a spirit medium is said to have championed the 1896 
Shona uprisings (Ellert 1989:22). The revolution in Zimbabwe was designed to 
overthrow oppression and domination of white minority rule (Lyons 2004:30). The 
Shona uprisings of the 1890s became known as Chimurenga which essentially was 
a resistance to white subjugation and domination in Zimbabwe (Moorcraft and 
McLaughlin 2008:20). Bond and Manyanya (2002:3) further attest to the fact that the 
first indigenous uprisings were known as Chimurenga in Shona, and Umvukela in 
Ndebele. These were crushed by white settlers in the 1890s.  
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Later on in the 1950s, the times that became known as „the days of Zhii‟ the African 
nationalists took up further forms of resistance. Zhii is a Shona word that, according 
to Francis Nehwati (in Ellert 1989:2), means a „devastating action which completely 
destroys or reduces to rubble‟. Moorcraft and McLaughlin (2008:26) hold the view 
that Zhii was a violent eruption that was translated to mean „desperate and frustrated 
violence‟. Violence was seen to be a tool to achieve national sovereignty by African 
nationalists. 
 
Ellert (1989:1) further concedes that in 1960 Southern Rhodesia experienced an 
episode of violence in rural and urban areas that was unprecedented in the country‟s 
history. In 1965 and 1966 Zimbabwean nationalists formed Zhanda groups and 
attacked „white-owned farms and property‟ (Ellert 1989:4) in order to destabilise the 
colonial rule. In the process they hacked down crops of maize and tobacco and killed 
livestock. This would seem to be something that the African nationalists learnt from 
the colonial masters given how they had been dispossessed of their land and cattle. 
Again one can notice how violence is used by African nationalists to achieve and 
attain national sovereignty. 
 
On the 21st of December 1972 guerrillas fighting under the command of ZANU 
attacked white-owned farms in the Zambezi valley escarpment. Operation Hurricane 
was formed by the Joint Operations Command (JOC) of the Rhodesian forces in 
response to the guerrilla attacks (Ellert 1989:23). Like the guerrillas, the Rhodesians 
responded violently to the attacks made by the guerrillas. Sovereignty in Zimbabwe 
was heavily contested, evidenced by both the African nationalists and the 
Rhodesians claiming the territory, seeking control and each ultimately pursuing their 
own national sovereignty. The contestation and violence continued for some time 
and on the 21st of December 1979, a cease fire was brokered at the signing of the 
Lancaster House agreement, that was to restore what was to be Zimbabwe‟s political 
independence from Britain (Campbell 2003:23). 
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4.2.8 Post-Colonialism  
 
From 1963, the year that ZANU broke away from ZAPU, until Zimbabwe‟s 
independence in 1980, the only unifying thread between ZANU and ZAPU was the 
common goal of liberating Zimbabwe (Ellert 1989:3). Hence the rivalry between 
these two political parties is still a factor today. However the first national democratic 
elections were held in February 1980 and Robert Mugabe emerged as the new 
leader in the new dispensation (Hill 2003:69). From the 18th of April 1980 to present 
day, the former Southern Rhodesia became known as Zimbabwe (Bond and 
Manyanya 2002:1).  
 
Hill (2003:35) argues that: 
After Robert Mugabe came to power in 1980 there was concerted effort to 
diminish the role of Matabele in both Zimbabwe‟s past and present. The 
massacres from 1982 to 1987, known as Gukurahundi, saw between 10 000 
to 30 000 Matabele slain by Mugabe‟s private army, the notorious Fifth 
Brigade.  
Gukurahundi is translated to mean „the wind that blows away the chaff before the 
rains‟ (Hill 2003:77). The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace [CCJP] 
(1997:13) avers that it refers to „the rain which washes away the chaff before the 
spring rains‟. This has been seen by some as a way of wiping out ZAPU and the 
Ndebele population and leadership that predominated ZAPU. By the end of 1982 the 
Fifth Brigade was deployed in Matabeleland in the infamous Gukurahundi Operation 
(Hill 2003:76). In 1984, the CCJP compiled a report „based on interviews with victims 
of Gukurahundi and handed it to Mugabe, but did not release it for public 
consumption until 1998‟ (Hill 2003:82). In essence Gukurahundi was a violent series 
of terror attacks on both the dissidents as claimed by the GoZ, but mainly on civilians 
as attested by the CCJP‟s report.  
 
It is debated as to when exactly Gukurahundi was carried out. Various scholars have 
proffered different dates. The Chatham House Meeting Summary (2007:2) avers that 
it was carried out during 1983-1984 and Benyera (2013:3) concurs with this view. 
Rupiya (2005:117) posits that Gukurahundi was carried between the years 1981 to 
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1986, while Hill (2003:35) is of the opinion that Gukurahundi happened between 
1982 and 1987. The CCJP and the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) argue that it 
occurred from 1981 to about 1988 (CCJP 1997:5-6).  
In late January 1983, 5 Brigade was deployed in Matabeleland North. Within 
weeks, its troops had murdered more than two thousand civilians, beaten 
thousands more, and destroyed hundreds of homesteads (CCJP 1997:14).  
 
Hill (2003:35) concurs with this observation. This shows the propensity of violence 
that the GoZ has. Violence has been a tool of governance and is likely to continue to 
be used. There was so much secrecy that surrounded Gukurahundi and this is 
attested by the fact that even to date no one exactly knows the number of casualties 
that were recorded. Benyera (2013:193) agrees with the CCJP (1997:12, 15) arguing 
that the findings of the „Chihambakwe and Dumbutshena Commissions of Inquiry 
were never made public‟. The Chihambakwe Commission was set up in 1984 
(Chatham House Meeting Summary 2007:2). It was for the purposes of investigating 
what had transpired during that period in the history of Zimbabwe. There are 
variations to the claims made, the then ZAPU opposition party leader Joshua Nkomo 
mentioned that about 20 000 people were killed, and „other sources putting the figure 
as low as 700‟ (CCJP 1997:18). Hill (2003:35) advances that about 10 000 to 30 000 
people were killed by the 5th Brigade during Gukurahundi. This figure was 
corroborated by Ncube (et al 2005:4) postulating the figure to be between 20 000 to 
30 000. Rupiya (2005:117) corroborates this figure. 
 
During that time a lot of curfews and blockades were put up to exclude people from 
entering and leaving affected areas, and the international media from getting the 
stories. The CCJP (ibid:14) is of the opinion that Matabeleland South was hard hit by 
Gukurahundi arguing that „there were no more than 200 dissidents in the curfew 
region and it was the 400 000 civilians who suffered most‟, although Matabeleland 
North and the Midlands were also affected (ibid). The CCJP further argued that „no 
journalists were allowed near the region, particularly Matabeleland South. This 
situation meant that it was very hard to get news of events out of the region, and 
hard to judge the truth of the early accounts‟ (ibid).   
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It has been argued that „dissidents often raped women, which made them unpopular. 
They also killed people they thought were sell-outs‟ (CCJP 1997:12). Dissidents 
were viewed as criminals and rightly so, they were outlaws. People living in the rural 
areas were the most affected. This is evidenced by the CCJP report arguing that „it 
was people living in rural areas who suffered worst once more, mostly from the 
activities of 5 Brigade, but also at the hands of dissidents‟ (ibid). It is clear that 
dissidents were notorious and were lawless. It was necessary for the government to 
act and bring the lawlessness and disorder to an end. Seemingly the government 
was quite aware of the need to bring about stability and peace in the land. The CCJP 
(1997:13) report goes further to say that: 
The Government said quite rightly that it was their responsibility to try and 
maintain law and order during these years. However, their response to the 
problem was seen by many as being too harsh. From early 1982, the 
Government used emergency powers to enforce widespread curfews, 
roadblocks, detention without trial and house to house searches.  
 
As dissidents continued to target White farmers, „the dissidents murdered at least 33 
white commercial farmers or members of their families. This forced farmers to move 
into town‟ (ibid). The GoZ in response to the civil unrest caused by the dissidents, 
targeted both dissidents and civilians indiscriminately. The CCJP (1997:13) report 
further revealed that the then Prime Minister, in April 1983, Mugabe was quoted 
saying „we eradicate them. We don't differentiate when we fight because we can't tell 
who is a dissident and who is not‟. It can be argued that Mugabe‟s utterances 
suggested a complete annihilation of the dissidents. The implication of that, 
unintended though it could have been, was that the civilians amongst whom the 
dissidents „hid‟ from the 5th Brigade were collaterally killed in the operation. Victims 
of Gukurahundi were forced to flee conflict areas and sought refuge in „safer‟ places 
in town. Civilians were terrorised by the dissidents and were further terrorised by the 
government which reacted violently to the disturbances caused by the dissidents. 
The civilian population was further subjected to violence from the state which ought 
to have protected them. It can be argued that Gukurahundi produced the „dirt‟ as 
people ran away from „unsafe‟ areas and squatted in urban „safer‟ areas.  
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 On the 22nd of December 1987, a day that is now celebrated as Unity Day in 
Zimbabwe, Nkomo, the leader of ZAPU, signed the Peace Accord which merged 
ZAPU with ZANU (Hill 2003:86). Nathan Shamuyarira, the then party spokesperson 
of ZANU PF, commented that his party had „many degrees in violence‟ (Bond and 
Manyanya 2002:xiv). This seems to indicate that ZANU was well aware that violence 
was used to subjugate Zimbabweans by colonists, they were also aware that 
violence was used as a tool of liberation by African nationalists in Zimbabwe and to 
that effect ZANU seems to believe that violence is part of statecraft. 
 
This union of ZANU and ZAPU somewhat ended the atrocities that people faced. But 
it was not long before reports of intimidation prior to elections surfaced. „Torture and 
murder have long been the instrument of war between ruling ZANU PF and the 
opposition MDC, and neither side plays clean‟ (Hill 2003:3). The Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) was started in the year 1999. Morgan Tsvangirai was 
elected to be the leader. He came from the ZCTU and had occupied the position of 
Secretary-General of the organisation (Matyszak 2010:xviii). This serves to 
demonstrate that Zimbabwe was colonised by violence. Violence was an instrument 
that achieved and reclaimed Zimbabwe‟s independence, and the GoZ has 
demonstrated that violence is a tool used in their statecraft. This is confirmed by 
such reports as stated by Gray Tichatonga, who had been appointed by Nathan 
Shamuyarira, when the latter was Minister of Information, telling the Sydney Herald 
„the only way we can maintain political control is through fear‟ (Hill 2003:72). 
Operation Murambatsvina was one such violent act by the GoZ on its own people. 
Even Zimbabwe‟s opposition political party, the MDC, is no better. In the year 2001 
the MDC through its leader Morgan Tsvangirai called for the removal of President 
Mugabe and his party ZANU (PF) from office by violent means – whatever those are 
(Mhiripiri 2008:162). 
 
So far this chapter has demonstrated that Zimbabwe has a long history of state-
sponsored violence. Gukurahundi was carried out by the state on its own people. 
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Though not explicitly stated, it can be deduced that the state considered its actions 
as a pursuit and preservation of its sovereignty. It was arresting disorder and chaos 
perpetrated by what it termed „dissidents‟. It is worrisome that the GoZ persistently 
esteems state sovereignty at the expense of individuals‟ sovereignty from which the 
state takes its sovereignty. This history of state-sponsored violence was again 
palpable during OM. Despite the justification submitted by the GoZ, that it carried 
OM as guaranteed by the doctrine of state sovereignty, this study asserts that the 
GoZ premised OM on municipal bylaws as promulgated by the Regional, Town and 
Country Planning Act of 1961 (Rupiya 2005:118). This is the only plausible Act under 
Zimbabwe‟s national laws that could have legal basis for OM. This work will now 
interrogate the domestic policy documents that (mis-)informed OM. The assertion 
that the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act misinformed OM is made on the 
basis that the Act was enacted in 1961, a time when Zimbabwe was still under 
British colonial rule. The Act was meant to contain black people in the townships33; 
thus, it was an instrument for colonial subjugation of Africans.  
 
4.3 Policy Documents that (Mis)Informed Operation Murambatsvina 
 
The GoZ possibly premised OM on the municipal bylaws of City Councils as they are 
the only legal instruments that made for such provisions rather than the doctrine of 
state sovereignty. The sovereignty doctrine was used as a justification of OM after 
the public outcry of various organisations and representatives of governments. The 
sovereignty doctrine was also used as a way to deter international involvement in the 
issue at hand. The specific bylaws that (mis)informed the GoZ are contained in the 
Regional, Town and Country Planning Act34 of 1976 (Nicolai 2006:821).  
 
Ironically, the bylaws of Harare, Zimbabwe‟s Capital City were inherited from the 
Smith-led government at Zimbabwe‟s independence in 1980. After Zimbabwe 
attained her independence, the bylaws were cosmetically amended at different times 
                                                          
33
 This containment of black people in the townships is similar to apartheid South Africa that asserted, in the 
person of the then Minister of Native Affairs, Hendrick Verwoerd,  that apartheid was ‘a policy of good 
neighbourliness’ (quoted in Hirsch and Dean 2002). 
34
 For the full Act it can be accessed on the following: 
(http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/legisl/reg_town_ctry_plan_act761101.pdf).  
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(1980; 1983; 1985; 1987)35 without changing the substance of the bylaws; a position 
that Tibaijuka (2005:25) succinctly notes. The bylaws were, by design, meant to 
subjugate the black majority as they favoured „white‟ areas36. It can be argued that 
the bylaws were actually made specifically to contain black people in the townships 
as they make specifically reference to „black township‟ (City of Harare 2014:internet). 
This observation was reiterated by Tibajuka (2005:35), arguing that „government 
officials repeatedly asserted in the press and in official statements to the mission that 
a major expected outcome of OM is the “return” of people to rural areas‟. 
 
4.4 Debates on Political, Economic and Social factors behind Operation 
Murambatsvina 
 
As alluded to earlier in Chapter Three, OM was carried out by the GoZ in the winter37 
of May 2005. It is well documented that Zimbabwe‟s housing crisis began in the early 
1990s as in-migration rose to unprecedented levels. „The urban population of 
Zimbabwe rose rapidly from 23% in 1982 to 30% by the early 1990s‟ (Southern 
African Regional Poverty Network 2005:22)38. Tibaijuka (2005:22) agrees with this 
view and avers that Zimbabwe‟s major cities, Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare and Gweru 
„attained population growth rates of over 5% per annum throughout the 1980s‟. The 
majority of Zimbabwe‟s rural population at independence in 1980 made inroads to 
the cities in search of employment, education and better prospects39, resulting in 
urban housing shortages. The National Association Of Non-Governmental 
Organisations (2007:12) reported that the rise in urban living was due to the 
„relaxation of colonial labour and pass laws‟ arguing that it „facilitated the movement 
of people from rural to urban areas thus fuelling the informal sector which accounted 
                                                          
35
This is information is available at:  
(http://www.hararecity.co.zw/images/jdownloads/CityDownload/harare%20by-laws.pdf).  
36
 In fact urban areas were designed for whites alone and blacks were supposed to stay only for the duration of 
their employment, thereafter they were supposed to go back to their rural homes. Blacks were staying within 
the white areas as a privilege, and not by right, they were provided with very little in terms of social services 
(http://www.hararecity.co.zw/index.php/component/content/article/27-dhcs/102-history-of-the-dhcs).  
37
 At the time of OM, Zimbabwe was entering its winter season and experiencing very cold weather. The GoZ 
counter-argued that winter being a dry season was the best time to implement the operation. OG/HK was 
meant to provide alternative accommodation before the onset of rains in October/November (Tibaijuka 2005: 
60). 
38
 A comprehensive report by the Southern African Regional Poverty Network (SARPN) is available at: 
(http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0001387/UN_Zimbabwe_July2005_part2.pdf).  
39
 This position is further consolidated by the report made by the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions 
(COHRE 2007:4). 
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for 20% of the labour force‟ by 1987. The 20% of the informal sector labour force is 
compared to the less than 10% at independence (Tibaijuka 2005:17).  
 
The urban government housing schemes took too long to materialise and were 
inadequately funded resulting in people squatting, in some instances admittedly, in 
undesignated areas. With urban living, people became more politically aware and 
astute to the politics of Zimbabwe. Many potential voters increasingly became 
agitated and felt short-changed by the government‟s failure to come up with effective 
policies that spoke to ensuing economic issues. This further created another 
problem, the congestion of housing led to the congestion of scarce economic 
resources and activities.  
 
Again in the 1990s the state adopted and started implementing the World Bank 
structural adjustment programmes and economic liberalisation clandestinely 
(National Association Of Non-Governmental Organisations: 2007:10). The Solidarity 
Peace Trust (2010:21) agrees with NAONGO, submitting that in 1991 the GoZ 
introduced the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) and liberalised 
the economy by „deregulating the labour market and introducing monetary reform, 
among other measures‟. This resulted in the disastrous social structures and 
economic constraints in Zimbabwe. The 1990s can be credited for the rise of 
Zimbabwe‟s most formidable opposition political party, the MDC, in response to the 
ensuing economic crisis. 
 
In the year 1997 the GoZ decided to appease war veterans by issuing them cash 
hand-outs after they threatened to destabilise the government with „public display of 
discontent‟ (Tibaijuka 2005:16). The finances were unbudgeted for, thereby 
contributed to inflation as it spiralled out of control. In the same year, 1997, the GoZ 
decided to engage in military intervention in the conflict in DRC. This further 
dismantled budgetary allocations of the state coffers. In the decade of the 1990s the 
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) became very popular as it pressured 
the opposition of the dominant rule of ZANU PF, which was clearly losing ground in 
the social, political and economic policies regulating the country (ibid). 
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The 2000 referendum elections signalled a watershed moment for the ZANU PF-led 
government. Never had it lost an election since independence in 198040. The ZANU 
PF-led government failed to gunner enough support to change the constitution of 
Zimbabwe, in a referendum, with the intention of consolidating Presidential powers. 
The opposing movement to the referendum was led by the MDC and demonstrated 
that the MDC had gained the confidence of the majority of the people. This did not sit 
well with ZANU PF. The majority of city dwellers were no longer controllable by the 
state through its media. ZANU PF was slowly, but surely, losing ground to the 
opposition MDC. The National Association Of Non-Governmental Organisations 
(2007:11) reported that „from 2000 Zimbabwean economy, political and social 
situation plunged in free fall with the state disregarding law, human rights, economic 
logic and social injustice‟. This marked the beginning of dire economic stagnation 
and collapse. In 2004 the labour force in the informal sector was at 40% (ibid).  
 
Consistent with the trend already set in the year 2000; again in an election41 in 2005 
ZANU PF fared badly, losing significantly to the MDC in urban areas. On the 31st of 
March 2005 Parliamentary election results were announced. The MDC won 26 of the 
30 parliamentary seats in major towns and cities with ZANU PF „winning almost all 
the rural votes and only 4 out of 30 urban votes‟ (NAONGO 2007:13). The Solidarity 
Peace Trust (2010:17) concurred with this view, arguing that: 
Most of the MDC‟s 41 seats were won in urban areas. Coming as it did in June 
2005, OM has been widely interpreted as an act of retribution against areas 
known by the government to have voted for the opposition, sending a 
message that it was irrelevant whether urban MPs and town councils were 
MDC or not.  
 
It can be argued that the MDC was viewed as an urban party, implying that ZANU 
PF was a rural party. May 2005 was to be a desperate attempt to rid the populated 
urban areas of Zimbabwe of the „ungovernable‟ voters. OM was a way to take former 
rural areas voters back to „where they belonged‟ and to a place they could easily be 
controlled by ZANU PF. The labour market also became congested, as many 
unskilled labourers made their way to cities. While city populations grew and 
                                                          
40
 This is evidenced by the National Association Of Non-Governmental Organisations (2007:11) report. 
41
 This is further evidenced by the then Secretary General of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), 
Mr Lovemore Matombo, who argued that ‘the reason for Murambatsvina was purely a punishment for the 
urbanites for rejecting ZANU PF in the elections *2005+’ (in Bright 2008). Mhiripiri (2008:150) concurred with 
this view. 
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expanded, the infrastructure - roads, sewage systems, housing, water systems and 
industry - remained stagnant (National Association Of Non-Governmental 
Organisations 2007:12). 
 
OM happened against a background of economic collapse in Zimbabwe. The 
Solidarity Peace Trust (2006:12) asserted that in May 2005, employment in the 
formal sector stood at 20%; and more than 80% of the population of Zimbabwe was 
estimated to be below the poverty datum line. Sachikonye (2006:10) advances that 
unemployment had reached 80% prior to OM. The situation described by the SPT is 
one of dire economic meltdown. The SPT further estimated that at some point about 
70% of economically-productive age were „outside their nation, on the run as illegal 
immigrants, or eking out an existence as cross border traders‟ (ibid). The 
desperation of Zimbabwean citizens to try and remain afloat in an environment of 
economic collapse came with many challenges, among those, was competition for 
the little resources perceived to be available to them. The ensuing economic 
meltdown in Zimbabwe at the time of OM came with a multifaceted conundrum of 
challenges. With the economic collapse, Zimbabweans desperately seeking a living 
were forced into diaspora thereby impacting of the integrity of family units. 
 
There was speculation that OM was meant to remove „local completion threatening 
newly arrived Chinese businessmen (sic)‟ whose stores sold cheap and often poor 
quality goods (Ncube et al 2005:10). It was estimated that about 10, 000 Chinese 
citizens had moved into Zimbabwe by July 2005 as part of the GoZ‟s „Look East‟ 
policy. This followed the economic sanctions that were imposed by, among other 
European countries, the USA, the UK and Australia following Zimbabwe‟s 
controversial „Land Reform Programme‟ in the year 2000 (ibid). Tibaijuka (2005:16) 
concurs with this view. 
 
The licensing of stallholders for small scale trading in the cities was taken out of the 
control the City Councils which were predominantly in the control of MDC members. 
The mandate was given to inter-ministerial committees that vetted, with the help of 
the police, people who were to be allowed to trade (Ncube et al 2005:10). It was 
observed that these inter-ministerial committees were staffed by people from the 
ZANU PF party and „vending sites in Bulawayo were allocated almost exclusively to 
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ZANU PF women‟s league members‟ (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010:24). Thus it can 
be argued that the vetting of who gets a stall for trading favoured ZANU PF loyalists 
at the expense of anyone who defied them. In an excerpt from the then Secretary 
General for Bulawayo Upcoming Traders‟ Association (BUTA), P.C. Ncube asserted 
that: 
Ten years of rejection by those mandated with ensuring the well-being of the 
weak as well as the strong, has seen our members in the informal sector eking 
out a living in situations which ensure only abject poverty and despair 
(Solidarity Peace Trust 2006:3). 
 
This assertion further reveals the dire economic situation that existed before OM; it 
suggests that OM only made things worse for many informal traders in Zimbabwe 
generally, but Bulawayo particularly. It is clear that the intentions behind OM are 
intertwined between social, economic and political problems that Zimbabwe was 
faced with. There is a myriad of possible underlying motives and intentions behind 
OM, these debates tabled here are not exhaustive. 
 
4.5 International Condemnation of Operation Murambatsvina 
 
Labelled as a „crime against humanity‟ under the Rome Statute by Nicolai 
(2006:826), OM received deserved condemnation from international interlocutors. 
OM stood in direct contravention of numerous international covenants and states. 
These include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights. The Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) also 
submitted a report similarly calling for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to 
prosecute Zimbabwean authorities responsible for OM as the operation constituted a 
„crime against humanity‟ (COHRE 2007:4). The particular Rome Statute Article 7 
reads:  
For the purpose of this Statute, „crime against humanity‟ means any of the 
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: 
(a) Murder; 
(b) Extermination; 
(c) Enslavement; 
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
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(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in 
violation of fundamental rules of international law. 
 
The enforcing authority of the Rome Statute is the ICC. This statute has no bearing 
on Zimbabwe as she is not a signatory of the ICC. Tibaijuka (2005:64), similarly 
notes that „Zimbabwe is not a party State to the Rome Statute therefore any referral 
would need a Security Council Resolution‟. This meant that the Mugabe government 
was un-prosecutable under the ICC; leaving the contentious option of R2P as an 
only means of redress. 
 
The USA in the person of the US Secretary of the State, Condoleezza Rice, decried 
the operation and urged AU member-countries to „push Mugabe‟s government to 
respect the rule of law and human rights‟ (Ncube et al 2005:11). Following her 
appointment as the US Secretary of State in January 2005, Condoleezza Rice 
labelled Zimbabwe as „one of the world‟s six outposts of tyranny‟42 (Besada 
2011:251) that the USA needed to „deal with‟. In response to the condemnation by 
the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Mugabe made personal attacks to the 
US Secretary of State‟s statement that labelled Zimbabwe as an „outpost of tyranny‟; 
Mugabe chided: 
That girl born out of the slave ancestry, who should know from the history of 
slavery in America, from the present situation of blacks in America, that the 
white man is not a friend (Goff and Mbakwe 2005:internet). 
 
 This reduced the debate to a personal attack on Rice. While the statement by Rice 
may have been interpreted as an unwarranted „attack‟ on Zimbabwe, OM gave 
credence to Rice‟s observations, given the severity of the operation. As it would have 
been, Condoleezza Rice was to again, four months down the line in May 2005, issue 
out an official statement of the USA‟s position on OM. The statement condemned the 
GoZ for the gross human rights violations it committed in carrying out OM. 
 
The United Kingdom concurred with the position of the USA and denounced OM as 
an abuse of human rights by the Mugabe government, in the person of the UK 
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw (Ncube et al 2005:11). Dr. Miloon Kothari, The Special 
                                                          
42
 The other five countries that Condoleezza Rice referred to as ‘outpost of tyranny’ are Belarus, Burma, Cuba, 
Iran and North Korea (Besada 2011). For the full speech of the US Secretary of State, see (http://www.age-of-
the-sage.org/sharansky/rice_confirmation_speech.html).  
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Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights on the Right to Adequate 
Housing, issued a statement on the 3rd of June 2005 urging the government „to 
immediately halt the mass forced evictions‟ (Tibaijuka 2005:13). In December 2005, 
the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland, added her voice in endorsing 
the Tibaijuka (2005) report; she retorted that OM was „not just a crisis, but a 
meltdown‟ arguing that „the UN could have done more if there were good working 
conditions‟. Egeland was of the view that had the GoZ removed bureaucratic 
hurdles; her organisation was to better help in the humanitarian crisis caused by OM 
(Solidarity Peace Trust 2006:3). This speaks of the politicking by the GoZ in spite of 
relief and aid organisations in OM. 
 
The European Union (EU) also added its voice in condemning OM (Human Rights 
Watch 2005:34). Britain called for a special meeting at the UN to discuss ways of 
intervention in Zimbabwe following OM. It was supported by the USA, France, 
Denmark, Romania, Greece, Japan, Argentina and Philippines. China, Russia, 
Algeria, Benin and Tanzania voted against the discussion and Brazil abstained43. 
This suggests that the countries that supported Britain‟s motion condemned 
Zimbabwe‟s OM tacitly; equally, some countries endorsed Zimbabwe‟s OM by not 
publicly condemning the GoZ and vetoing the UN special meeting on Zimbabwe. 
China, Russia and some African countries did not believe that Zimbabwe warranted 
to be discussed at the Security Council or UN Human Rights Commission claiming 
that Zimbabwe was „not a country in conflict‟ and was not „a threat to international 
peace and security‟ (Human Rights Watch 2005:35). This gives credence to the 
assertion made earlier in this work that the Global South in general is sceptical of 
Western interventions in domestic issues of sovereign states. 
 
4.6 The Tibaijuka 2005 Report 
 
Professor Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka the then UN-Habitat Director44, in Tanzania her 
native country, was appointed as the Special Envoy of the UN and was mandated to 
investigate Zimbabwe‟s OM. Her mandated was gazetted by the then UN Secretary 
                                                          
43
 The full article is available at: (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4721189.stm).  
44
The full article can be accessed at: (http://www.herald.co.zw/tibaijuka-fired-for-graft/).  
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General Kofi Annan. It was carried out between 26 June and 8 July 2005 (Rupiya 
2005:118). The (Tibaijuka 2005:24) report corroborated the observation that by the 
year 2004, „the informal economy was estimated to have accounted 40% of all forms 
of employment‟. It was against the economic, political and social backdrop of 
Zimbabwe‟s history that OM was introduced to: 
arresting disorderly or chaotic urbanisation including its health consequences; 
stopping illegal, parallel market transactions, especially foreign currency 
dealing and hoarding of consumer commodities in short supply; and reversing 
damages caused by inappropriate urban agricultural practices. 
 
While the reasons for engaging OM may have sounded logical and well thought out, 
the dire consequences of the operation suggested that the GoZ were up to 
something more sinister than met the eye. Had OM been properly planned and 
thought out, surely the consequences would have been anticipated and plans for 
mitigation put in place. Tibaijuka (2205:26) was of the view that „the implementation 
of the operation was effected without consultation with local authorities responsible 
for compliance and enforcement of the said standards and norms‟. The „said 
standards‟ here, refer to the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act regarding 
„prior notice to households concerned and the possibility of ex-post regularisation‟ 
(ibid). 
 
The destruction of OM took a toll on peoples‟ lives, livelihoods and social stability. 
Tibaijuka (2005:7; 33) submitted that: 
It is estimated that some 700,000 people in cities across the country have lost 
either, their (sic) homes, their source of livelihood or both. Indirectly, a further 
2.4 million people have been affected in varying degrees. 
 
The report further estimated that 114, 000 or 20% of people affected by OM were 
living in the open without shelter, another 114, 000 or 20%, went back to the rural 
areas forced by the situation, and about 170, 000 or 30% were absorbed by either 
friends, family or extended families; and a further 170, 000 or 30% sought refuge in 
community churches and other temporary accommodation (Tibaijuka 2005 35). Tens 
of thousands of people of Malawian, Zambian and Mozambican origin had 
established themselves for decades and some for generations in Zimbabwe. They 
had no rural homes to go back to (ibid). While Tibaijuka acknowledged that 
Zimbabwe had to come to terms with rapid urbanisation, the report determined that 
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OM contravened international laws and statutes on housing and basic human rights. 
In light of the findings of the United Nations Special Envoy (UNSE), some 
recommendations were made and are recorded in the following section.  
 
4.6.1 Recommendations of the Tibaijuka 2005 Report 
 
In terms of human settlements, OM rendered over half a million people either 
homeless or living with friends or family in overcrowded places exacerbating health-
threatening conditions. In political terms, OM made worse people‟s fears and 
mistrust, a result of years of a polarised climate. In economic terms, OM disrupted 
livelihoods of millions of people who had found some coping mechanism through the 
informal sector. The Tibaijuka report noted that the impact and consequences of OM 
were „life-threatening‟ (2005:71) and as such, made clear recommendations given 
the assessment it embarked on. There was a call for an immediate halt to the 
demolitions of OM.  
 
The first recommendation was to facilitate humanitarian operations that were pro-
poor, gender-sensitive, affordable housing, access to water and sanitation (ibid:72). 
This was to be achieved, among other measures, the review of the Regional, Town 
and Country Planning Act and other relevant Acts so as to align the „substance and 
the procedures of these Acts with the social, economic and cultural realities facing 
the population of Zimbabwe‟ (ibid:73).   
 
The second recommendation was aimed at addressing socio-economic issues and 
reconstruction after OM. The UN was to work with the GoZ to mobilise assistance 
from the international community, given that the GoZ had limited capacity to address 
the needs of the affected population fully (ibid:74). 
 
The third recommendation was for the GoZ to address the land issue, macro-
economic reform and governance. There was need to take corrective policy reforms 
in macro-management and governance issues (ibid:75). In line with this 
recommendation, the fourth one was for the GoZ to address issues of accountability 
by taking collective responsibility for what happened during OM (ibid:76). 
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Lastly, there was need for the GoZ to address issues of human rights especially 
given its track record of the land reform programme that was marred by violence and 
deaths of white farmers in 2000 and the untold human suffering that it caused during 
OM in 2005 (ibid:77).  
 
The Tibaijuka (2005) recommendations encompassed a wide array of issue that 
sought to address both some long term issues and short term considerations. There 
are many other organisations that made similar recommendations within Zimbabwe 
and in the international fraternity. 
 
4.7 African Responses to Operation Murambatsvina 
 
The African Union‟s silence was profound. It suggested that the union was in accord 
with the GoZ‟s position on OM. Yet the African Charter on Human and People‟s 
Rights45 (African Charter) Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 12(1), 14, 16, 18(1) and 22 protected 
human rights against operations like Murambatsvina. The Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) regional block was also disturbingly quiet. The 
National Association Of Non-Governmental Organisations (2007:19) report, noted 
that the SADC, AU and other regional bodies did not react to OM. 
 
The South African government too, was awkwardly silent over OM and referred to it 
as an „internal matter‟ of Zimbabwe (Ncube et al 2005:11). South Africa, considered 
the regional giant within SADC, maintained its policy of „quite (sic) diplomacy when it 
comes to Zimbabwe issues‟ (ibid).  At the request by the UK Foreign Secretary of 
state that the South Africa government must „act against Zimbabwe‟, Bheki Khumalo, 
the then South African Presidential Spokesperson question what her termed 
„bogeyman approach used to scare African countries, like children, into conforming 
with the West‟ (ibid). This suggested that South Africa was in agreement with the 
GoZ‟s position on OM as an exercise of its state sovereignty. Bheki Khumalo further 
commented that South Africa refused to accept the notion that it must appease G8 
                                                          
45
 The full document of the African Charter can be accessed at: 
(http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/achpr/banjul_charter.pdf).  
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leaders because Mbeki was attending the summit in Scotland. He stated that „we do 
things because we believe they are correct and right‟ (ibid), further suggesting that 
South Africa‟s silence over OM was an endorsement of the Mugabe government‟s 
stance on OM and sovereignty. The attitude displayed by South Africa on OM 
validated what Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
2003, stated that South Africa will „never‟ condemn its Zimbabwean counterparts; „it 
is not going to happen as long as this government [ANC-led government46] is in 
power‟ (Ncube et al 2005:12). The Human Rights Watch (2005:35) report, recorded 
that „the South African government indicated that it would await the UN report on the 
crisis before responding‟. Suffice to say that no condemnation ever surfaced from the 
SA government following OM. 
 
The then Kenyan Minister of Housing, Amos Kimunya, was reported to have 
„sympathised with the actions of the Zimbabwean government‟ and noted that 
„however painful, evictions are necessary‟ (Ndlovu 2005:Business Day 5 July). This 
further suggests that the silence and lack of public condemnation of OM by the 
Kenyan government meant that Kenya tacitly condoned and endorsed the GoZ‟s 
position in OM and sovereignty. It can be interpreted that Africa governments may 
very well believe that the GoZ‟s actions in OM were justified according to the 
doctrine of state sovereignty. 
 
4.8 Mugabe’s Government Responses to International Criticisms 
 
In a speech to the Central Committee of the ruling ZANU PF party, Mugabe justified 
the demolitions of OM arguing that: 
Our cities and towns had become havens for illicit and criminal practices and 
activities which just could not be allowed to go on. From the mess should 
emerge new businesses, new traders, new practices and a whole new 
salubrious urban environment. That is our vision. (Ncube et al 2005:5; 
NAONGO 2007:14) 
 
Suffice to point out that Mugabe continued to be arrogant after the casualties of OM. 
The then Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri retorted on the 16th of June 2005 
                                                          
46
 The African National Congress (ANC) is the current government in power in Zimbabwe’s neighbouring South 
Africa. 
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that OM was meant to „Clean the country of the crawling mass of maggots bent on 
destroying the economy‟ (Ncube et al 2005:5). Perhaps what is more shocking is 
Chihuri‟s referral to people, citizens of the country, as maggots. In November 2005, 
Action Aid International (2005:ii) reported that the GoZ continued to deny all 
accusations and allegations levelled against them as a result of OM, and showed 
little concern for the humanitarian consequences of that „disastrous venture‟. When 
the GoZ was the subject of adverse reports, it showed a tendency to vilify and 
denigrate the authors of such reports. 
 
In response to the specific UNSE report, the GoZ rationalised that objectives of OM 
were inter alia:  
Stem disorderly or chaotic urbanisation that hinder the Government and local 
authority by law and providing service delivery e.g. water, electricity, sewage 
and refuse removal; minimise the threat of major disease outbreaks due to 
overcrowding and squalor, stop economic crimes especially black-market in 
foreign currency; eliminate parallel market and fight economic sabotage; 
reorganise Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSSMEs); arrest social ills 
among them prostitution which promotes the spread of HIV/AIDS and other 
communicable diseases; stop the hoarding of consumer commodities, and 
other commodities in short supply, and reverse environmental damage and 
threat to water resources caused by inappropriate and unlawful settlements 
(National Association Of Non-Governmental Organisations 2007:15). 
 
The GoZ further claimed that OM was a follow-up campaign to the anti-corruption 
campaign „started in 2004 to cleanse the financial sector, which had become the 
centre of speculative services‟ (ibid). The rationalisation provided by the GoZ was 
always in line with the responsibilities of a sovereign state towards its citizens. It can 
be argued that this pseudo concern that the GoZ displayed in the face of 
international criticism, was aimed at giving credence to their position on state 
sovereignty. It was meant to pacify anyone who interrogated and questioned OM as 
a failed internal policy. 
 
The GoZ responded by initiating another equally frivolously devised Operation 
Garikai/Hlalani Kahle. It often ignored the domestic outcry of its own citizens and 
international inquiry on OM. 
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4.8.1 Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle 
 
Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle47 (henceforward OG/HK) was launched on the 9th 
July 2005 according to Rupiya (2005:117). The NAONGO (2007:15) argued that it 
was: 
Officially launched at Whitecliff in the presence of the UN Special Envoy with 
[the then] Vice President Joseph Msika and Minister of Local Government, 
National Housing and Urban Development, Ignatius Chombo.  
  
The inconsistencies in the dates proffered also are indicative of the unpreparedness 
on the part of the GoZ to launch OG/HK. This gives credence to the idea that OG/HK 
was a way to spruce up the tarnished image of the GoZ in the face of mounting 
international pressure. OM had been described as a gross violation of human rights, 
„crime against humanity‟ and outright barbarity of a government on its own people. 
To avert the situation, the GoZ embarked on OG/HK. 
 
The GoZ claimed that OG/HK was aimed at mitigating the effects of OM. The 
National Association Of Non-Governmental Organisations (2007:20) is of the view 
that OG/HK was announced by the GoZ as a „logical follow-up to OM‟. This work 
argues that OG/HK was a cover-up for the failures of OM. The objectives of the 
operation were purportedly to be achieved through the provision of affordable 
government housing, a recommendation that was made by the Tibaijuka report. The 
GoZ claimed that OG/HK was being implemented in the context of National Housing 
Programme and was aimed at providing decent, functional and affordable 
accommodation as well as an enabling and conducive environment that promotes 
micro, small and medium sized business enterprises (ibid).  
 
The objectives were to build 5 000 housing units by the end of 2005 under phase 
one, and phase two was to see the building of 10 000 units. It was also aimed „at 
promoting large scale delivery of low-cost housing, vending and marketing, as well 
as small and medium business sites‟ (ibid). The then Minister of Local Government, 
National Housing and Urban Development , Ignatius Chombo „boldly promised 
during 2005 that the government would build 250, 000 houses each year until 2008‟ 
                                                          
47
 Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle derives its name form a combination of Shona (garikai) and Ndebele (hlalani 
kuhle) words, meaning live well. 
125 
 
(Solidarity Peace Trust 2006:27). However, only a couple of thousand units of the 
houses were built and most of them were not inhabited (IDMC 2008:5). Only 3, 311 
housing units had been delivered as at June 2006, ten months after the 
commencement of OG/HK (NAONGO 2007:21). The allocation of the houses was 
also mired in controversy, especially around the selection of beneficiaries, which was 
subjected to patronage politics and favouritism. This further exacerbated the plight of 
women and children, as the housing allocation system favoured and benefited those 
with political connections. The lack of proper housing for the victims of OM 
compounded other challenges associated with the lack of shelter, such as lack of 
security for both persons and their belongings.  
 
By the year 2006 the GoZ had not kept its promise to provide decent and affordable 
housing to the victims of OM, thereby rendering OG/HK a still birth (COIS 2006:69). 
This was still the situation in 2014. Tapfuma Machakaire (in The Chronicle 2014), a 
reporter for the government mouth piece in Bulawayo, the Chronicle, reported that 
an estimated population of 2 000 people live in shacks in a place called Ngozi mine 
in the outskirts of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe‟s second largest city. These people were 
impacted by OM in 2005 and have been waiting for the shoddy government 
intervention OG/HK. 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
  
This chapter argued that violence has been used as a tool to govern in Zimbabwe 
since pre-colonial times. It also argued that Zimbabwe was colonised by violence 
and later liberated through violence. Given the events that have transpired in 
Zimbabwe since its independence in 1980, particularly Gukurahundi and Operation 
Murambatsvina, violence is likely to continue to be used as a tool to forcibly control 
people and exert the political dominance of ZANU PF. This chapter demonstrated 
that state sovereignty is crafted in and through the experiences of violence in 
Zimbabwe, arguing that the GoZ‟s framing and understanding of sovereignty is 
informed by the struggle for liberation which was by violent means.  
 
A discussion on OM was tabled. National laws and policy documents that the GoZ 
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premised OM were also discussed. The chapter also discussed some political, social 
and economic factors that were behind the implementation of OM. Despite the 
rationale provided by the government that OM was to get rid of slums, dirt and crime, 
this chapter also demonstrated that OM was a form of violence targeted at the urban 
population and carried out by state machinery and organs as a way of punishing 
voters for showing a preference for the opposition MDC at the 2000 and 2005 polls. 
  
The chapter also stated some international, regional and domestic responses to OM. 
The UNSE‟s report and recommendations following OM was also discussed. This 
chapter highlighted that OM exposed that the GoZ neglected the plight of its citizens 
and hurriedly initiated OG/HK in order to assuage the condemnation of the 
international community. Yet as a sovereign state, the GoZ should have protected its 
citizens and in turn protected its sovereignty. The chapter advanced that if the GoZ 
does not protect its citizens „from whom authority to govern is derived‟, it is in fact 
neglecting state sovereignty. To be sovereign is to protect the individuals who give 
rise to sovereignty in the first place. 
 
Lastly this chapter highlighted how domestic policies and operations generate 
interest in the international arena of politics as was OM and OG/HK. The position 
that a state adopts domestically can have negative effects in its foreign affairs as 
was demonstrated with the economic and „smart‟ sanctions in Zimbabwe. The 
chapter in that regard demonstrated the effects of global interconnectedness. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE ANALYSIS OF ZIMBABWE’S MAY 2005 OPERATION 
MURAMBATSVINA   
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As discussed in Chapter One that partly due to forces of globalisation it has become 
almost impossible for states to conceal from the outside world what happens in their 
jurisdictions. The case of OM in Zimbabwe gives credence to this assumption. In 
Chapter Two this work also discussed how the theory of realism consolidates the 
exclusive component of state sovereignty and the need for reconfiguring how the 
world thinks about sovereignty in conformity with the theory constructivism. 
Globalisation makes it possible and easier for the world to remain interconnected. It 
follows that, when there are contentious issues, such as OM, they generate interest 
and the world closely follows. Chapter Three highlighted the history of the sovereign 
states systems in Zimbabwe and also contrasted the core issues of sovereignty as 
generally understood and accepted by the UN. Chapter Four introduced the GoZ‟s 
understanding and interpretation of sovereignty and as discussed in that chapter, the 
GoZ‟s understanding of sovereignty is informed and cast through the country‟s 
history, particularly the war of liberation.   
 
This chapter seeks to analyse Zimbabwe‟s Operation Murambatsvina in and through 
the prism and frameworks of the doctrine of state sovereignty. Furthermore, the 
chapter seeks to extract lessons that could be used in policy formulation and 
implementation of the R2P framework, from the limitations of the application, or lack 
thereof, of R2P on Zimbabwe‟s OM of May 2005. Hence the research questions in 
this chapter are, among others: What was OM about? What were the objectives of 
OM and what means were used to achieve those objectives? Were the objectives of 
OM met? Was OM legally, humanitarily, politically and ethically justifiable? 
 
5.2 Current Discourse on Operation Murambatsvina 
 
A number of studies have been conducted on Zimbabwe‟s OM. Some studies, for 
example by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC 2008) and Potts 
128 
 
(2008), have concentrated on the sociological impacts of OM on the population of 
Zimbabwe. Other studies have focused on the policy weaknesses that surrounded 
OM (Maroleng 2005). Yet others have investigated the political context and impact of 
the operation on Zimbabwe (Chari 2008) and the southern African region (Tibaijuka 
2005). OM has also been studied and explored in relation to migration (IDMC 2008), 
urban developmental control (Chipungu 2011) and human rights (Centre on Housing 
Rights and Evictions & Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights 2007). Vambe (2008) 
investigated some economic implications of the operation on ordinary Zimbabweans, 
particularly women, and similarly Nyamanhindi (2008) focused on the gender 
implications of OM in the Zimbabwean context. This chapter seeks to investigate the 
impacts of OM from a humanitarian perspective and to investigate and analyse how 
the general population was affected by this operation. 
 
Beauty Vambe (2008:76), citing the report by Tibaijuka (2005:45), concedes that  
Most of the victims were already among the most economically disadvantaged 
groups in society … particularly among widows, single mothers, children, 
orphans, the elderly and the disabled persons.  
 
Vambe (2008:77) further contends that 
These violations of the Constitution of Zimbabwe by the authorities [of 
Zimbabwe] put in doubt the legality of Operation Murambatsvina. Also and 
more importantly, they lead one to infer that it may have been conducted in 
order to undermine black women‟s economic activities.  
 
It can thus be argued that OM, in the words of Vambe (2008:81), „actually targeted 
women in order to undermine their efforts, in the process depriving people 
[particularly women] of their money, livelihood and property‟. Vambe premised her 
pronouncement on the injustices committed against women by state organs and 
state machinery which ought to protect and defend them, thereby protecting and 
defending state sovereignty. It can be argued that without the people who give rise to 
the notion of sovereignty, there would not be a state to begin with. The manner in 
which OM was implemented, contradicts what the GoZ once stood for, the 
emancipation of women. According to Human Rights Watch (2005), in the 1990s the 
Zimbabwe government encouraged women, as part of women empowerment, to 
build cabins in their backyards to generate income through rentals (in Chibisa & 
Sigauke 2008:35). This was meant to protect women and minimise the harsh 
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realities of economic hardships. Is this not exactly what OM did away with? 
 
A combined report by Action Aid International in collaboration with the Counselling 
Services Unit, Combined Harare Residents‟ Association and Zimbabwe Peace 
Project (2005a) showed that the total number of the victims of OM was 1 193 370 
(Action Aid International 2005b:iii). The 2012 Zimbabwe census results revealed that 
the national population of Zimbabwe is pegged at 13 061 239 (Zimbabwe National 
Statistics Agency 2012:2). Of the 1 193 370, as much as 70%, lost their source of 
livelihood as a result of OM. The majority of that 70% were women engaged in 
informal economic enterprises. The enterprises included flea markets, tuck shops 
and roadside vending. OM specifically targeted flea market traders, most of whom 
were women (Chibisa & Sigauke 2008:40; Human Rights Watch 2005), in essence 
and by implication, targeted women specifically. If women are considered a 
vulnerable group in society as claimed in Carpenter (2013:33) and Waithera 
(2011:16) this must be the group that the state, in line with the principle of 
sovereignty, should protect and defend. The report pointed out that demographically 
the total number of children affected comprised 56% of the operation‟s total victims. 
It was observed that women form the bulk of the informal sector, and McPherson 
(1991) puts their share at 57% in Zimbabwe (in Chibisa & Sigauke 2008:5). 
 
5.3 The Impact of Operation Murambatsvina on the Population of Zimbabwe  
 
According to the IDMC (2008:4, 10) report, the UN estimated the number of those 
left homeless as a result of OM to be around 570 000, most of them being women 
and children. In corroboration of this fact the Tibaijuka (2005:7) report raised a 
concern that „it is estimated that some 700,000 people in cities across the country 
have lost their homes, source of livelihood or both‟. This indicates the magnitude of 
the crisis brought about by OM by a government on its own people it ought to serve 
and protect.  
 
The effects of OM on the ordinary population of Zimbabwe, but particularly on 
women and children, can be enumerated as loss of shelter, loss of livelihoods and 
income, loss of education for children, loss of property as some '32 538 of small and 
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medium size enterprises were demolished according to the government figures of 
the 7th July 2005' (Chibisa & Sigauke 2008:40), diminished health care facilities or 
loss of access to them, food insecurity, and the disintegration of families. It can 
further be argued that women and children, especially orphans and vulnerable 
children, suffered increased vulnerability, with those on medication suffering loss of 
quality care. This is in addition to the trauma that the whole operation brought to 
them. Without any psychosocial support being administered to the victims, and given 
the social-economic crisis in Zimbabwe most of them are probably still to recover 
from the trauma of their abrupt, forced and at times violent evictions. To further 
compound the crisis that Zimbabweans faced during OM, the demolishing of urban 
structures caused many people to resort to rural areas with women being 
disproportionately affected because „they did not own properties in rural areas and 
depended on flea market trading in urban areas for their livelihoods‟ (Chibisa & 
Sigauke 2008:42). 
 
According to the Country of Origin Information Service (COIS 2006:147), citing the 
Daily Telegraph of 4 December 2005, „people evicted from their homes following 
Operation Murambatsvina were struggling to obtain sufficient amounts of food‟. The 
report noted that, as an alternative, people without food resorted to eating chafer 
beetles, whose botanical name is Rhizotrogus majalis, to stay alive. Whilst the 
consumption of Rhizotrogus majalis (or mandere as they are known in Shona) is not 
a new phenomenon, it was shocking that whole families lived entirely on Rhizotrogus 
majalis as their only source of nutrition. This created new challenges of 
malnourishment, dieresis and the possibility that Rhizotrogus majalis may become 
an endangered species. 
 
Commenting on the devastation caused by OM, the United Nations Special Envoy to 
Zimbabwe, Mrs Anna Tibaijuka, noted that  
while there is a degree of overlap between those who lost their homes and 
those who lost their businesses, the total figure of 650,000 to 700,000 people 
directly affected by the Operation is considered plausible (Tibaijuka 
2005:34).  
 
The majority of the 650 000 to 700 000 people directly affected by OM were women 
and children as evidenced by the New African (2013:60-63) report. This could have 
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exacerbated the rate of social ills such as prostitution. This was corroborated by the 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, which noted that young women were 
turning to prostitution in a bid to earn a living (IDMC 2008:24). Further this could 
have created downstream challenges such as those associated with HIV, AIDS and 
sexually transmitted infections, thereby compounding the risk of contracting them. 
OM had already created challenges for those on antiretroviral drugs, as they were 
forced to move abruptly to new habitats, leaving many of them to struggle with 
access to their treatment. Orphaned and Vulnerable Children (OVC) who were 
benefiting from certain donor-funded programmes were suddenly displaced to new 
geographical areas, creating challenges of access to regular OVC interventions. It 
can therefore be argued that, under these circumstances, OVCs suffered manifold 
tragedies, namely the loss of parents and the loss of support they were receiving 
from donor agencies, disruption of schooling and a secure social environment. 
 
5.3.1 Women in Operation Murambatsvina 
 
Female victims of OM were further victimised by state security agents in the 
aftermath of the operation. These women were represented by those who publicly 
protested against the negative effects of the operation on their livelihoods. This 
development was confirmed by the online Zimbabwean newspaper, ZimOnline, on 
14 July 2005, which reported that „28 members of Women of Zimbabwe Arise 
(WOZA) were arrested in June 2005 while protesting against Operation 
Murambatsvina‟. This demonstrates the state‟s arrogance in not taking women‟s 
plight seriously even after it was the state that caused their plight in the first place. 
This further demonstrates the magnitude of the suffering and abuse that women 
endured during and after the operation. Their plight notwithstanding, the 
demonstration and subsequent arrest of the women illustrated that women were 
prepared to fight against the marginalisation and victimisation inherent in both OM 
and OG/HK.  
 
These demonstrations and resultant arrests indicate that ordinary people, particularly 
women and children, were not only directly affected by OM but were also further 
abused by the system of governance that was supposed to protect them but 
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criminalised their agitation for respect of their human rights. This was in direct 
contrast and inconsistent with the principles of sovereignty on which the GoZ justified 
the carrying out of OM. 
 
5.3.2 Children in Operation Murambatsvina 
 
The suffering experienced by children as a result of OM related to the following 
destabilisations in schooling, parental care, nutrition and security. When their parents 
or guardians were forcibly moved, children had to move as well. This resulted in the 
disruption of their schooling. Tibaijuka (2005:41) avers that „an estimated 113,000 
children aged between 5 and 11 while 109,000 children aged 12-18 were directly 
affected by the Operation‟. Tibaijuka further stated in her report that „one women‟s 
organisation told the mission that as many as 300,000 children were out of school as 
a result of the operation‟ (ibid) although she concedes that the mission was unable to 
verify that information. Although there were no figures of the aggregate or estimated 
number of children whose schooling was disrupted by the operation, most school 
authorities in areas affected by the operation testified to the huge movement of 
pupils away from their schools. This created a host of other challenges, such as 
attaining the famed Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and other government 
programmes to increase literacy levels. Children whose schooling needs were met 
by special programmes such as the government-run Basic Education Assistance 
Module (BEAM) also encountered further challenges in trying to enrol in new 
schools. The same can be said about pupils whose schooling was paid for by aid 
donor agencies.  
 
An example of the suffering endured by children, particularly OVCs, as a result of the 
operation was the demolition of an orphanage run by Roman Catholic Dominican 
nuns in the Hatcliffe suburbs of Harare, rendering the 180 resident orphans 
homeless (COIS 2006:119, citing the Daily Telegraph, 19 June 2005). The Daily 
Telegraph article noted that many of the orphans had lost their parents to HIV and 
AIDS and now had practically nowhere to go. This demonstrated that OM uprooted 
people from their social settings and in the process disturbed a wide range of people 
ecosystems.  
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5.4 Analysis of Operation Murambatsvina 
 
Ms Sekesai Makwawarara, Chairperson of the government-appointed Harare Town 
House, announced officially on 19 May 2005 that OM was „a programme to enforce 
by-laws and to stop all forms of illegal activity in the city‟ (Nyamanhindi 2008:119, 
citing The Herald, 19 May 2005:1), and the programme would be enforced „in 
conjunction with Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP)‟ (Tibaijuka 2005:12). This 
revealed that state organs were used in carrying out OM. Of particular interest in the 
statement that was issued on 28 May 2005, nine days after the official 
commencement of OM, by Ms Sekesai Makwawarara, is that prostitution was 
identified as a factor that contributed to operationalising Murambatsvina. The 
statement said: 
These violations of the by-laws in areas of vending, traffic control, illegal 
structures, touting/abuse of commuters by rank marshals, street 
life/prostitution, vandalism of property infrastructure, stock theft, illegal 
cultivation, among others have led to the deterioration of standards thus 
negatively affecting the image of the city. (The Herald 28 May 2005 cited in 
Harris 2008:45; Tibaijuka 2005:12) 
 
Prostitution affects mainly women as they are the dischargers of carnal services 
sought by mainly men, and in the process they are often abused and sometimes 
even killed. It could be argued that it was precisely to curb this and liberate women 
from such perils that OM targeted prostitution. But what would have caused those 
women to go into prostitution in the first place? Is it not society that discriminates 
against and ostracises them? Is it not society that refuses to treat women with 
respect and dignity, and society that denies women opportunities equal to those 
given to men? Are not sentiments such as those uttered by President Mugabe in 
defending his appointment of mainly men in his cabinet a form of perpetuating 
stereotypes and discrimination against women? President Mugabe, in justifying the 
dominance of males in his 2013-appointed cabinet, cited that there were not as 
many women who were educated enough in ZANU (PF), thus implying that women 
were not capable to run for office as government ministers (Moyo 2013:internet).The 
very framing and crafting of OM seems to have been biased against women and 
children. Should it not be a responsibility of a government to protect its people, 
particularly the vulnerable groups of its society? This is where a demonstration of 
jealously guarding sovereignty could have been displayed. This is where a state 
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should offer protection and security for its people, not abuse them at their weakest.  
 
Given that almost 51% of the population of Zimbabwe is female, it is apparent that 
women were the most affected by OM. Action Aid International (2005a:13) bears 
witness to this fact as they recorded that 47% of the homesteads visited in 
assessment of the impacts of OM were female-headed, of which 34% were actually 
widows. It is generally the norm as tradition would have it in Zimbabwe that women 
tend to children, so women are more involved directly with the upbringing of children. 
What affects women inevitably affects the children who depend on them. „Many 
divorced, widowed or separated women have migrated to town because they have 
been squeezed off the land and their social links in rural areas have become 
dysfunctional‟ (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010:18). In the year 2010 „37% of household 
heads in the informal settlement of Killarney in Bulawayo, consisted of widowed, 
divorced or single women‟ (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010:18). In Harare alone 37% of 
interviewed households acknowledged that „women and children had become more 
vulnerable to abuse‟ (Mwaniki 2005:10). Most of the people that settled at Killarney 
squatter camp in Bulawayo were victims of OM. This gives evidence that women and 
children were affected more as they constitute the majority of the general populace 
of Zimbabwe. Of the sampled population nationally, Harare had the highest number 
of orphans and recorded 31%, with Bulawayo at 25% and Mutare 23% (Action Aid 
International 2005a:11-12).  
 
5.4.1 Health Issues and Operation Murambatsvina  
 
The Tibaijuka (2005:39) report revealed that about: 
24.6% of adult Zimbabweans are infected with HIV/AIDS. Assuming that the 
displaced population had an HIV/AIDS prevalence rate similar to the rest of 
population, the mission estimates that over 79,500 persons over 15 years of 
age living with HIV/AIDS have been displaced.  
 
It is undeniable that owing to the displacement caused by OM, health-delivery 
systems were also upset in the process; thereby impacting negatively on people 
whose medical supplies were abruptly brought to a halt. It appears not to have 
occurred to the authorities that the destruction of people‟s houses and dwellings in 
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winter would affect their health. The Country of Origin Information Service (COIS 
2006:62), citing the World Health Organisation (WHO), „noted in Summary country 
profile for HIV/AIDS treatment scale-up (2005) that “women are disproportionately 
affected by HIV/AIDS, constituting 51% of the population and 53% of people living 
with HIV/AIDS in 2003 … Other groups severely affected by HIV/AIDS include 
women who engage in sex work, uniformed personnel and orphaned children”‟. 
Given these numbers, it is evident that disturbing human social settings in the face of 
HIV/AIDS would likely disturb their intake of HIV/AIDS-fighting drugs and medication. 
Because the displacement caused by OM was unanticipated, it is likely that many 
people were caught unaware and therefore could not make alternative arrangements 
for acquiring their antiretroviral medication (ARVs). In fact, the civic protest 
movement Sokwanele also noted that: 
On 2 December 2005 people whose HIV and AIDS treatment had been 
disrupted by Operation Murambatsvina in June 2005 were still unable to 
access ARVs or treatments for TB and other opportunistic infections by 
October 2005 (COIS 2006:64).  
 
Action Aid International (2005a: vi) corroborated this observation, reporting that 
„approximately 15% of surveyed households reportedly had lost ARV treatment as a 
result of the Operation‟ and that as a result 14% of the surveyed population claimed 
that they had lost home-based care (HBC). 
 
5.4.2 Coordination and Planning around Operation Murambatsvina 
 
It is well documented that OM was ill prepared; if indeed planning was involved in its 
execution at all. Displacing people, or resettling them as the GoZ claimed, without 
giving them alternative accommodation is simply irresponsible and unethical. Most 
people who were evicted from their urban dwellings were forcibly taken and dumped 
in open spaces without water, electricity, housing and health facilities. This 
constitutes an abuse of „national and international human rights law provisions 
guiding evictions‟ (Mhiripiri 2008:149). Their food security was compromised and 
they faced starvation. The consequences of such evictions and displacement 
include: 
An increase in vulnerability to HIV/AIDS and a disruption in HIV/AIDS services 
particularly Anti Retro Viral (ARV) Treatment, home based care and 
prevention. In cases where ARV treatment has been disrupted, this could 
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result in drug resistance, declining health and ultimately death (COIS 
2006:64).  
 
This development was supported by the Integrated Regional Information Network 
(IRIN) on 3 August 2005, when it reported that people suffering from HIV and AIDS 
and caught up in OM were forced to abandon antiretroviral treatment. A clinic, a 
crèche and an orphanage run by Missionary Sisters, the Dominicans, were 
demolished in Hatcliffe, Harare, leaving the children vulnerable and exposed to 
abuse (Ncube et al 2005:5). A list compiled by directors in the education sector in 
Zimbabwe revealed that about 300 000 children had dropped out of school as a 
result of OM (ibid). 
 
5.4.3 Displacement and Loss of Livelihoods in Operation Murambatsvina 
 
This analysis will further divulge the impact of OM as evidenced in Zimbabwe‟s three 
major cities, Harare, Bulawayo and Mutare. Harare‟s projected affected population 
was pegged at 851 434 people by Action Aid International (2005a:iii). Harare‟s 
affected population constituted 71% of the total affected by OM. A survey by David 
Mwaniki (2005) in collaboration with Global Crisis Solutions, Action Aid International 
and Combined Harare Residents‟ Association (CHRA) visited 14 137 homesteads in 
Harare to compile the following information: 32% of the population, which is almost a 
third of those surveyed, claimed to have been hosting an orphan, while 41% were 
female-headed households, indicating that females bear much of the burden. Of the 
households surveyed, 13% admitted to hosting a chronically ill person, and this 
figure could be an underestimation due to the stigma still attached to HIV/AIDS. 
Women-headed households constituted 44% of the surveyed population, and 14% of 
those were widows. Children of school going age were reported to have stopped 
attending school as a result of OM, and 22% of the households interviewed bore 
testimony to this fact. A further 45% were destabilised by the operation to the extent 
that accessing schools had been very difficult if not impossible (Mwaniki 2005:5-8). 
 
Bulawayo is the second largest city in Zimbabwe (Action Aid International 2005b:13) 
and the projected affected population was 196 635 people in August 2005, 
contributing to 16% of the total number of people affected by OM in Zimbabwe 
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(Action Aid International 2005a:iii). Mutare is the third largest city after Harare-
Chitungwiza and Bulawayo (Chibisa & Sigauke 2008:43). After the infamous OM the 
GoZ claimed a „decline of 50% in crime rate‟ (Manica Post June 2005), statistics 
drawn from a newspaper viewed as a mouthpiece of the government in Mutare and 
the greater Manicaland (Chibisa & Sigauke 2008). A survey carried out by Chibisa 
and Sigauke (2008:46) revealed that 72% of the 200 respondents who participated in 
the exercise were females whereas 28% were males. This gives further evidence 
that women were the most affected in the so-called Operation Restore Order. The 
survey by Chibisa and Sigauke (2008) assessed specifically how OM impacted 
people‟s economic livelihoods and particularly informal traders; and it concluded that 
„Operation Murambatsvina worsened urban poverty‟ (Chibisa & Sigauke 2008:60). 
OM affected mainly Zimbabwean citizens (Zimbabweans by birth), as foreign flea-
market traders may have been forced to leave Mutare because of OM (Chibisa & 
Sigauke 2008:47). Another survey carried out by Action Aid International through its 
Southern Africa Partnership Programme (SAPP) in August 2005 revealed that 
Mutare alone had a projected affected population pegged at 92 481, a figure 
amounting to 8% of the population affected by OM (Action Aid International 
2005a:iii). 
 
This analysis concludes that OM violated human rights and indeed state sovereignty 
in a number of ways. Firstly the sovereign GoZ did not offer protection and security 
to its people in the carrying out of OM. OM was not supposed to have been carried 
out in the first place without providing alternative accommodation and business 
premises. A government that was meant to protect and provide security for its people 
turned against its own people; some lost their lives in the process. Even by 
international standards, the GoZ is guilty of failing to „avert‟ (ICISS 2001:xi) serious 
harm in OM. The GoZ committed grave abuses and human rights violations in 
carrying out OM. The government as the highest authority in the land, with no other 
wielding authority above it, failed to protect its citizens as the doctrine of state 
sovereignty would have it. This then raises the question: what was the GoZ‟s 
understanding and interpretation of sovereignty in carrying out OM? This research 
will now focus on the official position of the GoZ‟s understanding of state 
sovereignty, particularly how it interprets its own sovereignty in light of what 
transpired during OM. 
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5.5 Sovereignty as defined by the Government of Zimbabwe; Before, During 
and After Operation Murambatsvina 
 
As alluded to in Chapter Four, the position, definition and understanding of 
sovereignty of the GoZ is informed, influenced and shaped by the political history of 
the Zimbabwean state as a whole. Ordinarily, in a sovereign state, the constitution of 
the land holds supreme and every citizen is subject to the laws of the land as defined 
in that constitution of the land. This is a fact that the various amendments made to 
the constitution that have been used in Zimbabwe to the time of this research make 
special mention of (Lancaster House Constitution 1979:18; Constitution of Zimbabwe 
2000:9; Constitution of Zimbabwe 2005:12; Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013:21). An 
exploration of the constitution of Zimbabwe will provide some ground for the 
extrapolation of the GoZ‟s comprehension and interpretation of sovereignty.  
 
On 21 December 1979, the Lancaster House Constitution was signed by two 
nationalist fronts led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Dr Joshua Nkomo with Mr 
Robert Mugabe. Dr Nkomo and Mr Mugabe represented the Patriotic Front 
(henceforward PF) as evidenced by Dr Nkomo‟s opening speech at the Lancaster 
House Talks in 1979; „Mr Chairman, the Patriotic Front is going to give a statement 
that represents the Front. Mr Mugabe and myself (sic) are presenting this statement 
on behalf of our group‟ (Minutes of the Lancaster House Conference 1979:9). The 
Lancaster House Constitution was ushered in as a measure to ensure that, what was 
going to be the future GoZ, would assume power based on majority rule determined 
by democratic elections. For the purposes of this dissertation, the Lancaster House 
Constitution will be referred to as Constitution of Lancaster House (CoLH) in order to 
differentiate the acronym used to refer to Lancaster House Conference (LHC). 
 
5.5.1 The Lancaster House Conference, Constitution and Sovereignty 
 
Colonial Zimbabwe, then Southern Rhodesia/Rhodesia, denied native Africans 
political rights and human rights. The Lancaster House 1979 Conference 
(henceforward LHC) presented a possible change of that status quo in favour of 
Africans who constituted the majority. Aware of this possibility, and seeking to 
articulate the desires and aspirations of the multitudes of Zimbabweans, the PF 
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through the person of Dr Nkomo, at the very onset of the LHC, expressed that 
„Zimbabwe must be a sovereign republic in which the sovereign nation pursues its 
own destiny, totally unshackled by any fetters and or constraints‟ (LHC minutes 
1979:11). Sovereignty meant self-determination, self-rule, self-governance and self-
definition for Zimbabweans. It can be deduced that sovereignty was at the very core 
of the Zimbabwean war of liberation. The war was fought to reclaim Zimbabwean 
sovereignty. The PF went on to express that: 
The sovereign Zimbabwean people must, acting through their own freely 
chosen representatives in parliament, be free and fully vested with the power 
to exercise complete dominion over resources from time to time as need 
arises (LHC minutes 1979:11). 
 
This excerpt from the PF‟s opening speech at the LHC clearly and succinctly 
expressed what was the will of the Zimbabwean people. The desire was to 
determine their future, and they exhibited that determination to follow through that 
commitment even if it meant death (Campbell 2003; Hill 2003; McLaughlin and 
Moorcroft 2008; Wood 2011). The very fact that the Rhodesians together with the 
British agreed to the LHC attested to the resilience and resolution of the 
Zimbabwean people and attested to the undeterred spirits of people to pursue their 
liberation and attain control of themselves and their future.  Sovereignty was of 
fundamental importance so much so that the LHC revolved around the question of 
sovereignty for the Zimbabwean African nationalists. The PF repeatedly made 
mention of the concept of sovereignty in its address to the LHC and asked „will the 
people of Zimbabwe be really sovereign and be able to exercise their sovereign 
authority?‟ The question of sovereignty was one of the fundamental questions that 
was posed to the conference at the onset, indicative of the resolve that 
Zimbabweans had to bringing down colonial rule and assume self-governance. The 
PF went on to ask „what will be the future of the people‟s land?‟ (ibid). 
 
State sovereignty was a fundamental component of Zimbabwe‟s independence and 
this was boldly highlighted repeatedly by the PF in its address to the LHC. Elsewhere 
Dr Nkomo, representing the PF, mentioned that the „Zimbabwean people, by whose 
blood and sacrifice colonialism was exorcised from the land, must themselves be the 
perpetual guarantors of sovereignty in the face of all challenges, domestic or foreign‟ 
(LHC minutes 1979:11). Sovereignty was mentioned seven times in the PF‟s 
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address, further consolidating the fact that it was the central question of Zimbabwe‟s 
war of liberation. The only other time that the concept of sovereignty was mentioned 
at the LHC and for the eighth time, was in the actual Constitution. The Constitution of 
the LHC categorically states that „Zimbabwe will be a sovereign state‟ (CoLH 
1979:16). 
  
The CoLH meant that Zimbabweans had rightfully assumed their political rights, 
particularly the right to vote for a government of their choice. This was the beginning 
of determining their destiny. It was also in line with what the majority of the people of 
Zimbabwe aspired and hoped the war of liberation would bring. The PF expressed 
this desire boldly and courageously at the LHC. Their statement read: 
They must be free to recognise the social, political and economic institutions 
and structures and be free to shape their own destiny as a nation without 
having to pander to any racial, ethnic, tribal, religious, social or other interests 
or differences (LHC minutes 1979:11). 
 
The attainment of sovereignty by the people of Zimbabwe was a protracted struggle 
that began in the 1890s, as discussed in Chapter Three of this work, and bore fruit a 
century later. For a century the people of Zimbabwe resisted colonial manipulation 
and subjugation and were resolved to put a permanent end to such slavery. The 
nationalists believed that, as exposed by the PF: 
Justice will not occur by accident in a sovereign Zimbabwe, nor will its 
administration and dispensation remain in the hands of privileged minority. It 
must conform to the social and cultural values of the Zimbabwe people 
themselves (LHC minutes 1979:12). 
 
The attainment of sovereignty of the Zimbabwean people was just the beginning of 
self-actualisation. However sovereignty alone was not enough and hence it meant 
sovereignty had to be maintained and guarded against any threats to it. As a 
sovereign state Zimbabwe at independence was to elect its own leadership that was 
to represent its aspirations and consolidate its sovereignty. The PF was perceptive in 
that it was aware that the attainment of sovereignty meant that there would be 
responsibilities and obligations met by the leadership on behalf of its people. The 
protection of human life was a priority as evidenced by the declarations on human 
life and its preservation and protection in the Constitution of Lancaster House 
(1979:17). An exploration of the Declaration of Rights, in the section to follow, as 
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contained by the Lancaster House Constitution, will highlight the views and opinions 
that the PF tabled at the LHC. 
 
5.5.2 The Constitution of Lancaster House on the Protection of Human Life 
 
Sovereignty, in the Zimbabwean African nationalists‟ understanding, implied a 
responsibility by the government to protect human life. This fact is well mirrored in 
the CoLH and is explicitly declared that „it would be forbidden to deprive any person 
intentionally of his (sic) life save in execution of the lawful sentence of a court after 
conviction of a criminal offence‟ (CoLH 1979:17). This is in line and consistent with 
the principles of sovereignty. The state is created to safeguard and preserve life of 
all individuals in its domain. State sovereignty is therefore intrinsically linked to the 
responsibility of protecting its citizenry.  
 
On another occasion the CoLH makes mention of the need for the protection of 
human life. It further states that „it will be forbidden to deprive any person of his (sic) 
personal liberty except as authorised by law‟ or under these circumstances: criminal 
conviction, court order or parliament and mental illness (CoLH 1979:18). It shows 
clearly that from the time that the PF negotiated the CoLH, it was an important 
feature for the sovereign government to protect and preserve human life of the 
sovereign people; for to be sovereign, a state needs its people who confer the 
sovereignty on it. This was to be further mirrored by the new Constitution of 
Zimbabwe (CoZ 2013:21). In other words state sovereignty is the sovereignty of the 
people of the state. People are sovereign, first of all, and the state is sovereign at the 
assent of the people.  
 
5.5.3 The Constitution of Zimbabwe (2000) 
 
The constitution that was operational in Zimbabwe at the time OM was carried out is 
the one that was amended in the 2000. For the purposes of this research it will be 
referred to as the CoZ 2000. The CoLH (1979) was amended, with Amendment 
Number 16, Act Number 5 of 2000 and came into effect on the 20th of April 2000 
(Kubatana.net 2000). This provides for a good analytic tool to assess the legal basis 
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of OM. Chapter III, Sections 12, 13, 15 and 16 of (CoZ 2000:7) reiterate what the 
CoLH (1979) articulated on the protection of human life, rights and liberties of 
citizens. Section 12 states that „no person shall be deprived of his life intentionally 
save in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence of which 
he has been convicted‟ (ibid). Section 13 further states that „no person shall be 
deprived of his personal liberty save as may be authorised by law‟ (ibid). It can thus 
be argued that in carrying out OM, the GoZ took little heed to the laws of the land, if 
at all it consulted the constitution. 
 
5.5.4 The Constitution of Zimbabwe (2005) 
 
In the year 2005 the CoLH (1979) was further amended. The Amendment Number is 
17 and Act Number 5 of 2005 and it came into effect on the 14th of September that 
year (Veritas Trust 2005). For the purposes of this work the 2005-amended CoLH 
(1979) will be referred to as the CoZ 2005. An analysis into what the ZC declared the 
year OM was carried out compels. According to the CoZ of 2005 under Chapter III, 
Section 12.1, „no person shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in execution of 
the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence of which he has been 
convicted‟ (CoZ 2005:9) and Section 12.2 states that: 
A person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life in 
contravention of subsection (1) if he dies as the result of the use, to such 
extent and in such circumstances as are permitted by law, of such force as is 
reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of the case 
(a) for the defence of any person from violence or for the defence of property; 
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person 
lawfully detained; 
(c) for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny or of 
dispersing an unlawful gathering; or 
(d) in order to prevent the commission by that person of a criminal offence; 
or if he dies as the result of a lawful act of war (ibid). 
 
Section 13 of the CoZ 2005 further consolidates the afore-mentioned civil rights of its 
citizens (ibid). It can be argued that this bears evidence that the GoZ fell short of 
protecting the rights of its people in carrying out the violent OM.  
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5.5.5 The Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) 
 
Among the founding values of the Republic of Zimbabwe is the „recognition of the 
inherent dignity and worth of each human being‟ (CoZ 2013:21), implying that the 
state respects the individuals who constitute it. It is further pronounced that the 
„respect for the people of Zimbabwe, from whom the authority to govern is derived‟ is 
paramount (ibid). This is indicative of the GoZ‟s understanding that the well-being of 
the state is dependent on the well-being of the individuals who constitute it. The 
supremacy of the constitution of Zimbabwe and the rule of law are other founding 
values embedded in the constitution of the day at the time of carrying out this 
research (CoZ 2013:21). Following from the supremacy of the constitution, 
Zimbabwean citizens are required by law „to the best of their ability, to defend 
Zimbabwe and its sovereignty‟ (ibid). In its current form, the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe relies on the rule of law. Independent Commissions form the bodies of 
appeal in cases of disputes and this is done „to protect the sovereignty and interests 
of the people‟ (CoZ 2013:107). There are apparent contradictions in the Constitution 
of Zimbabwe and the implementation of it. If the rule of law is indeed a value and is 
observed strictly by all, should the law not protect every citizen? Ideally if the rule of 
law was a reality, the use of violence and the threat of use of violence by the 
government on its people would not arise. A government that abides by the law of its 
land would not use violence or threat of violence to govern its people. The state 
cannot just do as it pleases in the name of sovereignty. This raises the nodal 
question of whose sovereignty matters? Is it the state or the people who are 
sovereign? 
 
The latest CoZ (2013) at the time that this research was conducted, described the 
state of Zimbabwe as „a unitary, democratic and sovereign republic‟ (CoZ 2013:21). 
This description of Zimbabwe as sovereign necessitates the inquiry of the GoZ‟s 
understanding of sovereignty. It raises the very contentious notion of sovereignty. 
Whose sovereignty counts? Is it that of the state or that of individuals? Closely linked 
to the notion of sovereignty is the notion of independence. Whose independence 
was it? Was it the independence of the state and can it thus behave as it likes that is 
like a sovereign; or is it the independence of the individuals in the state? This 
Constitution of Zimbabwe makes mention of the notion of sovereignty only four 
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times, and of the four times, it is in descriptive terms rather than definitive terms. 
Citing the liberation history of Zimbabwe from the British rule, the constitution reads 
„the people consequently took up arms in order to regain their land and political 
sovereignty, and this ultimately resulted in the Independence of Zimbabwe, in 1980‟ 
(CoZ 2013:45). From this account of history, it can be inferred that sovereignty 
according to the GoZ is understood in terms of liberation from the bondage of 
colonialism. The subjugation of Africans was through violence, colonial rule was by 
violence and threat of the use of violence and the liberation of Zimbabwe was 
through violence. Hence sovereignty in Zimbabwe is intrinsically linked to violence. 
Thus violence remains a possible tool to use in the pursuance of statecraft in 
Zimbabwe, as was evidenced in the implementation of OM.  
 
The latest CoZ at the time this research was carried out, made explicit reference to 
sovereignty four times under the sub-headings „The Republic‟ in Chapter 1,1 (CoZ 
2013:21), „Zimbabwean Citizenship‟ in Chapter 3, 35 (CoZ 2013:31), „Declaration of 
Rights‟ and „Rights to Agricultural Land‟ in Chapter 4, 72 (CoZ 2013:45), and 
„Objectives of Independent Commissions‟ in Chapter 12, 233 (CoZ 2013:107). This 
indicates that sovereignty remains a fundamental and founding principle of the 
Zimbabwean state. 
 
 
5.5.6 The Constitution of Zimbabwe on the Protection of Human Life 
 
The current CoZ (2013) makes explicit the duty and obligation that the GoZ has of 
protecting its citizens and ensuring the security of its people. „The state and every 
person, including juristic persons, and every institution and agency of the 
government at every level must respect, protect and promote and fulfil the rights and 
freedoms‟ of every person (CoZ 2013:34). The CoZ further states that the agents of 
law „must promote the values and principles that underlie a democratic society based 
on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom‟ (CoZ 2013:34). „Every 
person has a right to life‟ (CoZ 2013:35), „A law may permit the death penalty to be 
imposed only on a person convicted of murder committed in aggravating 
circumstances‟ (CoZ 2013:35). It can be argued that these principles were not 
upheld or met during the implementation of OM. Arguing that OM happened in 2005 
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and so cannot be judged against the CoZ which only came into effect in 2013, would 
be beside the point because the same people who were in government in 2013 were 
the government of the day in 2005.  
 
5.5.7 Sovereignty According to the Sitting Head of State 
 
The sitting Head of State at the time that this research was conducted, Robert 
Gabriel Mugabe, was often heard and quoted on his articulation of state sovereignty. 
As the leader of the country, his understanding and definition of state sovereignty 
influences the GoZ‟s domestic and foreign policy. In the 1970s, way before 
Zimbabwe attained her independence from Britain, Mugabe travelled the world 
drumming up support for the establishment of a democratic state of Zimbabwe. „We 
are fighting for democracy, we would like to see a democratic state established in 
Zimbabwe, and this means a state based on the wishes of the majority of the people‟ 
(Mugabe in Bright 2011:internet). In support of Mugabe‟s stance on the 
establishment of a democratic society in Zimbabwe, Wilfred Mhanda, a Zimbabwe 
African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) High Command member, submits the 
view that: „we were articulating our struggle as a struggle for freedom, democracy, 
social justice, peace and human dignity‟ (ibid). This was the struggle for 
independence and sovereignty in Zimbabwe. 
 
In 2008, just 28 years after the attainment of Zimbabwe‟s independence, the rhetoric 
about democracy seemed to change as articulated by President Mugabe. 
„Democracy in Africa is a very difficult proposition because always the opposition will 
want much more than what it deserves‟ (Mugabe in Bright 2011: internet). This was 
uttered at the Harare International Conference Centre following the temporal 
amalgamation of ZANU PF and MDC to form a Government of National Unity (GNU). 
The GNU became necessary after the disputed Zimbabwe Presidential elections of 
2008 (Mwanaka 2013:203). There clearly is a discrepancy here. The liberation 
struggle was meant to restore the human dignity of the African people who were, at 
the time, subjugated by colonial masters. President Mugabe himself is on record 
saying „the best way in which people can demonstrate their participation in 
democracy is by voting; elections are quite a necessity‟ (in Bright 2011:internet). Yet 
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this is the same man who heads a government that allegedly beat up people, 
maimed, tortured and killed some for electing and exercising their democratic right to 
vote for a party and president that they liked (Alexander 2003:103, 105; Makumbe 
2009:98-101; Matombo in Bright 2011:internet; Shari 2004:45, 48; Zunga 2003:87-
93).  
 
This goes against what the liberation struggle was about in the first place. It is 
arguably an abuse of the privilege of state sovereignty that was brought about, in 
Zimbabwe, by the liberation war and struggle. On the other hand, given that 
Zimbabwe was colonised by violence, ruled by violence and the threat of violence 
during the British reign in Zimbabwe, liberated through the explicit use of violence, 
the GoZ may know violence as the only effective way to govern. Violence is what 
attained independence for Zimbabwe, it is clear that violence is the preferred tool of 
governance as was witnessed at OM. Ultimately one can deduce that violence may 
be all they know48. 
 
5.5.8 President Mugabe’s International Addresses on Sovereignty 
 
The President on another occasion declared that „Zimbabwe is a sovereign state and 
it will never be a colony again‟ (Sylvester 2014:195; VOA News 2008:internet). Yet 
the GoZ seems to hold at ransom its own people thereby almost colonising its own 
populace. In the year 2002, at the World Earth Summit held in Johannesburg, South 
Africa, President Mugabe was quoted saying „Blair keep your England, and I will 
keep my Zimbabwe‟ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009:1148). At the same event Mugabe 
further uttered „let no one interfere with our processes‟ (SABC 3 02/06/2013). In this 
line of thought, Simkins (2008:internet) reveals that „Mugabe repeatedly told his 
critics to stay out of his country‟s internal affairs‟. The Head of State exposes that the 
GoZ believes in the exclusivity of state sovereignty, and can and will exclude what 
they deem undesirable elements.  
 
                                                          
48
 This can be deduced from Nathan Shamuyarira, the then spokesperson of the party, who is on record for his 
infamous statement that ZANU PF has ‘many degrees in violence’ (Bond and Manyanya 2002:xiv). 
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In reinforcing the idea of non-interference in Zimbabwe‟s processes by foreign 
forces, Mugabe advanced the position that „I am President of my country, we have 
our own rules here, I say we are sovereign, they should not interfere with our 
sovereignty‟ (VOA News 2008:internet).  According to the Head of State and the GoZ 
which he leads, the state is sovereign and not the people of Zimbabwe necessarily. 
This is exactly what this work in Chapter Two discussed on realism. Realism 
excludes outside forces and elements from a country‟s internal structures and 
sometimes to the detriment of the country concerned. This becomes the GoZ‟s 
justification of OM. The international community of states implicitly is told to stay out 
of Zimbabwe‟s internal issues, such as OM.   
 
The President further demonstrated that the GoZ prefers the exclusive undertones of 
state sovereignty when addressing the United Nations General Assembly in 2013. 
Directed to the USA and European Union, President Mugabe tabled that „Zimbabwe 
is for Zimbabweans, so are its resources. Please remove your illegal and filthy 
sanctions from my peaceful country‟ (Mugabe 2013). The same point on national 
resources as an expression and privilege of the nation‟s sovereignty is emphasised 
in an article that the president wrote: „the targeted equity and threshold recognises 
Zimbabwe‟s total ownership of all its natural resources as an expression of our 
national sovereignty‟ (Mugabe 2013:5). Economic sanctions were imposed on 
Zimbabwe since the year 2000 following the war veterans-led and state-sponsored 
„farm invasions‟ (Cornwell 2003:46; Hammar 2003:130; Phimister 2004:274, 280; 
Tibaijuka 2005:16; Worby 2003:51, 61). The President has remained unapologetic 
for the policies that his government has taken to address the land issue in 
Zimbabwe. Back in September 2002, addressing the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD), President Mugabe argued: 
That is why we, in Zimbabwe, understand only too well that sustainable 
development is not possible without agrarian reforms that acknowledges, in 
our case, that land comes first before all else, and that all else grows from and 
off it. This is the one asset that not only defines the Zimbabwean personality 
and demarcates sovereignty but also that has a direct bearing on the fortunes 
of the poor and prospects for their immediate empowerment and sustainable 
development (Mugabe 2002b:internet). 
 
Responding to questions from CNN in New York, the President of Zimbabwe in 2011 
further emphasised that „land reform is the best thing that could have ever happened 
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to an African country, it has to do with national sovereignty‟ (Mugabe 2011: internet). 
It is correct that some states occasionally bullied smaller and weaker states publicly 
as argued by the President of Zimbabwe at the 2005 UN summit, when he submitted 
that: 
 We have witnessed instances where the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
small and weak countries have been violated by the mighty and powerful, in 
defiance of agreed rules of procedures and the provisions of the United 
Nations Charter (Mugabe 2005:3).  
 
Asked by Christiane Amanpour, a renowned CNN journalist, what strategy his 
government was going to employ in getting out of the mess created by the Western-
imposed economic sanctions on Zimbabwe, President Mugabe responded by 
arguing that „the sanctions must be lifted and we should have no interference from 
outside, the continued imperialist interference in our affairs is affecting the country 
adversely‟ (Mugabe 2011:internet). His own style of leadership and governance 
leaves a lot to be desired. OM was a violation of international law (Mwanaka 
2013:21; Tibaijuka 2005). The same international law which President Mugabe 
wants to use in calling to order the „mighty and powerful‟ states who violate 
international agreements as espoused by the UN Charter. He argued instead that 
world-peace, security and development must be „based on respect for the 
sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity of all states‟ (Mugabe 2005:3). 
 
President Mugabe again emphasised his stance on state sovereignty when he 
addressed the 61st session of the United Nations General Assembly in 2006. He 
called upon partnerships that „should be based on the principles of sovereign 
equality of nations and on mutual benefit‟ (Mugabe 2006:7). This further reveals the 
preferred interpretation of the state as sovereign, sometimes to the detriment of 
individuals presided over by the state. This again is unchallenged by the theory of 
realism. It consolidates the exclusory element of state sovereignty. It opens up 
abuse by the state of its citizens. 
 
In the year 2011, the President of Zimbabwe again repeated his calls for a UN that 
fosters principles of sovereignty. Addressing the UN General Assembly, Mugabe 
(2011) said „Zimbabwe reposes her hopes in a United Nations that recognises the 
equality of sovereign states as enshrined in the founding Charter‟. Judging from the 
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calls that President Mugabe has made on several occasions cited in this work, it is 
clear that state sovereignty is a principle he takes seriously and influences his 
government to foster and abide by. 
 
5.5.9 President Mugabe’s Domestic Addresses on Sovereignty 
 
In the year 2002, at the close of the annual congress of the ruling party ZANU (PF), 
President Mugabe said that „the issue of sovereignty calls for utmost sacrifice, and 
on it I give my life‟ (Mugabe 2002a:internet). This clearly demonstrated how 
unshaken is his belief in the principle of sovereignty. 
 
The 2008 Presidential election was a watershed moment for Zimbabwe. The 
campaigning was equally fierce from the ruling party ZANU (PF) and the opposition 
MDC. In one of the party‟s campaigns President Mugabe (in Bright 2011:internet) 
was quoted saying, in his mother-tongue Shona:  
kutora nyika yatakawana neghidi, yotorwa nepenzura nhasi? Hazviitike 
tirikudzokera kumasango! Tirikudzokera kumasango! Penzura nepfuti 
zvaitisana nharo apa? Aa kwete! Kana ini ndakaisa bhairo pano apa, 
ndinochikanda pasi ndoti vakomana kwatakabva!‟  
 
This is translated to mean:  
They want to take the country we won by the gun? Shall it be taken by people 
voting with a pen today? It will never happen. We are going back to bush war. 
The gun is mightier than the pen. I will throw away the pen in my pocket and 
say let us go back to the struggle. Let us go back to war (Bright 
2011:internet).  
 
This provides a sharp contrast to what Mugabe believed and said in 1979 on 
democracy (Bright 2011). It is a direct contradiction to what he stood for during the 
liberation struggle. Sovereignty, then, meant that the will of the majority was to be 
respected. If sovereignty meant that people could choose a leader and government 
of their own choice, what had gone so wrong in the 2000, 2005 and 2008 elections 
that Mugabe was not prepared to respect that will of the people? This calls for an 
analysis into what is sovereignty exactly for the GoZ and its Head of State. Is 
sovereignty a principle or an opinion that changes with circumstances and time? 
President Mugabe comes across as self-contradicting on the issue of sovereignty. 
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Sovereignty is a convenient concept, pulled out when it suits the GoZ and the Head 
of State. 
  
Consistent with his rhetoric, and not the practice, the President of Zimbabwe, on the 
occasion of the country‟s 32nd Independence celebrations, stated that „Zimbabwe‟s 
foreign policy objective is anchored in safeguarding the country‟s hard-won 
Independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity‟ (Murphy 2012:internet). The irony 
of OM is that while the GoZ‟s foreign policy seeks to defend its territorial integrity, it 
trivialised the rights of it citizens, who needed the state‟s protection in the first place. 
In the same year, 2012, addressing a gathering in commemoration of the Zimbabwe 
Defence Forces (ZDF), Mugabe retorted: 
We are celebrating as a proud country, 32 years of defence excellence since 
the formation of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces. The forces stand a cut above 
the rest as they continue to excel in the defence of our national independence, 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests (Mugabe 
2012:internet). 
  
Again President Mugabe displayed a preferred statist interpretation of sovereignty. 
The state is sovereign, not the people. The country is independent, and not the 
people. The danger with this preference and interpretation is that the state overrides 
the preferences of individuals. Citizens risk being abused and left without recourse 
as was the case with OM. The state organs such as the military and police stand 
ready to defend state sovereignty even if it means abusing the people from who 
sovereignty is derived and authority to govern conferred. It can be argued that this 
was what happened during OM. The police were used to destroy human settlements 
in the name of state sovereignty (Mhiripiri 2008:150). In the same address of the 
2012 ZDF celebrations, Mugabe stated that: 
The Zimbabwe Defence Forces, in conjunction with other national security 
organs, have a responsibility to institute effective responsive solutions to such 
unjustified and provocative manoeuvres in the internal affairs of a sovereign 
state (Mugabe 2012:internet). 
 
It is evident that the GoZ and the Head of State boldly upholds state sovereignty 
over the sovereignty of the individuals who constitute that state. This upholding of 
state sovereignty is problematic because not only does it exclude foreign forces and 
elements from Zimbabwe‟s domestic processes, it excludes citizens who oppose and 
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are in disagreement with the government on political and governance issues. 
Chimedza (2008:100) argues that:  
One can be included as long as one agrees with this narrative and bows to its 
rituals like buying a ruling party [ZANU PF] card, participating in [ZANU PF] 
meetings voluntarily or otherwise and accepting that only the party of 
liberation, the ruling party, carries with it the „historic mission‟ of nation-building 
and defending „our‟ sovereignty. 
 
The statist interpretation of sovereignty implies that the citizens who do not agree 
with the status quo are excluded from active participation in the affairs of the state, 
which is their right. This development was confirmed by the online Zimbabwean 
newspaper, ZimOnline, on 14 July 2005, which reported that „28 members of Women 
of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) were arrested in June 2005 while protesting against 
Operation Murambatsvina‟. This demonstrates that state sovereignty can be abused 
and therefore stands in need of some mechanism(s) to ensure that the state does 
not abuse its own people, especially those who hold dissenting views. This is 
precisely the rationale behind the R2P doctrine. The doctrine of state sovereignty on 
its own is prone to abuse by the state. There is need for some accountability of 
sovereign states to the greater international community by way of the R2P doctrine. 
 
5.5.10 Sovereignty According to Government of Zimbabwe’s Officials 
 
It makes a worthwhile venture to analyse positions expressed and proffered 
generally by the GoZ‟s officials on the preservation of sovereignty. Of particular 
interest, are the views expressed by former Justice Minister in the GNU (2008-2013) 
Patrick Chinamasa (Minister of Finance at the time this research was undertaken).  
 
Chinamasa (2013:14) argued that: 
They [MDC] are puppets and we [ZANU PF] are revolutionaries! We want to 
maintain a pan African vision for our country and continent, and we want to 
align ourselves internationally with countries that respect the sovereign rights 
of others.  
 
This position resonates with the greater GoZ‟s position and the position is similar to 
what the President constantly dwells on. It emphasises Zimbabwe‟s position on 
sovereignty as a fundamental value of the nation‟s foreign policy. 
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ZANU (PF) is a party that led the liberation of Zimbabwe by violent means. 
Sovereignty born out of violent clashes and encounters shapes the interpretation that 
officials in ZANU (PF) hold. Consistent with the position of the GoZ and the Head of 
State, Chinamasa avers that: 
We will not compromise on principles … for us our bearings are very clear: to 
safeguard not only the sovereignty and hard-won independence of this country 
[Zimbabwe], but also the policies of indigenisation and economic 
emancipation.  
 
Sovereignty is often expressed with connotations of the liberation struggle and the 
„hard-won independence‟ brought by ZANU (PF). This gives the impression that only 
they [ZANU (PF)] are qualified to pronounce on what is sovereign or not.  It can be 
argued that this is equivalent to holding the nation at ransom in the name of 
liberation and independence. A question can be asked, Zimbabwe was liberated 
from the British, but for what? To be held at ransom by its [former] liberators? Put 
differently, Zimbabwe is said to be independent from Britain; but what is Zimbabwe 
independent for exactly given the brutality of OM for example? 
 
So far this chapter has tabled the core issues surrounding OM. More importantly, it 
has shown the link between sovereignty and independence in Zimbabwe. 
Zimbabwe‟s independence was a bitter struggle and war, and so sovereignty in the 
prism of the GoZ and its officials is closely linked with violence. OM was one such 
violent implementation of the GoZ‟s policies. Despite the draconian attitude 
portrayed by the government in its implementation of OM, it remains that in the 
international domain of politics, domestic sovereignty of states must be respected by 
other states. No sovereign state should interfere in the domestic affairs of another as 
guaranteed by international law. In the case of abuse by a government of its own 
people as was the case in OM, what recourse does the populace have? When does 
domestic sovereignty require international intervention? At this juncture this chapter 
will advance the argument that domestic sovereignty is a constituted concept of 
international sovereignty. The manner in which a government treats or ill-treats its 
population in the domestic arena impacts on its foreign policy as well. Domestic 
sovereignty is the one side of a coin, with the other side being international 
sovereignty. This is what constructivism entails when it refers to the constitution of 
terms. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed some impacts of OM on the general population of Zimbabwe 
and particularly on women and children as they are considered the vulnerable of 
society. It concludes that the GoZ in its implementation of OM violated international 
laws and agreements in terms of housing and providing security for its citizens. Even 
the doctrine of state sovereignty was not upheld by the GoZ as it failed to protect its 
citizens, from whom sovereign authority to govern is derived. Women and children 
are identified as a group in society that was more vulnerable and bore much of the 
burden of OM. 
 
OM disrupted human settlements and displaced societies. The disruption of societal 
living affected the health of people as they had no food security and those receiving 
treatment were, in the process, denied. 
 
The chapter also explored the position adopted by President Mugabe on the issue of 
sovereignty. It is evident that the Head of State prefers a state-centred definition of 
sovereignty. The state is sovereign more than the people from whom sovereign 
authority to govern is derived. In line with the GoZ‟s position, this chapter also 
exposed the biased nature of some government officials‟ preference of a statist 
interpretation of sovereignty at the expense of individual freedom and liberties. 
 
Ideally, the R2P doctrine should have been invoked as was suggested by O‟Connell 
(2011:76). It was not. This exposes the biased nature of the application of 
intervention by the „international community‟ and the UN. It could be argued that the 
bias is against Zimbabwe. 
 
Despite the politicisation of the R2P/sovereignty nexus, it remains that any 
government should be curbed in the event that it is unwilling to protect its citizens 
from whom authority to be sovereign and govern is derived.  
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Main Research Findings 
 
This section will provide the concluded positions of this research in light of the 
research questions it sought to answer. The main research question that it sought to 
answer was:  
Was Operation Murambatsvina justifiable under the doctrine of sovereignty as 
was insinuated and claimed by the GoZ?  
Despite the rationalisation and justification provided by the GoZ that OM was justified 
under the doctrine of state sovereignty, it breached the sovereign rights of the people 
of Zimbabwe. In the social contract between individuals and the state, the agreement 
is explicit, and sometimes tacit, that citizens will renounce their sovereign rights to 
the state. The state is the guarantor of all individual sovereign rights in a given state. 
In other words, citizens in fact ascend to being governed by the state on condition 
that it protects their sovereignty. In OM the GoZ displayed behaviour that is contrary 
to what it ought to have done, to protect its citizens‟ interests and livelihoods. The 
demolitions of housing as was done in OM, without the provision of alternative 
accommodation, was tantamount to state neglect and the deliberate antagonising of 
citizens by their own government. People‟s freedom of movement was disturbed as 
many were forcibly contained and restricted to rural areas. This behaviour was 
inconsistent with what the state purports to uphold under the CoZ. 
 
The argument provided by the GoZ that it was within its Sovereign mandate to carry 
out Operation Murambatsvina is rendered baseless by its one conflicting actions. In 
fact OM demonstrated that, contrary to such claims, the Government transgressed 
its citizens‟ sovereignty as it failed to offer protection of human life as obligated by its 
Constitution. The research also concludes that the justification provided by the 
Government was meant to censure international condemnation. Equally, the follow-
up OG/HK was a shoddy cover-up of abuses it committed and was an attempt at 
appeasing the international community given the condemnation of OM. It can be 
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concluded that OG/HK was also an attempt at normalising the strained interstate 
relations between the GoZ and the „international community‟ as it stood accused of 
human rights abuses in the implementation of OM. 
 
The implications of Zimbabwe‟s justification of Operation Murambatsvina suggests 
that its condemnation and critique of the R2P, while credible, was a way of 
maintaining the status quo in Zimbabwe, one that esteems a statist interpretation of 
sovereignty at the expense of individuals‟ sovereignty that the state ought to protect 
and preserve. Therefore Zimbabwe‟s critique of the R2P loses moral and ethical 
standing as it behaves like the „West‟ behaves towards the Global South, only it ill-
treated its own citizens in OM.  
 
This study concluded that the current status quo in international relations is a result 
of the theories that inform the conception of interstate phenomena. Realism seems 
to perpetuate the notion that each state governs itself without being answerable to 
any other. The GoZ seemingly favoured this conception of interstate phenomena in 
its OM. It suited the interests of the GoZ to argue and highlight the exclusive 
elements of state sovereignty. This position, however, constituted abuse of the 
individual sovereign rights of the people of Zimbabwe. It should be emphasised that 
this position is also impossible to defend in this global age. The precarious position 
that the doctrine of sovereignty has been subjected to compels for a paradigm shift 
in the conception of interstate phenomena. This paradigm shift is better espoused by 
the theory of constructivism.  
 
The international publicising of OM could be attributed to forces of globalisation 
because the phenomenon trans-crossed Zimbabwe‟s political borders. Despite the 
preferred position of the GoZ‟s exclusivist interpretation of sovereignty, the media, 
civil society organisations and INGOs played a crucial role in exposing the abuses 
that the GoZ committed in OM. The forces of globalisation aided the international 
community to get involved with the situation of many victims of OM through 
humanitarian work and assistance. The masking of the political intentions of the GoZ 
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was uncontainable, to the discredit of realism that seemed to inform the position of 
the GoZ on the interpretation of sovereignty. 
 
Realism perpetuates the idea of anarchy in international politics, as was 
demonstrated by the GoZ‟s OM. The lack of tangible intervention by the UN attested 
to its limitations in maintaining global order. The UN did not invoke the R2P in 2005 
even as their own Tibaijuka indicated gross human rights violations in Zimbabwe‟s 
OM. It can be argued that this indicates the biased nature and selective application 
of R2P and therefore the abuse of R2P. Therefore, realism maintains the status quo 
in international politics. The GoZ, supported by the conception of interstate political 
phenomena as proffered by realism seemed to make a compelling argument that it 
was none of any state‟s business what happened in Zimbabwe during OM. The 
position that the GoZ adopted on highlighting the exclusive notions of sovereignty 
gave credence to, and affirmation of the perception that, realism maintains the status 
quo of anarchy in the global political environment.  
 
At face value, liberalism seems to esteem individual sovereign rights of citizens. 
However, the limitation there is on liberalism is that the so-called „liberal states‟ 
seemed to deal heavy-handedly with what they perceived as non-liberal state, in this 
case Zimbabwe. The inconsistency in the behaviour of some „liberal states‟, 
particularly the USA, suggests that there still exist some discrepancies in the 
pragmatic application of liberal values. This further suggests that possibly liberalism 
has nothing to do with principles because principles do not change because of 
circumstances; principles should be above and beyond circumstances. The selective 
application of liberal values by some so-called liberal states elicits scorn on, the 
otherwise good, theory of interstate phenomena. Instead of helping the suffering 
victims of OM, the US government maintained so-called „smart‟ or „targeted‟ 
sanctions of Zimbabwe even at the height of OM. The sanctions crippled the 
economy that was already under a lot of strain. 
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On the other hand constructivism advances the notion of sincere negotiation. 
Constructivism accepts that concepts are constituted. In other words one aspect of 
sovereignty is constituted by another; thereby suggesting and validating the 
possibility of interpreting sovereignty differently, one state from the other. 
Constructivism is open to change and can explain change in conception and practice 
and therefore is best suited for analysing social phenomena and it is fluid and 
changes. 
 
The doctrine of sovereignty in essence is an instrument for national security. It is 
meant to ascribe authority to a democratically-elected government to act on behalf of 
citizenry‟s protection and preservation. Since the sovereign are individuals, it is 
incumbent on any democratically-elected government to pursue policies that 
preserve and protect individuals‟ sovereign rights. According to the doctrine of state 
sovereignty, the GoZ is guilty of not upholding the principles of sovereignty. The 
protection of individuals‟ sovereign rights can never be over-emphasised.   
 
The doctrine of state sovereignty does not justify any government‟s abuse of citizens 
whatsoever. Instead, the doctrine of sovereignty emphasises responsibility on the 
part of the state over its citizens. It is the sovereign right of citizens to receive state 
protection as it is the state‟s obligation to provide security, preservation and 
protection of human life of the citizens. Despite the invocation of the GoZ that OM 
was carried out on the justification of state sovereignty, it remains an invalid excuse. 
The justification that OM was within the margins of state sovereignty constitutes 
further abuse of the doctrine of state sovereignty by the GoZ. 
 
Assessing OM against the CoLH (1979:17), Declaration of Rights Section C 1.1, 1.2, 
and Section 2.1, the GoZ failed to protect human life. It can be argued that it is rather 
absurd given that this Constitution was negotiated by the Patriotic Front of which 
ZANU (PF) was a part, and the constitution came out boldly and strongly on the 
upholding of principles of sovereignty. It was precisely because of sovereign power 
to protect and to provide security for its people that the PF went to the war of 
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liberation in the first place. At the LHC sovereignty was sturdily emphasised by the 
PF; now that the GoZ has sovereign power and authority, this surely cannot be 
justifiable that it abuses, kills and tortures its own people as it did during OM. 
 
Sovereignty according to the GoZ is a violent taking of its destiny from the coloniser 
and anyone who seems to stand in its way. It is not necessarily to preserve the lives 
of individuals who are truly sovereign. The individuals must conform to what the state 
decides is right, not the other way. The creation of state is precisely to govern 
between individuals in society, but seemingly the GoZ seems to erroneously suggest 
that the state is served by the individuals. 
 
When judged against the UN definition of sovereignty, and its cause to engage in the 
liberation struggle for independence in the first place and its own understanding of 
sovereignty, the GoZ failed in OM to provide security and protection for its people - a 
corollary of state sovereignty. 
 
In this study, it emerged that violence was used to subjugate and rule between 
kingdoms in pre-colonial Zimbabwe. It was also used to govern Zimbabwe during the 
colonial era. Violence was used by the African nationalists to achieve Zimbabwe‟s 
independence from Britain. Violence has been continually used to „govern‟ and keep 
a grip on power in post-independence Zimbabwe. This suggests that the GoZ‟s 
understanding of sovereignty is intrinsically linked to the struggle for independence 
which was achieved by violent means. It is likely that it will continue to be used as a 
tool of statecraft by the ZANU (PF)-led government in Zimbabwe. Despite the fact 
that colonialism was by violent means, and the struggle for liberation of Zimbabwe 
was equally violent; violence cannot be justified as a tool to govern the affairs of 
sovereign people. That would be a breach of the doctrine of state sovereignty which 
the GoZ used as a justification of the violent OM. The African nationalists in 
Zimbabwe (during Rhodesian rule) were denied sovereign equality and individual 
sovereignty. Rightly so, they had to demand and literally take their sovereign destiny 
from the hands of the oppressors. One would anticipate that given their experience 
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of being denied their sovereign rights, they would not deliberately deny others their 
individual sovereign rights, especially if those people were their own people. OM 
proved that the GoZ denied their own people individual sovereignty which they ought 
to have protected and preserved in the first place. 
 
OM was a military-style operation to enforce bylaws of local municipalities and city 
councils. While these municipal bylaws were supposed to have been observed, the 
simultaneous implementation in all major towns suggested that the national 
government was behind the suspicious operation. National government‟s failure at 
providing decent and affordable housing, economic management, social coercion did 
not warrant the sudden implementation of bylaws that were supposed to have been 
observed already.  
The use of the police force and army personnel suggests the involvement of national 
of government. This gives further credence to the observation that OM was instituted 
by the government, in the name of sovereignty and as a tool for national security. It 
is debatable whether or not the objectives of OM were met. According to 
government, through its representatives, the objectives were met. They managed to 
arrest chaos and disorder in most residential and market places around the major 
cities. However, the objectives were met by further compounding social, political and 
economic problems emanating from decades of mismanagement and corruption. 
 
According to the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2000) operational at the time of OM, the 
GoZ contravened Chapter III, Sections 12, 13, 15 and 16 as it failed to protect 
human life in the execution of OM. When further judged against the amended ZC of 
2005, the year OM was carried out, under Chapter III, Section 12.1, Section 12.2 and 
Section 13 again the GoZ stands in direct contravention of what it professed and 
declared in its own constitution. When assessed against the CoZ (2013), Chapter 2, 
Sections 15, 19, 21, 25 and 28, and Chapter 4 Part 2 Section 48, 49, 52 and 66, as 
well as Part 3 Section 80 and 81 the GoZ is equally in contravention of the rule of 
law. It stands in direct contravention of the Constitution as it failed to provide 
protection and security for human life in its OM. 
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Given the housing shortages in Zimbabwe pre-OM, the GoZ had no ethical base to 
carry out OM. It was equally unethical, if not utter cruelty, to not provide alternative 
accommodation to victims of OM. It can be concluded that OM was an illegal 
operation given that it transgressed on the very constitution of Zimbabwe, that the 
GoZ and the generality of the population of Zimbabwe ought to uphold and obey. 
 
It is debateable whether or not the sovereignty doctrine is compatible with the R2P 
doctrine or vice versa. The doctrine of sovereignty is affirmed by the UN in its 
Charter, articles 2(1), 2(7) and 78. The ICISS is a clear indication that sovereignty is 
the status quo. In other words, despite its limitations the doctrine of sovereignty is a 
necessary component in international political affairs. The R2P doctrine in some 
sense is an affirmation of the doctrine of sovereignty. It emphasises that the 
responsibility to protect lies with a sovereign government. Only if that government is 
unwilling or unable could that responsibility be assigned to the „international 
community‟ of states. Therefore the sovereignty/R2P nexus does not necessarily 
constitute a logical lacuna. However, the R2P should be guarded against powerful 
states that could abuse smaller and weaker states for their own agendas. In its 
current form the „international community‟ is not defined. This could cause problems 
as who exactly should act in cases where a determination regarding the application 
of R2P has been made. 
 
6.2 Recommendations 
 
As discussed in Chapters One, Three and Five, it can be argued that the UN is viewed 
as panacea to the Global South in general and Africa in particular. Further, it can be 
suggested that the UN is even seen as an imperialist tool which seems to represent 
super-powers (America and NATO) in the view of some African Governments. This 
suggests that the UNSC needs reform. This research would strongly recommend that 
African countries should constitute the UNSC as this is the most influential component 
of the UNGA and Africa has the majority of countries that constitute the UN. This 
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move is likely to ensure that African views and perspectives are well represented in 
line with contemporary international norms such as democratic principles and 
representation. The African countries that will constitute the Security Council should 
be vested with veto power as other permanent members of the UNSC. This is likely to 
ensure that African leaders together with their counterparts in the UNSC can also 
decide and call upon, recommend and in the final instance authorise the application of 
R2P. 
 
R2P is under-developed; there is need for scholarship to engage more in the debate 
on issues and concerns surrounding it. An extensive consultative dialogue on the 
conceptualisation of R2P that encompasses all governments of sovereign states must 
be held so as to include every stakeholder concerned. The UN in its diplomatic ties 
with member-states should carry out an exercise to gather views and concerns of the 
third world countries especially as they are the ones who perceive themselves as 
targeted by super-powers (America and NATO). Should any concerns arise, they 
should be satisfactorily addressed. 
 
R2P is some form of a mitigating factor on state abuse. OM was determined to be 
one such case of state abuse on civilians and citizens of Zimbabwe. There is need 
for citizens‟ education on tools and methods of appeal in cases of state abuse. The 
UN and civil society organisations should take a leading role in citizens‟ education 
especially the concept of R2P. It is considered to be victim-centred and oriented, it 
therefore should be disseminated to citizens so that, if need be, they can invoke and 
call for the application of R2P in their domains. This further suggests a need to carry 
out feasibility studies on the pragmatic implications of civilians calling for the 
application of R2P in their domains since it is primarily state-centred in its 
formulation. 
 
6.3 Summary 
 
Chapter One introduced the study and rationale behind the formulation of this study. 
The background and problem statement compelling the investigation and discussion 
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of this study were identified. The methodology used in this study was also stated, and 
the research questions formulated. Chapter one also defined the key concepts that 
constitute this study. Limitations that surround this study were also identified and a 
chapter outline was given. 
 
In Chapter Two, this work explored three major international relations theories; namely 
realism, liberalism and constructivism. In this chapter, an analysis of the three theories 
revealed the importance of constructivism as the best theory to discuss the concept of 
sovereignty, which in itself is a social construct. The chapter also identified that 
constructivism as a theory is best designed to investigate socially constructed realities 
such as sovereignty and R2P. 
 
Chapter Three of the study alluded to what OM was about, a violent phase 
perpetrated by the GoZ on its people. Chapter three also defined what sovereignty is 
and how its doctrine came into being. The chapter also explored an intervention 
mechanism, the R2P doctrine, in the event that a government abuses its state 
sovereignty. The chapter also discussed the dangers that are embedded in the R2P 
doctrine as super-powers such as the USA, have in the past used such intervention 
strategies for their own national interests other than the interests of the „international 
community‟ or for the greater good for all. 
 
Chapter Four demonstrated that in history of the Zimbabwe state systems from pre-
colonial times through to colonialism and the fight for Zimbabwean independence right 
through to independence and post-independence, sovereignty was pursued by violent 
means. Violence has been used post-independence by the GoZ as a tool of 
governance. Sovereignty has been crafted through the lens and prism of violence in 
Zimbabwe. OM was a violent act not unique in that the GoZ previously and repeatedly 
carried out acts of violence on its own people as a way of maintaining grip to power. 
OM was just another of those episodes to consolidating ZANU (PF)‟s waning 
popularity. OM violated what state sovereignty stands for, therefore the GoZ violated 
the very doctrine that they insinuate informed the carrying out of OM. 
 
Chapter Five identified some of the effects that OM had on the general population of 
Zimbabwe. It noted that ordinary people were made destitute by their own government 
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which was supposed to protect their sovereignty and ultimately that of the state. The 
GoZ violated several international laws and its national laws in its implementation of 
OM. The Constitution of Zimbabwe, particularly the one last amended in the year 2000 
was disregarded in the implementation of OM. 
 
Chapter Six stated the main research findings and offered a few recommendations on 
the way forward on the R2P doctrine as it remains an important tool to avert disasters 
and dissuade governments from abusing and holding its own people at ransom as 
was the case with Zimbabwe‟s OM in 2005. 
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